Confronting family poverty and social exclusion
Ensuring work–family balance
Advancing social integration and intergenerational solidarity
In North America

North American Expert Group Meeting
Convened as part of preparations for the Twentieth Anniversary of the International Year of the Family (2014)
In cooperation with the Focal Point on the Family (United Nations DESA)

Mexico City
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The Expert Group Meeting convened in Mexico City on 19-20 May 2014 was held as part of celebrations for the Twentieth Anniversary of the International Year of the Family. Experts and practitioners from the three countries discussed about the proposals for recommendations of social policies that should be promoted from United Nations. The outcomes, in particular its conclusions and recommendations, will further guide the follow-up of the Twentieth Anniversary and will be used as inputs to the upcoming reports of the Secretary-General on family issues.

The Meeting was organized International Federation for Family Development (IFFD), a non–governmental, independent, and non–profit federation, founded in 1978. Its activities consist of family enrichment courses organized in 65 countries of the five continents, with a participative methodology based in the case study method. IFFD collaborates in local, national and international institutions to promote and protect family values. It holds general consultative status with the Economic and Social Committee of the United Nations.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The importance of the stability of the family – “the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members” – becomes increasingly evident as the negative consequences of its absence continue to relentlessly manifest themselves. “Stable and healthy families are the foundation of strong societies, when family breakdown, the costs are high, societies suffer and the role of government tends to expand.”

Since 1978, the International Federation for Family Development (IFFD) has been working to promote and support different kinds of initiatives which aim to bolster and strengthen the family. Our experience in family matters has shown us time and again that the best solution is not to replace families’ social functions, either via the state or other institutions, but to try to support and empower families to carry out these functions in their own right. “Governments cannot afford to fully replace the functions families perform for the benefit of their members and for the good of society. The family is the most powerful, the most humane and, by far, the most economical system known for building competence and character. Still, families do better in a supportive policy environment—one in which, for example, schools actively seek parental engagement; employers recognize that workers are also family members; agencies and organizations are family-centered in their philosophy and operation; and laws support family members’ roles as caregivers, parents, partners, and workers. A vital role remains for government to supplement and complement the private investments families make. Policies and programs, along with community institutions and societal norms and values, shape the extent to which families can fulfill their functions and develop new capabilities when challenged to do so.”

In other words, state intervention is effective when it does not replace the family, but rather plays a role in designing policy and public assistance programs, because it can no longer be taken for granted that couples will decide to have children. For various reasons, it is important to reward, in some measure, those people who do decide to have and bring up children, in contrast with those who prefer not to and therefore have more resources. Both groups will end up benefitting in equal measures from the future of these children, who will eventually become the professionals needed to ensure that society continues to function and, in many cases, that the fiscal system remains balanced. The time, effort and money that families invest in their children should receive some form of

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2 Concept Note for the Doha International Conference on the Family, 16-17 April 2014.
social and economic return from the society that will benefit from it, via political measures that encourage and reward the ‘generosity’ of these families. On the other hand, as well as a context that promotes maternity, it is also necessary to have guarantees of stability, as the example of France demonstrates.

IFFD has participated in the preparation of several documents in United Nations. We have also contributed to the 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family by organizing, in conjunction with the UN Focal Point on the Family, Expert Meetings and other events in Spain, Poland, Belgium, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico, and have coordinated other events and activities in the headquarters in New York and Geneva, including the official celebration of this Anniversary.

IFFD has also carried out several communication projects to promote the family perspective in governments and international organizations, and has set up a website with all the relevant information about the 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family: www.familyperspective.org.

A. FAMILY POLICY IN THE UN CONTEXT

The IFFD, in cooperation with the United Nations DESA Focal Point on the Family have organizing a North American Expert Group Meeting under the theme of ‘Confronting family poverty and social exclusion; ensuring work–family balance; advancing social integration and intergenerational solidarity in North America.’ The meeting was convened as part of celebrations for the Twentieth Anniversary of the International Year of the Family, 2014.

One of the objectives of the 1994 International Year of the Family (IYF) and its follow-up processes is a sustained, long-term effort to strengthen national institutions to formulate, implement and monitor policies in respect of families. In its resolutions 62/129 (2007) and 60/133 (2005), the General Assembly has encouraged Governments to continue to make every possible effort to integrate a family perspective into national policymaking. In particular, the General Assembly recommended that the United Nations agencies and bodies, intergovernmental and non–governmental institutions, research and academic institutions and the private sector play a supportive role in promoting the objectives of the International Year and contribute to developing strategies and programmes aimed at strengthening national capacities. The 2010 General Assembly resolution4 encouraged member States to adopt holistic approaches to policies and programmes that confront family poverty and social exclusion and invited Member States to stimulate public debate and consultations on family–oriented and gender– and child–sensitive social protection policies.

4 A/RES/64/133.
One of the Economic and Social Council’s resolutions on the ‘Preparations for an observance of the Twentieth Anniversary of the International Year of the Family’\(^5\) noted the importance of designing, implementing and monitoring family–oriented policies, especially in the areas of poverty eradication, full employment and decent work, work family balance, social integration and intergenerational solidarity. The resolution further encouraged Member States to continue their efforts to develop appropriate policies to address family poverty, social exclusion and work–family balance and share good practices in those areas.

In addition, the resolution adopted in July 2012\(^6\) invited ‘Member–States, non–governmental organizations and academic institutions to support, as appropriate, the preparations for regional meetings in observance of the Twentieth Anniversary of the International Year of the Family.’

The Expert Group Meeting was convened in response to above mentioned resolutions.

**B. Family policies**

Like family itself, family policy is not easy to define. Family policies differ in content, scope and target. Some define it broadly as Government’s actions to benefit the family. Family–friendly policies can also be enacted by private institutions and come from civil society organizations. Often family policies benefit only families with children while those caring for adults, e.g. older persons are thus excluded. Frequently, family policies are also confined to economic issues, disregarding other aspects of family functioning.

Implicitly, family perspective in policymaking considers the impact of policies and programmes on the well–being of families, including family stability, its economic prosperity and the ability to carry out its numerous functions. Explicit family policies aim to support family well–being directly, e.g. through the provision of child benefits or tax incentives.

It has been often observed that family policy should aim to help families perform their various functions, including economic support, childrearing, nurturing and educational roles as well as caregiving to all family members, young and old. To support those functions, policies should aim at reducing family poverty and social exclusion; ensure minimum standards of social protection; prevent intergenerational transmission of poverty; focus on multiple aspects of child well–being; attempt to reconcile work and family life, as well as support intergenerational strengths and various care arrangements within the family.

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\(^5\) 2011/29.

\(^6\) 2012/10.
The assessment of family policies at national and regional levels is necessary in order to improve policy performance. Despite the need for evidence-based design, implementation and monitoring of family-oriented policies, there have been but a few attempts to assess them in a comprehensive way. A recent assessment has been provided by an OECD team of researchers who compiled a comprehensive list of indicators including the provision of family-related leaves, early childhood education and care and family benefits as well as work–family reconciliation programmes provided by employers within a framework of three main family policy goals: child wellbeing, gender equality, and balancing of work and family life.

There is a need for more assessments of this nature to inform policy makers of the effects of social policies and family policies in particular on the well-being of families at national and regional levels. It is especially important in the context of current disconnect between research and policy.

C. CONFRONTING FAMILY POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

Family-oriented and gender—and child-sensitive social protection policies addressing family poverty and reducing the vulnerability of younger and older generations have been increasingly mainstreamed in the overall development efforts. In particular, income transfer programmes sustaining the poorest families are indispensable to changing the structure of opportunities and are key to reducing the intergenerational transfer of poverty and inequality.

Family benefits such as child allowances and social assistance play an important role in addressing short term experiences of poverty, and going some way to stopping families employing their savings or using debt. For longer term solutions to poverty risks, investments designed to equip families with the necessary skills and tools for good and sustainable employment are necessary.

The vast majority of jobless families, in all of the developed countries, will live in poverty due to the low levels of welfare benefits in developed countries. Although increasing these benefits may create a new set of welfare dependency problems, and paying above poverty rates for any significant length of time might be undesirable (benefits could be reduced over a period to increase work incentives, whilst effectively combating poverty risks in short periods outside of the labour market), higher levels of cash benefits are undeniably one way to reduce poverty risk in the short term.

To complement short term poverty reduction strategies through cash benefits, strategies such as employment support programs in high unemployment areas, or in–work training, or targeted minimum wage legislation, in areas with high levels of in–work poverty, are more likely to lower poverty rates in the medium term.
The first Millennium Development Goal established by the General Assembly was to reduce extreme poverty and hunger, including the reduction in social exclusion. In that regard, still 1,000 days are left to the 2015 target date for the MDGs. Now, the post–2015 UN development agenda, with the definition of the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), should maintain the focus on human development.⁷ A number of developing countries in Asia have been narrowing the gap in living standards vis-à-vis developed countries. Others, especially in Africa, have fallen further behind. The number of the world’s poor living on less than $1.25 a day decreased from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 1.3 billion in 2008.⁸ There have been progress in poverty reduction, but major inequalities persist. International income inequalities can be measured by comparing the GDP per capita between countries and between individuals.

Poverty and inequalities in North America are persistent. While we can find countries with citizens living in poverty and social inclusion, there exist also countries where inequalities are not just economic problems that directly affect the most disadvantaged and excluded persons, but also issues relating to natural disasters, personal security, access to natural resources, discrimination, including discrimination against migrants, denial of human rights and social exclusion.

In Canada, ‘L’Aquila Summit Commitment’ helped to double investments in support of sustainable agricultural development.⁹ Other programs such as the ‘Scaling Up Nutrition Movement’ and the ‘Muskoka Initiative’ has helped to triple the investments in basic nutrition between 2006–2007 and 2011–2012.

Different studies have shown how the strength of the family is a core value that can reduce or increase family poverty. Child Trends, a NGO based in Washington, has shown how the family structure is a key factor that influence family poverty. Another study done by The Heritage Foundation, shows how stable marriage contributes to child poverty reduction. The Institute for American Values in partnership with the National Fatherhood Initiative and the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, published a report, awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, through which many politicians, academics and representatives of civil society can engage in the public discourse about the role of family and marriage in public policy and in reducing poverty. This study shows how a growing consensus of family scholars confirms that family matters in reducing poverty.

The Innocenti Research Centre, established in Italy in 1988 by the United Nations Children’s Fund, has advocated for children worldwide with the ‘Innocenti Report Card’ publications. In its issue number 6, we found how United States and Mexico are at the bottom

⁷ ‘Realizing the Future We Want for all’, Report to the Secretary-General, New York, June 2012, page 9.
⁹ Canada announced it at the G8 2009 L’Aquila Summit in July 2009.
of the ‘child poverty league’, with child poverty rates of more than 20 per cent. It is also an evidence how spending on family and social benefits is clearly associated with lower child poverty rates. United States is one of the few OECD countries to have an official definition of poverty and a long record of regularly publishing a wide range of poverty and inequality indicators, including information on children. In 1990, an all–party resolution committed the government of Canada to “seek to eliminate child poverty by the year 2000”.

In Mexico, ‘Oportunidades’ Program is the principal anti–poverty program of the Mexican government. This program helps poor families in rural and urban communities invest in human capital, improving education, health and nutrition of their children. The aim of this program is to improve the economic future of those families and therefore the poverty reduction in Mexico.

D. ENSURING WORK–FAMILY BALANCE

Balancing work and family life is a critical challenge in countries around the world continuously shaped by various economic, demographic and social factors. Jobs are becoming more complex with longer working hours. The needs of employees with family obligations are often ignored and families find it more and more difficult to balance their family responsibilities with the requirements of their jobs.

Comprehensive legal and policy frameworks balancing work and family life should be established to encourage shared responsibilities between family members, the State, the private sector and the society at large. Such policies may range from parental leave to child benefits and access to quality and affordable childcare. Flexibility of working hours and working place, professional support and advice and efforts to create a more family–friendly culture in the workplace are equally important.

As the labour market participation of women has increased, governments and employers in many parts of the world, have ‘stepped forward’ to find ways to support work–family balance at key family transition points such as childbirth, having young children, or caring for sick and elderly kin. Similarly enlightened employers have become aware of the benefits of a flexible and human response when employees have family crises such as illness, stress or bereavement. Many of the basic provisions reviewed, such as maternity, paternity and parental leave and early childhood education and care have emerged in richer nations, but not exclusively so. In other countries very little progress has been made on work–family balance or family–friendly initiatives with negative consequences for employee health and wellbeing, gender equality and child well–being.

There is now a critical mass of research evidence showing the benefits of work–family reconciliation measures. The negative impact of poor quality job conditions on individual workers and their families have been documented by research. Similarly, evidence indi-
cating that long working hours put workers’ health and relationships at risk has emerged. This especially affects vulnerable groups of employees, and those without kin help for the essential daily care of dependents and domestic responsibilities.

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The Pew Research Center, a think tank based in Washington, have researched how mothers and fathers spend their time and how the way they spend it has changed dramatically in the past half century in United States. Since 1965, mothers have almost tripled the amount of paid work they do each week, but they still lag fathers who work, on average, 37 hours a week. Meanwhile, fathers have increased their housework and childcare time, but still only do about half of what mothers do.

In most two–parent households today, both parents work at least part time. Roughly equal shares of working moms and working dads say it is difficult to balance work and family responsibilities. Fully 40 per cent of working mothers and 34 per cent of working fathers say they “always feel rushed.” As we can see, work–family balance nowadays in North America is far from meeting what families desire and more efforts are needed. Since the start of the recession, the share of moms who prefer to work full time has increased significantly. Tough economic times may have ushered in a new mindset, as women in the most difficult financial circumstances are among the most likely to say working full time is the ideal situation for them.

United States appears to have low level of political commitment to the well–being of families, lacking even the guarantee of unpaid leave to all workers. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is the first and only federal parental leave legislation since 1993, although some states have implemented programs that make parental leave more accessible. This legislation offers twelve unpaid workweeks of leave and requires employers to provide job–protected unpaid leave for certain family and medical reasons, including pregnancy, childbirth, adoption etc... This legislation is limited to employees who have worked for at least twelve months at the same job. Other studies, such as the one from the Center on Children and Families at Brookings, shows how many moderately–educated Americans, especially high school–educated men, are left with jobs that provide markedly less stability and lower real wages than the jobs their parents enjoyed prior to the 1970s, causing less stability in families and even less commitment to have a family. For that, policy responses such as an increase in training for middle–skill jobs and an expansion of the child tax credit could help families in their struggle between work and family formation.
In Canada, such benefits as family allowances and maternity leave have long been directed to families. The situation of work–family balance is better than in the US, although some workplaces have long talked about creating better work–life balance for their employees. One–third of Canadians feel they have more work to do than time permits. That number rises to 40 per cent when family roles are taken into account.

Comprehensive legal and policy frameworks balancing work and family life should be established to encourage shared responsibilities between family members, the State, the private sector and the society at large. Such policies may range from parental leave to child benefits and access to quality and affordable childcare. Flexibility of working hours and working place, professional support and advice and efforts to create a more family–friendly culture in the workplace are equally important. Canada is a federal country and each province has different policies in this area. Of the Provinces, Québec arguably has the most comprehensive mix of family–friendly policies, including childcare and out–of–school childcare support, in–work benefits for parents, and paternity leave. However, affordability and quality in childcare remains an issue across Canada. Particularly vulnerable are sole parents, whose childcare costs are amongst the highest in the OECD. Providing greater investment in childcare would both reduce costs of childcare to parents and increase the quality of service, with positive effects on child development.

In Mexico, nearly 29 per cent of employees work very long hours, one of the highest levels in the OECD where the average is 9 per cent. In Mexico, more public support to families with children is needed. Mexico has the highest child poverty rate in the OECD. Child–related leave entitlements are limited. Maternity leave, although paid at 100 per cent, lasts just 12 weeks and only covers women in formal employment. No other form of parental leave, including for fathers, is available. Efforts to increase childcare (Programa de Estancias Infantiles para Madres Trabajadoras) and pre–school enrolment rates (by implementing compulsory pre–school education) have translated into higher participation rates. But more can be done as childcare enrolment rates among under–3’s remain considerably low (6 per cent compared with an OECD average of 31 per cent), and access to high quality and affordable care is central for facilitating parental employment.

Gender gaps in paid and unpaid work in Mexico are among the largest in the OECD area. Female employment rates, though modestly increasing, are the lowest in the OECD after Turkey (43 per cent of Mexican women are in paid work compared to an OECD average of 60 per cent). At home, Mexican women spend 4 hours per day more on unpaid work than men. Gender roles clearly constitute a barrier to women’s and Mexico’s economic opportunities.

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10 2012 National Study on Balancing Work and Caregiving in Canada.
11 OECD Better Life Index.
12 OECD Better Life Index.
E. ADVANCING SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

Intergenerational solidarity is critical for families and societies. Families are units where values are learned, culture is transmitted, and children learn relationship skills (Mitts, N. 2003). As such, they are the foundation of our global society. Intergenerational solidarity has been defined as bonding between and among individuals in multigenerational family networks and among different age cohorts in the larger community (Bengtson and Oyama, 2010). In recent times where the organization of our social and institutional structures has been increasingly along age-specific divisions which segregate one generation from another (e.g. schools are for the young, adults concentrate in work places, and seniors congregate in retirement communities), family is noted as probably the only ‘truly age integrated’ institution (Hagestad and Uhlenberg, 2005, 2006). While intergenerational relationships within the family are key, they are also fundamental to the well-being of the larger community and societies at large.

Policies and programmes promoting sound intergenerational relations and intergenerational solidarity play an important role in contributing to effective public policy by promoting social cohesion, national unity and shared responsibility (Hatton–Yeo, 2002). Intergenerational programmes also play a key role in supporting positive relations between generations. They provide a platform for developing positive relationships across age groups and have been shown to strengthen the quality of ties between family members (Thang, 2006).

Unfortunately the structure of many policies, programmes and services is often agebased. This age-graded approach is not always conducive to intergenerational harmony and generational integration. Such policy approaches are also reflected in the training of professional groups which is normally age segmented rather than life-course based, which creates further dislocation between the planning and delivery of services for people of different ages.

In a similar vein, family policy is often narrowly focused on families with children. With the advent of nuclear families, it also often narrowly restricts its scope to parents and children only. These policies seek to strengthen the family but in reality have weakened the extended family by excluding grandparents and other relatives. In an ageing society, governments and civil society are challenged to broaden the scope of policies to reflect longer life spans and changing roles and demands on each generation of a family.

The social integration of older people becomes more and more important especially nowadays as many retirees’ income have become an essential economic source for their home and immediate families and relatives. Their social integration can be advanced through a variety of social benefits and volunteer programmes.
Social integration and intergenerational solidarity concerns not just grandparents’–grandchildren relationships or older–young people relationships in the society, but also relationships between parents and their children. Investing today in good relationships between them, will benefit their social integration and intergenerational solidarity in the future.

Initiatives aimed at promoting intergenerational solidarity and cooperation encompass a variety of social protection schemes targeting the older and younger persons within families. At a community level, youth and older person’s volunteer programmes are being implemented to bring generations closer together. Similarly, investing in cross-generational community centres has been found to increase the level of interactions between the generations. In the work-place, programmes promoting intergenerational communication through job–sharing and mentoring opportunities aim at improving both interactions between employees and their overall productivity.

The vision of moving toward a ‘society for all ages’, a concept formulated for the 1999 International Year of Older Persons and a critical component of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging (MIPAA), is one that has been embraced by many around the world. This is due in part to the major impact of the longevity revolution on individuals, families and communities as well as on the nature of age relations. The traditional family pyramid with more youth supporting elders is changing to an inverse pyramid that has two generations of older adults depending on fewer children. Economic, employment, urbanization and migration trends are threatening intergenerational ties and contributing to age–segregation in many societies. Individuals in both developed and developing countries are experiencing an eroding web of support that has deleterious consequences for all age groups. A recent report by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs underscores the importance of strengthening intergenerational solidarity through initiatives aimed at promoting “mutual, productive exchange between generations, focusing on older persons as a societal resource”.

In an effort to take the concept of a society for all ages to a more local and concrete level, in 2002 the Temple University Center for Intergenerational Learning in Philadelphia developed Communities for All Ages (CFAA) – a holistic framework for community building that promotes the wellbeing of children, youth, and older adults, strengthens families, and fosters interaction and interdependence across ages. CFAA is both a vision and a life span approach to community building. It focuses on improving the quality of life for entire communities, not specific age groups, and transforming varied age groups from competitors to allies.

The American Association of Retired Persons in United States, dedicated to enhancing quality of life for old people, provides a wide range of unique benefits, special products and services for all its members. Their non–profit foundation ‘AARP Foundation’ tries to reduce poverty among vulnerable low–income American over 50 years old through empowerment programs for older people. In their study done in March 2012’ through two
grandparenting studies, they showed how important are older people in their roles of: grandchildren carers, grandchildren communicators, shapers of next family generation, grandchildren counselors and consumer agents in goods and daycare services, etc...

Intergenerational Citizens Action Forum in Miami, Florida encourages high school–aged youth and older adult volunteers to come together to learn about public policy issues of mutual concern and, in a non–partisan effort, work to effect public policy change. Older adults serve as mentors to the students and help them to organize town meetings that address issues such as Social Security reform, crime and environmental protection. After the intergenerational teams define and prioritize critical issues to address, they receive training in how to conduct advocacy campaigns, and then initiate a community organizing campaign aimed at promoting desired community changes.

The establishment, in the United States, of Generations United, as the national agency supporting intergenerational initiatives, provided the opportunity to contact a spokesperson in Washington DC capable of promoting IPs (Intergenerational Programs) and lobbying for legislative support for the issue.

F. Objectives and Outcomes

The primary objective of the Meeting was to provide Member States and other stakeholders with expert opinion and recommendations regarding confronting family poverty and social exclusion; ensuring work–family balance and advancing social integration.

Experts dealing with various aspects of family policy were invited from a broad geographical distribution to participate in the meeting in their personal capacities. They were asked to provide a paper, participate in group discussions and give their expert opinion and policy recommendations on the best ways of integrating family perspective into overall policy making and developing family policies in the areas of poverty reduction, work–family balance and intergenerational solidarity in Europe. The experts are also expected to provide specific recommendations and examples of good practices in the three areas mentioned above.

Among the outcomes, papers by experts focused on the proposed issues, explained their relevance, provided quantitative and qualitative evidence, analyzed the roles of social institutions, summarized conclusions and provided policy recommendations. In as much as possible, an emphasis was placed on policy actions at the local, national, regional and international levels. This final report of the expert group meeting as well as expert papers has been used as an input for the 2014 Report of the Secretary-General on the preparations for and observance of the twentieth anniversary of the International Year of the Family, submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty–eighth session.

The report and experts’ papers have been also posted on the twentieth anniversary of the International Year of the Family website www.familyperspective.org.
In this commentary we discuss the association between social exclusion, social capital, and socioeconomic mobility among America’s poor, and how economically and racially privileged individuals and groups participate in marginalizing this population. We render three arguments. First, we contend that social capital is a key process in mitigating the effects of social exclusion as cause and consequence of poverty and is thus a critical resource for disadvantaged families seeking socioeconomic mobility (Brady 2009; Lin 2000; Silver 1994; Wilson 1987). Second, we argue, as has Prus (1987) and Schwalbe et al., (2000), that beyond the common macro–level sources of social exclusion (e.g., institutional racism) that contribute to poverty in the U.S., there are micro–level processes that govern social interactions both within and between groups of the “haves and the have–nots” that also shape poverty outcomes. These exclusion–laden processes preclude the poor’s accumulation of social capital and comprise four generic social processes: othering, subordinate adaptation, boundary maintenance, and emotion management (see Schwalbe et al, 2000).

These processes are frequently represented in race and class discrimination behaviors and practices and implicitly involve members of society–as–a–whole regardless of whether actors share the same geographic or physical space (Burton et al. 2010). Third, we assert that context matters relative to how the poor can assuage the micro–processes that perpetuate social exclusion and their capacity to garner and leverage social capital to attain upward socioeconomic mobility. We conclude this discussion by offering thoughts about public policy recommendations that focus on these micro–processes as agents of social exclusion and impediments to social capital and socioeconomic mobility for the poor. We suggest that policy interventions must be designed in ways that seriously consider these marginalizing processes less, as a global society, we will continue to surreptitiously promote social exclusion and disadvantage as a way of life for some and not for others.

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2. Poverty Eradication: Confronting Family Poverty and Social Exclusion


Linda Burton

A. Overview

With Whitney Welsh, PhD (Sociology Department and the Social Science Research Institute, Duke University, USA).
B. SPATIAL INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN THE U.S.

Our discussion of social exclusion, social capital, and socioeconomic mobility begins with a portrait of the U.S. poverty and inequality landscape detailed in the work of Burton, Lichter, Baker, and Eason (2013). In the U.S., the first two decades of the new millennium ushered in growing spatial inequality and concentrated poverty which was characterized by the uneven geographic spread of historically disadvantaged populations into segregated and isolated communities in inner cities, aging suburban communities, and rural small towns (Curtis, Voss, and Long 2012; Lichter, Parisi, and Taquino 2012; Lobao, Hooks, and Tickamyer 2007). This new geography of haves and have-nots was reinforced in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 “Great Recession” (Grusky, Western, and Wimer 2011). The economic downturn and rising inequality left a trail of personal misfortune and family upheaval as it made its way across the U.S. landscape driven by its chief engineer, rising poverty rates (Jensen, McLaughlin, and Slack, 2003). Poverty rates increased nationally, spiking to 15.1% in 2010, and the number of poor Americans – 46.2 million – was at an all-time high (DeNaves–Walt, Proctor, and Smith, 2011).

Much of the scholarly and public discourse on U.S. poverty and inequality has focused on big-city populations, which have been hit especially hard by slow job growth, high unemployment, and the housing crisis. Indeed, the poverty rate reached nearly 20% in 2010 among the nation’s metropolitan principal (or central) cities (DeNaves–Walt, Proctor, and Smith, 2011). And, surprisingly, more of America’s poor were living in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods despite unprecedented declines in concentrated poverty during the 1990s (Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Since 2000, segments of the U.S. population residing in high-poverty urban neighborhoods (of over 40%) rose by one-third (Kneebone, Nadeau, and Berube 2011). At the same time, America’s upper-income groups increasingly cordoned themselves off in gated communities, affluent neighborhoods (e.g., Plandome, Hewlett Neck on Long Island, or exurban developments in Northern Virginia), downtown luxury condos, and exclusive resort communities (e.g., Aspen) (Park and Pellow 2011). This strategy of opportunity hoarding and segregation are leading indicators of growing socioeconomic inequality in America (Hartman 2014; Massey 2007; Tilley 1998).

High rates of poverty and growing class-based spatial segregation did not bypass America’s rural landscapes (Weber, et. al., 2005). The poverty rate among rural Americans (i.e., living outside metropolitan areas) – 16.5% – exceeded the nation’s overall poverty rate in 2010. Today, the rural poor (7.9 million) comprise about 17% of America’s poor population, yet they remain largely invisible to some social scientists and policy-makers despite their presence in almost every geographic corridor in the U.S. The rural poor are found in geographically isolated and economically-depressed parts of Appalachia, the Delta, the Southern Black Belt, the Midwest and Great Plains, the Pacific Northwest, New England,
the Alaskan panhandle, and on American Indian Reservations in the Upper Midwest and desert Southwest (Ulrich and Stanley, 2011).

Race and ethnicity also figure prominently in the geographic segregation and isolation of the poor. Some of the most impoverished racial and ethnic minority populations live in geographically isolated rural areas and have done so for generations (Lichter 2012; Summers, 1991). In this context, America may be entering a new period of growing spatial economic balkanization, which is inextricably linked to changing race relations and economic and political incorporation. African Americans in the Mississippi Delta and the southern Black Belt crescent face exceptionally high rates of poverty (Lee and Singelmann 2006), as do Mexican–origin Hispanics in the colonias of the lower Rio Grande Valley (Saenz and Torres 2003), and American Indians on reservations in the Great Plains states and the American Southwest (Snipp 1989). The regional concentration of rural minorities, especially the poor, underemployed, and uneducated, is a historical legacy of racial subjugation and oppression, slavery, conquest, genocide, and legally sanctioned land grabs (e.g., in the historical case of Mexicans who controlled vast land holding and property in the Southwest) (Tomaskovic–Devey and Roscigno 1997). The statistics are often staggering. Today, more than one half of all rural Blacks (57.9%) and 66.8% of poor rural Blacks—mostly in the South—live in high-poverty counties (Lichter, Parisi, Taquino, and Beaulieu 2012). For rural Hispanics, the corresponding poverty figures are 31.9% and 38.7%, respectively. Rural minorities are highly segregated from their White counterparts, regardless of income (Lichter, Parisi and Taquino 2012). Rural racial and ethnic segregation often matches or exceeds big-city neighborhood patterns.

C. Social exclusion

The demography of inequality and the spatial distribution of poverty in U.S. poignantly bring a recurring story of American life to the fore. Although our previous discussion focused intently on the geographic distribution of poverty in the U.S., it clearly directs our gaze toward a much broader narrative in the everyday lives of Americans. Americans, whether they are legal citizens or not, are either exposed to, turn a blind eye toward, or are deeply embedded in lived experiences involving the micro–processes which socially exclude the poor.

The concept of social exclusion is a term most commonly used in the European and Latin American scholarly discourse on poverty (Dewall 2013; Daly and Silver, 2008). Indeed, that discourse suggests that social exclusion has a more powerful impact on poverty and socioeconomic mobility than our demographic description of the spatial distribution of poverty and it corollary geographic isolation portends. Social exclusion is arguably a process that serves as cause and consequence of poverty (Duck 2012; Silver and Miller 2006). According to Hunter and Jordan (2010: 245) “it is commonly understood to refer to multiple and often intersecting disadvantages (including disparities in economic as well as
socio–political resources) and captures the relationship between individuals and society and hence the structural roots of disadvantage.” Social exclusion “is not just a situation, but a process that excludes” (Rodgers, 1995: 43). It is characterized by: (1) incomplete or unequal integration of the poor into society (Daly and Silver 2008); (2) disadvantaged access to status, benefits, and the human capital building experiences (e.g., education) that should be rightfully afforded to human beings (Brady, 2009); (3) temporal domination by the privileged which creates delays or sociotemporal marginalization in the poor receiving necessary assistance (e.g., Katrina victims) (Reid 2013); and (4) from a relational perspective, “it entails social distance, isolation, rejection, humiliation, denial of participation, and a lack of social support networks” (Silver and Miller 2006:59). In our view, it is the exclusion from social networks and the support that leads to social capital that we, and others have argued, is the Achilles’ heel for the poor attaining upward socioeconomic mobility (Lin 2000; McDonald 2011; Wilson 1987).

D. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Social capital refers to resources that are accessible through social interactions and extended networks of social ties. Put another way, social capital denotes the value that can be extracted from social relations (Portes 1998). Like other forms of capital, social capital is not evenly distributed in society (Lin 2000). Rather, the social networks through which social capital flows develop in accordance with the homophily principle, which states that similar people are more likely to interact with each other than dissimilar people (McPherson, Smith–Lovin, and Cook 2001). In other words, like attracts like. Different degrees of similarity between individuals, in turn, give rise to different types of social capital. Bonding social capital reinforces the similarities that exist between strong ties (such as family and close friends) which bolsters solidarity and strengthens support reciprocity. In contrast, bridging social capital reaches across gaps in the social structure to link heterogeneous groups, generally through weaker ties (such as acquaintances).

While bonding social capital is useful for marshaling support in order to maintain the status quo, bridging social capital offers the chance of social mobility precisely because it “bridges” social divides. For example, consider the problem of finding a job. Although a person’s strong ties may be more motivated to help with the job search, because they have much in common (by virtue of the homophily principle) both with each other and the job–seeker, there is likely to be a great deal of overlap in the job leads they can provide. On the other hand, because more distant acquaintances travel in different spheres, they are more likely to hear about fresh job opportunities that they can then pass along to the job–seeker (Granovetter 1973, 1983). In communities where unemployment is high and jobs are scarce, these weak, bridging ties take on even greater significance for those pursuing upward mobility.
Studies have shown that bridging social capital has a particularly strong effect on the social mobility of the disadvantaged (Stanton–Salazar and Dornbusch 1995; O'Regan 1993). There is even some research that suggests social capital has a greater impact than human capital on the fortunes of the poor (MacLeod 2008). However, the disadvantaged generally possess few of these valuable bridging ties due to persistent social isolation and exclusion across multiple domains (Wilson 1997; Krivo et al. 2013; Tigges, Browne and Green 1998).

In the post–Civil Rights era, the legal barriers that previously limited social interactions were dismantled, and there have been active efforts to integrate critical areas such as education and housing. In addition to these formal, top–down measures, several informal trends, such as the gentrification of inner–city neighborhoods and the rise of social media, also would seem to increase opportunities for heterogeneous interactions. Why, then, does this social isolation and exclusion persist?

There are several reasons why. First, a number of scholars have argued that even when social ties are theoretically possible, actually making a connection still requires a measure of trust on behalf of all parties concerned. Unfortunately, although they have the most to gain from social capital, people living below the poverty line tend to have high levels of distrust for both institutions and other individuals (Burton, Cherlin, Winn, Estacion, and Holder–Taylor 2009; Edin and Kefalas 2005; Smith 2007). In her exploration of trust among low–income mothers, for example, Levine (2013) observed a pervasive and often overlapping distrust of welfare caseworkers, employers, childcare providers, romantic partners, and extended kin, which made them reluctant to seize opportunities to grow their social capital. The mothers simply did not trust these other actors to follow through on their promises or treat them in a fair manner, and felt they could not afford to risk what few resources they had gambling on someone they did not trust.

Moreover, Levine (2013) found that this distrust was largely learned, resulting from the mothers’ own past experiences of extending trust in these various situations and getting burned. In order for effective bridges to form, trust must run in both directions; in other words, the recipients of trust must be trustworthy. Given their economic vulnerability and the untrustworthiness of many of the mothers’ associates (both institutional and individual), distrust is, in fact, a more effective strategy for getting by, although it comes at the expense of getting ahead. Any policy designed to reduce poverty through social capital must therefore take into account both the conditioned reaction of the disadvantaged to distrust, and the trustworthiness of the actors they are being asked to network with, particularly the institutions. Distrust is yet another force that leads the poor down the path of social exclusion.

Second, Desmond’s (2012) recent work on evicted tenants in high–poverty neighborhoods provides additional insights on social capital and how social exclusion and mistrust can become mired in strong, weak, and what he calls “disposable ties.” Through longitudinal ethnographic work with poor Whites residing in a trailer park and Blacks in an inner–
city neighborhood, he followed respondents who had been evicted from their homes to explore the families’ survival and the social capital they would accumulate. Results from his study were counter-intuitive to long–standing beliefs that the poor rely heavily on the strong ties of kin in times of need. Desmond (2012) found that some of his respondents relied somewhat on family but were confronted with obstacles in tapping into those ties. Rather, “to meet their most pressing needs, evicted tenants often relied on more disposable ties formed with new acquaintances. They established new ties quickly and accelerated their intimacy. Virtual strangers became roommates and ‘sisters.’ Once a disposable tie was formed, resources flowed through it. But these bonds were often brittle and fleeting, lasting only for short bursts. This strategy of forming, using, and burning disposable ties allowed families caught in desperate situations to make it from one day to the next, but it also bred instability and fostered misgivings between peers” (Desmond 2012: 1296). Essentially, disposable ties were intense for short periods of time but did not connect sets of people in the ways that bridging ties do. Specifically, these ties were not useful in diffusing information or connecting people in ways that would lead to the accumulation of social capital and mobility opportunities. They often isolated the poor from their families and their “quick fix nature” led to diminished capital and greater social exclusion for those most in need.

A third consideration is provided in the recent work of Harrison and Lloyd (2013). In their ethnographic case study of how employers contribute to occupational segregation on Wisconsin dairy farms, they provide a vivid picture of what some social exclusion theorists argue impede the poor’s ability to build social networks, accumulate social capital, and ultimately achieve socioeconomic mobility. Harrison and Lloyd’s (2013) work is unique in that – in line with social exclusion theorists promotion of the theoretical and on-the-ground importance of considering the roles of all actors not just the poor – it shows the actual personal processes, practices, and relationships that employers engage in to stall the upward mobility of their workers and why they do it. Essentially results from the study show that employers engage in numerous practices to create inequality and exclusion among their poor immigrant workers including racial stereotyping in assessing them, recruiting workers thought to be the most subservient, and presenting profile of the workers that differentiate them in uncomplimentary and unequal ways. More importantly, however, Harrison and Lloyd (2014: 282) find that the employers exclude and marginalize workers, thereby usurping their abilities to build social capital, because in doing so the employers “not only succumb to stereotypes and greed, but because the unequal organization of work and workers enables these employers to maintain profit, meet their own middle-class aspirations, comply with their peers’ middle-class lifestyle expectations, manage their own concerns about immigration policing, assert their own class identity, justify privileges that they and their White, U.S.–born employees enjoy on the farm, and maintain the advantages they have gained.” This study provides the perfect segue to our central argument in this commentary – that is, if U.S. policy hopes to affect poverty in more prominent and sustained ways, it will have to con-
Consider the micro–processes and “underground” nuanced practices around social exclusion, social capital, and socioeconomic mobility that the haves and have–nots are involved in beyond those visible at macro–structural levels.

**E. The reproduction of social exclusion: four generic processes**

Here we recount the work of Prus (1987) and Schwalbe et al. (2000) who have identified four generic processes by which the advantaged isolate the disadvantaged and the disadvantaged isolate themselves: othering, subordinate adaptation, boundary maintenance, and emotion management. Moreover, because they are complementary, these four processes can compound and reinforce each other, so that even if one is overcome, the others will fill the void to preserve the divisions between people. The four processes are described in greater detail below.

**F. Othering**

Othering refers to the processes by which individuals and groups manufacture identity by rhetorically distancing themselves from select categories of people who are perceived as different or inferior. These distinctions, in turn, enable people to refrain from interacting with Others or otherwise intervening in their lives. Schwalbe et al. (2002) highlight three types of othering that create and reproduce social inequality—oppressive, implicit, and defensive.

Oppressive othering occurs when dominant groups attempt to marginalize the less advantaged by defining them as morally or intellectually deficient. Examples of oppressive othering include blaming a “culture of poverty” for socioeconomic inequality (Lewis 1966; Hunt 2007; Hunt and Bullock forthcoming), and promulgating stereotypes such as that of the “welfare queen” living high on the public dole (Hancock 2004) or the “gun–toting, illiterate bumpkin” populating Appalachia (Fisher 1993). More recently, the emphasis on characterizing undocumented immigrants as illegal likewise serves to set them apart from the rest of society. Trouille (2014) poignantly chronicles these dynamics in an ethnography of a neighborhood park in which “liberal” Whites engage in oppressive othering and exclusion behaviors to keep Latino immigrants from using this public space.

Implicit othering, on the other hand, constructs an identity for the dominant group by linking their advantaged status with other desirable traits and implying a similar correlation of disadvantage and undesirable traits. For instance, the narrative of rugged individualism that asserts success is achieved through hard work implies that anyone who has not achieved success is simply not willing to work hard. Threads of implicit othering are seen in the public and scholarly discourse on Asian American immigrants as model minorities and paragons of academic achievement (Lee and Zhou 2013).
Defensive othering occurs when members of a disadvantaged group try to deflect stigma by distancing themselves from, or even disparaging, people who are similarly situated in the social hierarchy, in accordance with the elite narrative. Women who receive public aid, for example, often insist that they are different from most welfare recipients (invoking the stereotypes endorsed by the advantaged), or attempt to hide their association with public aid altogether, in order to avoid being negatively labeled (Seccombe, James, and Walters 1998; McCormack 2004). Duneier (1999) similarly observed two factions of homeless men in New York – panhandlers and trash scavengers – who both insisted that they had too much pride to do the other’s activity.

**G. Subordinate adaptation**

Subordinate adaptation denotes the behaviors and strategies that the disadvantaged employ to cope with their diminished status, which in turn often inadvertently perpetuate the existing social hierarchy. For example, in their exploration of why low-income African–American, Puerto Rican, and White women in Philadelphia put motherhood before marriage, Edin and Kefalas (2005) found that the limited opportunity structure the women faced, combined with the high value low-income communities place on children, resulted in many of them becoming mothers at earlier ages. Although motherhood increased their status within the community, it effectively arrested their social mobility more generally and curtailed the growth of their social networks by cutting short educational careers and making it more difficult to work (see also Fernandez–Kelly 1995).

Similarly, in his study of impoverished Whites in a rural Midwestern community, Harvey (1993) uncovered a “jack-of-all-trades” work culture among the men, which prized physical strength, mechanical dexterity, and practical knowledge across a wide (but shallow) set of skills. Although these values made sense in the context of an ever-churning economic environment, they also fostered a certain contempt for people who specialized or dealt in abstracts, which curtailed their ability to bridge and transition out of that niche. Subordinate adaptation can also take the form of joining gangs (Bourgois 1995; Anderson 1992) or organized crime syndicates (Steffensmeier and Ulmer 2006), which offer not only status within the community, but also access to the material goods of the dominant culture. However, any gains are usually fleeting, and the illicit business of these groups impedes true upward mobility, both because of the negative impact a criminal record has on employment and because it tends to encourage insularity, which prevents the development of bridges to the legitimate economy.

Alternately, some groups adapt to their lower social position by rejecting the values of the dominant culture. Researchers have described subgroups of disadvantaged African–Americans (Fordham & Ogbu 1987), Mexican–Americans (Matute–Bianchi 1991), and working class Korean–Americans (Lew 2004) who disdain educational achievement because they equate it with “acting white.” Similarly, many Asian and Latino immigrants
(including younger generations) remain wary of acculturation because they identify problem behavior, such as disrespecting elders, having premarital sex, and misbehaving in school, with becoming “Americanized” (Zhou and Bankston 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 1996). In all of these cases, aversion to the dominant culture has the effect of isolating the subgroups from mainstream society, and encouraging interactions only within homogeneous niches, thereby hindering the development of bridging social capital.

H. Boundary maintenance

Boundary maintenance indicates the activities that groups engage in to control and limit access to resources by Others, and thereby preserve their power and status. Empirically, boundary maintenance is most apparent in the persistent segregation that divides neighborhoods throughout the U.S. by race, ethnicity, and class (Lichter, Parisi and Taquino 2012; Massey and Denton 1998). Poor neighborhoods, in turn, generally have fewer quality schools, employers, and cultural institutions, which limits their residents’ ability to accumulate all types of capital. Boundary maintenance can also act more obliquely to isolate the disadvantaged. For instance, Goffman (2009) documented how aggressive policing in poor neighborhoods, in addition to overtly reinforcing social boundaries, also disrupts the mobility aspirations of young African–American men in Philadelphia by making incarceration seem both commonplace and unavoidable.

Although the advantaged would seem to have more to gain from upholding these boundaries, the disadvantaged at times also work to sustain them. For example, Harvey (1993) described a rural community that steadfastly resisted incorporation by a nearby city because of strong anti–urban biases and a sentimental attachment to the land passed down from their farmer forebears. Alternately, some of the subcultures described in the preceding section, such as gangs or organized crime syndicates, can only amass power in resource–poor environments. Thus, they attempt to keep wealthy, well–connected (and therefore more difficult to intimidate) people and enterprises out of their territory, while at the same time discouraging residents from cooperating with representatives of mainstream society, such as law enforcement.

Boundaries are also preserved within disadvantaged communities. In their study of Vietnamese–Americans in New Orleans, Zhou and Bankston (1998) observed that once a youth began to acquire a reputation for being a “bad kid,” rather than attempt an intervention, the community rejected and excluded him (or more rarely, her), which in turn tended to encourage further delinquency. Along the same lines, Smith (2007) found that blue–collar African–Americans in Michigan were less likely than either more affluent African–Americans or jobholders from other ethnic groups to act as bridges for jobseekers in their social networks, because they lacked confidence in their associates’ follow–through. Consequently, their own networks and opportunities for bridging remained limited.
I. Emotion management

Because inequality foments feelings such as anger, resentment, despair, and sympathy that threaten to destabilize the social order, these emotions must be managed. One way of managing emotions is by regulating discourse. Scott (1990) asserts that dominant and subordinate groups in society participate in both a shared public discourse, which is controlled by the dominant group and reinforces the existing social structure, as well as separate private discourses that work to strengthen and challenge, respectively, the public discourse. The reframing of welfare discourse in terms of personal responsibility and corrosive dependency, and the subsequent adoption of this language even by welfare recipients, offers an example of how elites can shape public discourse to make inequality more palatable (Hancock 2004). Pfeiffer (2006) similarly described how discourse about public housing was manipulated to spur redevelopment and deflect attention away from the consequences of severing the displaced residents from their communities.

Another means of managing emotions is through conditioning emotional subjectivity. This involves suppressing a natural emotional reaction by habitually reinterpreting the meanings assigned to the circumstances that trigger the emotion. For instance, in order to prevent caseworkers at public aid offices from bending the rules out of sympathy for the applicants, they are conditioned to focus on eligibility compliance rather than engaging with the applicants on a personal level (Bane and Ellwood 1994; Rosenthal 1989; Watkins–Hayes 2009). Along the same lines, Devine (1996) noted the efforts of both administrators and students of inner–city schools to downplay the violence they encountered at school, even though it was frequent and disruptive. Outsiders, in turn, feel alienated not just by the violence, but also by the community’s desensitized reaction to it, further curtailing interactions.

J. Context matters

Because the social isolation and exclusion that the disadvantaged encounter is the cumulative result of these four mutually reinforcing processes, simply bringing different people into contact with each other will not be sufficient to generate bridging social capital, as the underwhelming results of social experiments like the Moving to Opportunity program clearly demonstrate (Briggs, Popkin, and Goering 2010). Dissimilar people who suddenly find themselves in proximity of each other, with no social script to guide them, are far more likely to behave like strangers in an elevator than neighbors. However, these processes are also not entirely insurmountable. Social interactions are highly contingent on context, at both the individual and organizational levels, and changing the contexts in which these processes are operating has the potential to disrupt (or exacerbate) their effects.
Several studies have affirmed the importance of context to the procurement of bridging social capital. In his exploration of why having a child enrolled in a childcare center improved the well-being of low-income mothers in New York, Small (2009) determined that the organizational structure of childcare centers was highly conducive to acquiring social capital. Specifically, the centers provided opportunities for the mothers to repeatedly interact for extended periods in a noncompetitive setting, which for many resulted in the expansion of their support networks (bonding social capital). The centers also brokered ties to other organizations and resources, which enabled the mothers to acquire information and services they would not otherwise have been likely to access (bridging social capital). Notably, Small credits the combination of state mandates and the professional norms of the childcare providers as providing the framework for parental involvement that has proved so advantageous for the mothers.

In terms of the four generic processes, the principle means by which Small’s childcare centers helped actualize bridging social capital was by enabling the mothers to cross boundaries that would have otherwise checked their mobility through contacts between institutions. Key to this brokerage service was the emotional involvement of the childcare providers. Unlike the social workers who were conditioned not to sympathize with their clients, the professional norms of the childcare providers in fact encouraged them to forge emotional bonds with the families and assist them in any way they could. Finally, the noncompetitive setting, repeated interactions, and common goal of caring for children fostered solidarity and discouraged othering.

Alternately, Dominguez (2010) examined the experiences of Latino immigrants in two Boston neighborhoods that until recently had a predominantly White population. One of the neighborhoods, East Boston, had in the past been home to successive waves of immigrants, while the other, South Boston, had a reputation for racial antagonism and insularity. She found that the historical context strongly influenced the development of bridging ties, but in a rather unexpected way. Precisely because South Boston had so notoriously resisted past integration efforts, a number of individuals from the community went out of their way to forge connections with the new arrivals. In East Boston, on the other hand, because previous waves of immigrants had successfully assimilated into the community, residents were more complacent about outreach, and most of the bridging ties arose from institutional mandates. Moreover, the spontaneous bridges in South Boston ultimately proved to be more effective with respect to social mobility than the mandated bridges in East Boston.

Dominguez’s narrative begins with the institutional dismantling of the racial boundaries that had characterized public housing in South and East Boston; the Latino population in both communities was growing in part as a result of desegregation mandates handed down by the courts. Previous efforts to integrate South Boston had led to the residents violently defending their boundaries. This past violence, in turn, provoked an emotional reaction in certain individuals within the community, which prompted them to actively
work to combat the othering of Latinos during more recent efforts to desegregate. In contrast, residents of East Boston had been historically conditioned not to worry about how new immigrants were faring since previous groups had succeeded without interventions, and thus relied solely on institutions to build bridges.

Likewise, in separate studies of HOPE VI relocations in Chicago and Boston, Chaskin (2013) and Curley (2010) found that social interactions both in and out of public housing were conditioned by the physical structure and spatial arrangement of a community in combination with its policies regarding public space and intensity of surveillance. In public housing, the built environment enclosed the community, and what regulations there were, were not strictly enforced, resulting in a lively social scene within the development. However, the same qualities that fostered social activity inside the projects impeded bridging to the wider neighborhood.

The mixed-income communities, in contrast, were designed to be more accessible to the rest of the city, and thus decentralized the common areas. Public spaces were also more heavily regulated and monitored. Furthermore, many of the former public housing residents felt that the tenants paying market rent were, at best, not interested in getting to know them, or at worst, actively trying to have them evicted, and both scenarios made them more hesitant to use the common areas. Consequently, not only were the HOPE VI relocatees seldom interacting with the tenants paying market rent, they also had fewer interactions with other former public housing residents.

One of the explicit ambitions of the mixed-income design was to break down the boundaries between socioeconomic classes and better integrate the housing development with the neighborhood. Another goal was to counteract some of the negative adaptation strategies that had flourished in public housing. However, in the process of addressing these problems, the administrators created a whole new set of boundaries within the community that isolated and alienated the former public housing residents. Likewise, the rampant othering that occurred in the communities along socio-economic lines further undermined the redevelopers’ intent.

Interestingly, these three examples offer differing assessments of the effectiveness of administrative mandates. Small (2009) conveyed a generally favorable impression of the ability of state mandates to create environments where both bonding and bridging social capital could flourish, though in his exemplar cases an individual childcare provider usually facilitated the bridging connections. Domínguez (2010) acknowledged the role of institutional mandates in linking residents to services, but found that spontaneous bridges between individuals were the real drivers of social mobility. Chaskin (2013) and Curley (2010), meanwhile, made the case that administrative mandates did more to inhibit the creation of social capital, though the attitudes of management and both sets of tenants no doubt contributed to the former public housing residents’ feelings of isolation.
While seemingly contradictory, the overall picture that emerges in our commentary confirms the importance of both the individual and organizational contexts to the acquisition of bridging social capital. Organizational structure is vital to creating an environment that either stimulates or hinders bridging social capital. An organizational structure that actively facilitates interactions between its members is more likely to stimulate bridges than an arrangement that is disinterested, or one that encourages solitary pursuits. Organizations can also help to offset disparities in human capital between actors by providing opportunities and incentives to form bridging ties. However, individual interactions are ultimately what make or break the bridges. Just as social exclusion is created and reproduced by repeated individual interactions (conditioned by the four generic processes described in the preceding section) that eventually assume the character of structure, so too must local interactions bridge the divides if poverty, socioeconomic mobility, and the structure of inequality are to be altered.

K. Thoughts on public policy and social exclusion

As noted in our demographic description of inequality in America, the U.S. consistently experiences a high prevalence of poverty despite its global distinction as a leading developed country. Our goal in this commentary was to link three processes – social exclusion, social capital, and socioeconomic mobility – that shape and sustain that prevalence. We also aimed to highlight how economically and racially privileged individuals and groups participate in marginalizing poor populations. We argued that: (1) social capital is a key process in mitigating the effects of social exclusion as cause and consequence of poverty; (2) there are micro–level exclusion–laden processes – othering, subordinate adaptation, boundary maintenance, and emotion management – that form the bases of interactions both within and between groups of the haves and the have–nots and preclude the poor’s accumulation of social capital; and (3) context matters, particularly in how it facilitates bridges between helping organizations and the disadvantaged in promoting the poor’s ability to assuage the micro–processes that perpetuate social exclusion and their capacity to garner and leverage social capital to attain upward socioeconomic mobility.

As we considered the policy recommendations we would offer based on our arguments and the extant literature on the prevalence of and the difficulties of ending poverty in America (Edelman 2012), we also consulted the literature on poverty and social exclusion in Europe, Latin America, and Australia. What we found, albeit still in the early stages of our synthesis of this literature, is that in considering the myriad factors that forestall efforts to reduce poverty – that is, from the shift to a low–wage economy and changes to the criminal justice system to the increase in out–of–wedlock births – the U.S. remains concerned and focused on macro–level processes, policies, and interventions, many of which are fragmented and even compete with each other. In contrast, what we saw in the literature on other countries, such as Australia (Long 2013) and those in Europe (Silver
and Miller 2006), was an openness to consider the processes of exclusion and inclusion which points policy-makers in the direction of contemplating the role of micro-level processes, such as the ones we described, in mitigating the reproduction of poverty and shifting the broader national discourse about the poor away from deficit models.

For example, in our discussion of othering, subordinate adaptation, boundary maintenance, and emotion management it became clear that, in the U.S., the discourse and interactions around the poor remain anchored in racism, class stereotypes, and elitism that are not limited to one-on-one interactions such as those the dairy farmers had with their immigrant employees (Reid 2013). They are also prevalent in the top-down messages that are sent within organizational hierarchies to front-line workers who provide direct services to the poor (Watkins-Hayes 2009). U.S. policy-makers must pause to discern and seriously consider what types of discourse, micro-processes, and interactions are occurring on the ground level in peoples’ everyday lives that are keeping America from achieving more profound reductions in poverty. That level of consideration has to take into account the four generic processes we outlined that clearly are contributing to increasing exclusion of the poor in American society from the bottom up as well as the ways in which exclusion impinges on the poor’s access to social capital and social mobility.

What is more, the manners in which the disadvantaged engage in othering, subordinate adaptation, boundary maintenance, and emotion management toward each other requires further empirical investigation and the development of evidence-based contextually appropriate interventions as needed. Research and interventions also need to consider the multiple levels of distrust experienced by the poor as described in the work of Levine (2013), and the emerging variants of social networks, such as the disposable ties reported by Desmond (2012) must be recognized as “real” and that they are not moving America any closer to reducing poverty, especially among the poorest of the poor.

Perhaps, in the long run, America’s spirit of individualism may have kept it on the wrong side of ameliorating poverty. Relationships and how people connect with each other, pass on useful information to one another, think about each other’s relevance and worth to society, and are committed to leveling the playing field (e.g., quality education for all) for all citizens to have access to the “American Dream” are critical to the reduction of social exclusion of the poor. We are not naïve enough to suggest that public policy should mandate how people relate to each other, but such changes can, as Hillary and Miller (2006) contend, alter the discourse about the poor and the privileged in ways that can lead to an openness about community-building as a major source of poverty reduction. Communities, if provided with the appropriate financial support and relationship and participation interventions can guide families in building bonding and bridging social capital. We already have some potential bright spots in the country as seen in Small’s (2009) work in a Boston day care center and Dominguez’s (2010) work in a housing project. We are sure there are more. But, they are not part of the dominant discourse on poverty in
America. As an important step forward, they need to become primary spoken and visual messages to Americans as behavioral theory tells us that people often imitate the actions they hear about and witness.

**L. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS**

**RESEARCH**

Empirical research on the poor in the U.S. has relied heavily on theoretical perspectives on social capital and socioeconomic mobility and rarely considered the conceptual frames on social exclusion used in the global discourse. Moreover, extant U.S. empirical studies fall woefully behind those in other countries (e.g., Australia) which simultaneously consider how organizational policies and practices and the social interactions between the haves and have-nots shape social exclusion and ultimately affect the garnering of social capital among the poor. Research designed to capture these dynamics are warranted to expand our understanding of how social exclusion and the macro and micro processes associated with it are shaping the growing inequalities between and within populations in the U.S. and what factors might mitigate the deprivation of social capital among the poor.

**PUBLIC POLICIES AND PROGRAM**

While public policies and programs that provide cash transfers and access to health care, education, housing, employment opportunities, and child care remain essential to the survival and upward mobility of the poor, these policies and programs must also be mindful of how on-the-ground social processes such as othering, subordinate adaptation, boundary maintenance, and emotion management, impact social exclusion, social capital, and social mobility among America’s disadvantaged populations. It is imperative that public policies and programs:

a. create innovative interventions in geographic and physical spaces with well-trained staff who can facilitate “organic” opportunities for the poor to develop and nurture bridging capital with each other as well as those who occupy more privileged rungs in American society.

b. reconsider the designs of programs like HOPE VI which create mixed-income living/housing environments, but may do little in the way of facilitating social interactions among groups in ways that do not reproduce segregation and social exclusion.

c. not underestimate the competition and fragmentation that occurs in social relationships among the poor themselves and their negative impact on social exclusion.
d. develop a national discourse on inclusion that is not mired in the trappings of outdated language about “diversity” and “privilege.”

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3. **Poverty Eradication: Confronting Family Poverty and Social Exclusion**

**Familiar Strangers: Migrant Family Reunification in Canada**

*Denise L. Spitzer*

**A. Introduction**

From 1960 through 2008, the number of global migrants increased from 75 million to over 214 million (Cymbal and Bujnowski 2010). While migration is not a new phenomenon, it has intensified in breadth, depth, and frequency in the past 40 years with the rise of neoliberal globalization. This phenomenon is characterized by shifts in manufacturing that first moved from industrialized centres in the global North to the margins of Northern industrial states, and later fractured into subcontracted production chains that have spun out across the globe in search of ever-cheaper sources of labour and production costs (Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Puentes 2013). Concomitantly, international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the support of multinational corporations and select governments, demanded the implementation of Structural Adjustment measures in borrowing/indebted nations that included a reduction in the public provision of health and social services and burgeoning support for privatization (Bello 1999; Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Puentes 2013). In the South, urban centres had already become the sites of widespread rural to urban migration due to the increased concentration of land in the hands of a few wealthy individuals and families (Castles 2011). The exodus from rural areas was exacerbated by the environmental impact of resource extraction; resultanty, cities in industrializing countries played host to a growing pool of un- and under-employed workers who were (and are), in essence, a reserve army of labour (Castles 2011; Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Puentes 2013). Declining employment opportunities in countries of the global South, the increase in global networks of decentralized production chains, and the readily deployable reserve army of labour coalesced into making out-migration an important alternative means of sustaining one’s family (Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Puentes 2013). Furthermore, a migration industry comprised of state supported programs and policies as well as private interventions in the form of recruitment agencies and training centres also emerged that help sustain and normalize labour migration in the absence of remunerative employment at home (Hugo 2005; Rodriguez 2010; Wright 2006). Global financial institutions and numerous nation-states maintain that this outflow of labour—and most importantly the

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2 With Sara Torres, PhD (L’Université de Montréal, Canadá).
remittances they send home—is helpful not only for individual families, but is key to reducing poverty in the South world (Faist 2008; Geiger and Pécoud 2013; Piper 2009).

In this paper we draw the links between the declining social and economic opportunities for people in the Global South and the escalating number of workers, especially women, who leave their families to seek temporary and precarious employment in the global labour market. Specifically, we draw from research we conducted with Filipino families to illustrate the impact of familial separation and reunification under the auspices of the Canadian Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP). While this Program offers successful applicants the right to transform their temporary foreign worker status into permanent residency, thereby allowing for permanent resettlement and family reunification, we assert that these transactions must be located within the context of neoliberal globalization and the legacy of neocolonialism.

B. Migration and Familial Separation in Canada

Welcoming over 248,000 immigrants in 2011 (CIC 2014a), Canada is among the top five countries with the highest absolute number of international migrants (Cymbal and Bujnowski 2010). In recent years, however, the numbers of temporary migrants entering the country have exceeded those of permanent residents. In 2008 for example, nearly 400,000 temporary foreign workers arrived in Canada as compared to 247,243 permanent immigrants (Thomas 2010). The Federal Government appears committed to the deployment of temporary foreign workers despite the critiques leveled at these policies for: enhancing the precarious nature of work with workers bound to a single employer upon whom they are dependent for housing as well as wages, compelling their separation from family members as they are required to enter the country as sojourners, and creating a permanent underclass of workers (Pratt 2012).

When the war broke out, everyone went to different directions... The best thing that can happen in life is to have your husband and your children with you. I'm thinking too much. My mom died in the war. Most of my family died in the war. I want my husband with me... What can I do for him? I'm thinking too much. I developed diabetes and high blood pressure, high cholesterol. I developed all of these things because I am thinking too much because my husband is not with me.

—Fatoun, Somali refugee in Canada (1)

Note that at time of writing, the Federal Government has instituted a moratorium on the employment of temporary foreign workers in the food industry (May 2014) in response to public outcry regarding the outsourcing of jobs to temporary foreign workers in light of high unemployment amongst Canadians.
In addition to temporary foreign workers, refugees, refugee claimants and circular migrants are also subject to familial separation. For example, the Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program (SAWP) is a circular migration program that is predicated on familial separation as a means of impelling return to one’s home country and of controlling workers’ behaviour in Canada as those with positive evaluations are ‘named’ by employers—that is they are given priority for entry—and are thus able to return annually, ensuring some economic stability for workers’ families (Hennebry 2012).

While migrant workers may mitigate the financial challenges of households in their home countries through the transfer of remittances, familial separation across borders may also strain family networks and relationships (Bernhard, Landolt, and Goldring 2005; Parreñas 2005; Spitzer and Torres 2012). Moreover, spouses who live apart for an extended period may be inclined to develop new intimate relationships (Parreñas 2005; Sobritchea and de Guzman 2006; Spitzer and Torres 2012) although Rousseau, et al. (2004) report that separation may in fact enhance some couples’ relationship.

Our children, even if they are at university, they live at home. Until they get married, they are with the family. It doesn’t matter what age they are. The mother will cook for them, wash their clothes and take care of him, thinking, my child is at university studying. If we can, we take care of him, wash for him, feed him, and when he gets married, he’s in the hands of his wife. You can raise your brother’s children, your sister’s children, if they need a hand, if they don’t have enough economical support. They are part of your family and they keep with you. That’s part of our culture.

–Aman (Spitzer 2006:50)

Moreover, familial separation may engender considerable stress for workers and their family members. Women migrant workers who are often tasked with familial caregiving responsibilities regardless of their location may in particular suffer from guilt and anxiety with regards to their physical absence from children, parents, or partners (Bernhard, Landolt, and Goldring 2005; Lam, and Tsoi 2005; McGuire and Martin 2007; Torres, et al. 2012). Pratt’s (2006) study of family reunification of former foreign domestic care-workers and their families undertaken in Vancouver noted three common experiences: marital discord, intergenerational tensions and poor occupational prospects for the children. Others such as refugees and refugee claimants may be tormented by the absence of family members whose lives may still be in danger as they may yet reside in refugee camps, their homeland, or in an unknown location (Spitzer 2006).
The presence of family members and the social support they can provide is integral to health and well-being particularly amongst immigrants (Dunn and Dyck 2000; Stewart, et al. 2008). Family members also play an integral role in integration into Canadian society and entry into the labour market especially in the first four years of resettlement (Li 2007). Reuniting with family members is not a privilege granted temporary foreign workers, but one reserved for permanent residents or citizens. Moreover, the definition of family under Canadian immigration policy is one that is decidedly nuclear and Euro–centric and circumscribes who may join a successful applicant for permanent residency (PR) status. The immediate family members that qualify include one’s spouse and children under the age of 22 unless they are single and enrolled in full–time academic study. NOTA ii This description is predicated on a particular notion of adulthood and individualism that is not shared by other societies that embrace greater interdependence amongst family members who help sustain a household materially and emotionally (Spitzer 2009).

To sponsor other relatives such as parents, grandparents, or siblings, under 19 years of age, one must sign an undertaking assuming financial responsibility for family members for a period of three to 10 years, depending upon their age. Importantly, sponsors must meet an income threshold in order to be eligible to bring their relations other than a spouse or children to Canada (CIC 2014b). As racialized immigrant women are most likely to experience a precipitous decline in professional and economic status (Chui 2011; Chui and Maheux 2011), they are disproportionately excluded from being joined by their kin. Resultantly, single workers are less likely to be able to access familial support in Canada.

In light of the contributions they make to Canadian society and the skills gap they fill in the labour market, the 40th Canadian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration stated that: “All temporary foreign workers should be eligible to apply for permanent residency status after working 24 months within a 36 month period, with the possibility of extension in extenuating circumstances” (Tilson 2009: 13). Furthermore, the Committee recognized that family separation was not in the best interests of workers, children, or Canadian society and they recommended that immediate family of temporary foreign workers should have the opportunity to accompany the worker to Canada and be granted an open work permit (Tilson 2009).

**FOCUS ON THE PHILIPPINES**

Currently, 14% of temporary foreign workers in Canada are from the Philippines, comprising the largest single national group (Thomas 2010). Over 8.2 million Filipinos work abroad, approximately 10% of the population or nearly a quarter of the total labour force (Go 2012; Ruiz 2008; Weekley 2006). Years of neo–liberal measures that opened markets

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3 At present, the Canadian Government is considering reducing the age to 19 and eliminating the exemption for adult students.
and reduced demand for local products resulting in pressure to devalue the currency led to a rise in unemployment and poverty (Bello 1999; Bello, et al. 2009; Kalleberg and Hewison 2013). Resultantly, the Philippine government has promulgated a labour export policy that facilitates the out-migration of Philippine workers (Go 2012; Rodriguez 2010; Weekley 2006). Remittances from overseas workers comprises more than 13% of the country’s GDP (Ruiz 2008) and an estimated 34% to 54% of the populace is dependent on remittances for their continued survival (Parreñas 2005). Indeed, out-migration is so common that over 9 million Filipino children have at least one migrant parent (Parreñas 2005). Gender roles that describe men as breadwinners and women as ‘the light of the home’ are enshrined in the Philippine Constitution and are inculcated in the populace through its religious and educational institutions such that the children of migrant mothers, as opposed to those with absent fathers, are more apt to feel abandoned despite ongoing contact with their overseas parent. Concomitantly, migrant workers are heralded as heroes of the economy and as the international demand for care-work has continued unabated, thousands of Filipino women migrate annually to labour as domestic workers (Parreñas 2005; POEA 2010). Migrants from the Philippines, predominantly women, comprise well over 90% of workers who have entered Canada under the auspices of the Live-In Caregiver Program (CIC 2005; Kelly et al. 2011).

C. CANADA’S LIVE–IN CAREGIVER PROGRAM (LCP) AND FILIPINO FAMILIES: A CASE STUDY

CANADA’S LIVE–IN CAREGIVER PROGRAM (LCP)

For more than a century, Canada has engaged in the importation of foreign domestic workers to care for children, the elderly and people living with disabilities under the auspices of a variety of different temporary worker and immigration schemes (Arat–Koç 1997; Schechter 1998; Spitzer and Torres 2008). The current iteration, the Live–In Caregiver Program (LCP), instituted in 1992 enables workers to settle permanently in Canada after they fulfill their obligations under the Program. LCP workers must speak one of Canada’s official languages, have completed the equivalent of a Canadian high school education, and be in possession of a bona fide offer of employment caring for children under 18, persons with disabilities or the elderly, and to have undergone six months of full-time care-giver training or have 12 months of experience in a related field such as nursing, teaching, or caregiving in another country (CIC 2006). In reality, 63% of live-in caregivers in 2009 possessed a Bachelor’s degree or higher, a substantially higher proportion than the 39.5% of economic immigrants to Canada with university degrees (Kelly, et al. 2011).

For their part, employers must provide a private, lockable room, “acceptable working conditions, reasonable duties and fair market wages” (CIC 2006) outlined in a standard
contract; notably, wages, overtime payment and access to worker’s compensation differ across the country (Spitzer and Torres 2008). LCP workers are allowed to change employers; however, doing so requires a change in permit that may take an undetermined amount of time to process. Processing times for bureaucratic matters become quite salient for LCP workers as they must complete 24 months of employment under the Program in a 48–month (formerly 36–month) period or be deported (CIC 2010). Upon completion of their obligation under the LCP, live-in caregivers may apply concomitantly for permanent residency (PR) status, which enables them to remain indefinitely in Canada and eventually apply for citizenship, to bring immediate family members (spouse and children), avail themselves of a broader range of health and social programs, and pay Canadian rather than foreign student tuition at post-secondary institutions, and to obtain an open work permit that enables them to take up employment in any sector (CIC 2010; Spitzer and Torres 2008). Obtaining the open work permit may take from three to 12 months to process during which time they must remain with their LCP employer. The PR application uses information provided when workers first apply to the LCP that includes the names of children and/or their spouse who are eligible to join them in Canada upon completion of the Program (CIC 2008). Therefore, even if a couple’s relationship has soured during their years apart, the former LCP worker is compelled to bring her spouse to Canada if he so wishes. Importantly, unless children over the age of 22 are enrolled in full-time academic study, they are considered adults and ineligible to join their parent. Moreover, if any family member fails the required medical examination or has a criminal record, none of the family is allowed to join the former LCP worker in Canada (CIC 2008). Consequently, LCP workers are anxious about completing the Program in as short a time as possible, to limit the possibility that family members will fall ill or age out of eligibility to be reunited with the family (Spitzer 2013).

**ANTICIPATING FAMILY REUNIFICATION AFTER THE LCP**

In our research study, Transnational Families in Transition: Filipino Families, Canadian Issues that included interviews with former LCP workers and dependents (children and spouses) in Ottawa and Edmonton (see Appendix 1 for details), all participants referred to the long separation from their families as a major source of stress, which combined with harsh working conditions under the LCP and holding multiple jobs after completing LCP and holding multiple jobs after completing the LCP, had an impact on their health and well being. While LCP workers who had children and/or spouses could anticipate being reunited with family members after obtaining their PR status, the definition of immediate family as spouses and children meant that single, childless persons were required to sponsor family members, typically parents and/or grandparents, under a different program stream, one that required a minimum income and that demanded a promise of financial support for a specific period of time (CIC 2008, 2014b).
... When they weren’t here, I woke up at night... I thought that I can’t breathe. But, I cannot do anything... I’m so depressed I’m just sitting in the corner and think about them.

—Elvira (2)

**Family Reunification after the LCP**

Between 1993–2009, 52,493 people, between 95% to 98% women, came to Canada under the LCP. They were reunited with 30,028 dependents, 20,000 of which joined 34,237 former live-in caregivers to form lone-parent households (Kelly, et al. 2011). Importantly, each year families remain fractured as a family member’s health or criminal status voids the application for any of those listed to migrate, a spouse decides to remain behind, or children are no longer deemed eligible due to their age or because the course in which they are enrolled does not meet immigration criteria (Torres, et al. 2012).

We are like strangers. ... They feel that I am no longer the same Mom I used to be. I said, “I am the same, but then how can I [be]?... My last vacation was in 1999.” My children are growing up without me and I am not there when they are sick. It’s been 8 years that I’ve been away.

—Annie (2)

Reuniting with family members on Canadian soil after years of separation can certainly be a welcomed and joyous process despite the readjustment and tribulations that often ensue. Both mothers and children held high expectations about being reunited once again; however, these dreams were often curtailed by harsh socio-economic conditions that meant there was often little time available to try to redress the years of separation from family, which ranged from three to 16 years. Working in low-wage jobs—often in multiple positions—with little flexibility, meant that women had little time to spend with their families upon arrival. While two participants were able to take time off work to reacquaint themselves with family members and help orient them to their new environment, the vast majority were too enmeshed in their employment to spend time with family. Furthermore, the transition from long distance mothering to on-site parenting challenged mothers in creating bonds with their children. Mothers felt the need to transform themselves into makers of rules and of structures to address the growing pains of adolescence within a new country and society—a new role that was not always appreciated by their children. In addition, children were compelled to not only adjust to life in Canada...
but also to cope with the sentiments of being torn between a mother who, despite frequent communication, was still in essence an unknown figure and the people who had been caring for them in recent years and with whom they have developed emotional bonds. Socio–economic issues, family separation and reunification, therefore, are matters that cannot be disentangled.

_They didn’t really know me and I don’t know them, too. So it’s kind of tough getting connected... I come home, I am so tired and I can’t even sit them and say, “How was your day?”... And even over the weekend, I hardly see them. I work, too. At some point my kids told me: “You’re too far away. You’re here, but you are too far.”_

–Melodie2 (in Spitzer 2013)

**Socio–Economic Issues**

After reunification, however, most former LCP workers felt conflicted. On one hand, they felt a sense of accomplishment at having brought their family to Canada, were happy to be reunited with family, and were suffused with love for their children and spouse. Conversely, they reported a high level of stress due to the financial pressures to make ends meet.

While after the LCP, workers’ efforts were often directed towards saving for immigration costs for the family, including travel and landing fees, while paying for rent, food, and utilities, costs that either part of a standard deduction or handled by their employer. After family reunification, costs associated with living in Canada escalated and demands multiplied, creating a seemingly unrelenting burden on the migrant and her family. In one instance, a family’s dream of co–residence was shattered as family members had to scatter across a region in order to find employment so they could contribute to household coffers; thus they remained separated albeit in the same country.

_Working, working. We will see each other when we go to bed. Yeah like that, always busy because we have a lot, we have all jobs here._

–Alyin (2)

Like other migrants in Canada who often find themselves situated in a racialized hierarchy in the labour market regardless of education, deskillling was common amongst our informants as demands for “Canadian experience” often excluded them from employment opportunities and further entrenched these migrants, like others from non–
European countries, into the least remunerative jobs (Galabuzi 2006; Haan 2008; Picot, et al. 2009; Pratt 2003/4; Zietsma 2007). As Kelly (2006) has noted Filipinos in Canada are employed at higher rates than other immigrant groups; however, they occupy a distinct poorly waged section of the labour market characterized by clerical work, healthcare, hospitality, retail and manufacturing. Specifically, while 57.1% of our sample were university educated, they reflect this larger trend wherein Filipino Canadian workers are thrust into “deprofessionalized versions of their occupational identities back home in the Philippines [that] result in anomalously low earnings” (Kelly 2006: 36). While trapped in low wage positions that are generally incommensurate with their education and prior work experience, former LCP workers felt pressured to provide not just the basic necessities for their family, but to purchase services or materials that would make the adjustment to life in Canada somewhat easier or more tolerable for them, such as a vehicle to avoid the challenges of waiting in the cold for public transportation, which is generally less frequent than in the Philippines. Moreover, they were still expected to send remittances back to the Philippines to continue to support extended family members back home.

**INTERGENERATIONAL TENSIONS**

Although family members kept in frequent contact via phone or electronic means, reuniting after a long physical separation, was often fraught. Relationships and attachments change over time and it was often a challenge for mothers to regain their children’s love, trust—and even recognition. Lucinda, for example, stated that the greatest difficulty she experienced was realizing that her daughters who had been raised by their grandparents “do not feel that I’m the mom.” Other women noted a discrepancy between their children’s chronological and the emotional ages—a lack of maturity—as some expressed the need to be ‘babied’ in ways the women found disconcerting. For example, one 11 year-old daughter demanded her mother bathe her. Conversely, some children felt that their mothers had not acknowledged that they had in fact matured since they last resided together and they chaffed against strict guidelines on their movements and behaviours as though they were still children instead of young adults.

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*Of course now it’s, she’s bigger, she’s a teenager,...you can see, she’s in an adult body, but I’m sure emotionally she’s, probably like eight years old or six years old, right, like, the emotional attachment with both of us so, I think that’s, um, it’s the work that has to be done. Ah but she’s smart, she’s, you know, responsible, but, she doesn’t know us, we don’t know her too!*

—Ramona (2)
Age appeared to play a role in how children responded to reunification with their mothers. Younger children generally voiced their simple pleasure at being with their mothers; however, older children often expressed more complicated sentiments as they navigated different familial roles and relationships. For example, often older siblings, especially daughters, assumed a maternal role in their families in their mothers’ absence. While some resented having to take on these responsibilities, this situation also led both to friction between the daughter and the mother who appeared to want to usurp this status position from her after having apparently “abandoned” it, and to confusion from younger siblings who were unsure to whom to turn. Some of the daughters admonished their mothers, telling them when they have children, they “don’t want to be like you, mom,” meaning they would not put their own offspring through prolonged separation. Given that providing a better life for their children was often the primary rationale for enrolling in the LCP, mothers found these remarks particularly painful.

The ideal hope was, when I see my mom, it’s just going to be all right—like communication is not going to be that difficult, and I’ll be able to talk to her about everything, but it wasn’t like that.... I think part of me is still angry [with my mom]. About her not being there.

—Mariana (2)

Marital Matters – Gender Matters

One phenomenon that occurred as a result of separation is that approximately a third of fathers stopped working soon after their spouses moved to Canada as a live-in caregiver. In receipt of remittances from their wives, a minority of these men assumed greater childcare responsibilities, others simply relinquished their jobs, while others who were unemployed halted their search for employment. This had a significant impact on the LCP workers’ ability to save monies for their family’s immigration and settlement needs and recalibrated traditional gender roles, which had further influence on marital relations as men felt that their masculinity was undermined.

When either the father or the mother goes abroad, there’s a tendency that some temptations will come the other way, so...and sometimes, one is working, sending the money, and the other, the wife or the husband is using it in vices: that’s a problem... Yeah, and some other, Filipino overseas workers, when they go, to other countries, they get married again! That’s a problem! Yeah. So, that one left in the Philip-
pines, or, either way, when you go abroad, your wife or your husband, keep another, partner, and that’s already broken family.

—Igorot (2)

The sense that their masculinity was being eroded was often heightened upon arrival in Canada. Their wives who had resided in the country for several years were the experts and were relied upon to navigate this new environment and help orient family members along the way. Men’s lack of familiarity with Canadian society enhanced their sense of dependence on and resentment towards their spouses particularly as they commenced their search for employment. Women felt tasked with securing employment for their husbands and often deployed the social networks comprised of friends, former LCP employers, church, and members of the Philippine community that they had nurtured over the years to locate possible job opportunities for them. When they did obtain work, they found themselves, like their spouses, subject to deskilling and relegated to some of the lowest echelons of the labour market as their credentials and foreign work experience carried no weight with potential employers. The recognition that their job prospects were not as they anticipated led to some confusion regarding the path to take to reassert their role in the family. For instance, Raphael felt conflicted about his desire to be the family’s breadwinner and his need to return to school in order to regain credentials in his profession. For some couples, men’s perceived loss of job prestige further exacerbated anger towards their wives and heightened marital tensions. Men’s role was further challenged by adult children particularly if they were contributing to the household income as they were more apt to assert their own independence and less prone to unquestioningly obey their fathers. Furthermore, men were no longer the sole authority in the family as their spouses expected to assume a greater stake in parenting than they were able to do previously. Some men, however, recognized that they needed to endure changes and challenges part of the sacrifice they were making for their children’s future, and over time, some felt they recovered or reconfigured their sense of masculinity.

They have to listen to me … because [l] know what is going here. Especially my husband, sometimes he complains. “You have to listen to me so, later you’ll understand why it is like that. You will realize why it is like that.”

—Natalie (2)

Interestingly, one response to reunification was to seemingly re-entrench traditional gender roles in the home. Women who might have been the sole or major breadwinner in the family, potentially working multiple jobs, were expected to assume full responsibility
for cooking and housework even if family members performed these tasks while in the Philippines. While some women found this burdensome and requested greater household assistance from family members, others assumed this ‘woman’s work’ without complaint.

Well, you know, they [their wives] act like they know everything there. Then again, ... you’re the man of the house, ... you look like down, you look like you’re nothing, this and that. But then again ... you learn how they do it here, too. And then, ah, just adjust yourself.

–Raphael (2)

**D. Discussion and conclusion**

In addition to the exigencies of conflicts and catastrophes that has led to the dispersal of refugees across the globe, neoliberal globalization has engendered greater frequency of familial separation as increasing numbers of individuals seek work in different parts of the world whether for opportunities in high tech fields, further education or for the vast numbers who are compelled to find employment outside their homeland due to low wages and un– or under–employment. In this paper, we have explored the impact of familial separation on a particular subset of migrant workers who are engaged in a Canadian temporary foreign worker program—the LCP—that uniquely offers successful applicants the right to permanent residency, family reunification, and resettlement. Despite its unique characteristics, the Program offers us the opportunity to explore some general insights into migration and family separation where reunited familiar strangers must learn to mend weakened bonds and reorient themselves to different roles–or attempting to return to pre–separation ones–within their household and their new environment.

Firstly, the matters of family separation and reunification cannot be relegated to the individual family, but are inextricably linked to larger political–economic and historical contexts. In the case of Filipino workers and the LCP, the Philippines’ labour export policy and the efficiency of its migration industry, facilitate the out–migration of workers– and laud their efforts–to compensate for under–development and impoverishment of the country due to neoliberal globalization and the legacy of colonialism and neo– colonialism. As Parreñas (2001) has noted, care– work is one of the Philippines’ major exports, and a segment of Filipino foreign domestic workers have opted to realize their “Canadian dreams” through the auspices of the LCP (Spitzer 2013). Through the LCP, “... families are able to purchase the labour of less economically advantaged Southern women to take care of their children or family members. Poor women in Canada and in Southern countries bear the inequalities and inequities of patriarchal systems that undervalue caregiving. For poor Southern women, selling their caregiving labour in Northern mar-
kets may be their best option, although it relegates them to disadvantaged social locations (Torres et al., 2012, p.228).” In essence, women are responsibilized for both saving the Philippines economy and maintaining the well-being of their families at home, emotionally and materially.

Secondly, policy measures have a significant impact on family reunification. The presence of family has the potential to improve and maintain health and well-being through emotional, informational, and material support and to aid in immigrant integration and resettlement. However, Canadian policy may actually constrain family reunification and confer negative health benefits by elevating the stress of Canadian migrants who are concerned about relatives left in their homeland. By narrowly circumscribing the definition of family to refer to spouse and children under 22 years of age, other family forms such as multi-generational, extended families are excluded from the potential for reunification. Moreover, the age limit placed on adult children eligible to join migrant parent(s) not only reflects Western notions of individualism, it prevents these family members from contributing to the welfare of the family as a household in Canada as they might be expected to do in their homeland. In addition, the sponsorship agreements put in place to enable the migration of other family members creates an undue financial hardship on immigrants, in particular single women from non-European backgrounds. The relegation of racialized migrants to the lowest echelons of the labour market regardless of education and work experience creates further stress for those hoping to reunite with family as they are faced with enormous costs related to the immigration and resettlement process. Consequently, workers may find themselves forced to take on multiple poorly waged jobs, resulting in greater work–family imbalance, and potentially greater inter-generational tensions as there is little time left to re-acquaint themselves with the familiar strangers who are their kin.

E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

We must recognize that other issues such as intergenerational solidarity and work–family balance cannot be extracted from matters of socioeconomic class and poverty. Furthermore, all of these issues—and any potential remedies—must be situated in the context of racialized status, gender ideologies, neo–liberal globalization, and historical/neo–colonial legacies. As Renato (below) suggests, the challenges of family separation and reunification spawned by the need for remittances from abroad would not be as relevant if there were decent employment opportunities and fair wages.

I want to see Philippines, like... there is work for the Filipinos, the family doesn’t go anywhere. Filipinos doesn’t have to go anywhere to
work. Just here in the Philippines, you know, enough living for the Filipinos.
–Renato (2)

POVERTY REDUCTION

- Ratify and Enforce ILO Convention C–189 Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 that outlines a decent work agenda for domestic workers.
- Ratify and Enforce the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.
- Recognize that many live–in caregivers are health professionals, therefore the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel may apply.
- Recognize care–labour as skilled work.
- Establish an independent Office of Migrant Labour to hear complaints of migrant workers and to educate migrant workers and their employers about their rights and responsibilities.
- Allow family members to accompany migrants as recommended by CIMM of 40th parliament (see Tillson 2009).
- Ensure that temporary foreign workers are used for short-term gaps in the labour demands and open permanent immigration for broader set of skill levels as the need or un– and semi–skilled workers is on–going.
- Allow temporary foreign workers to be tied to a sector and not an employer to ensure that they have options for mobility.
- Require employers to pay a living wage based on Provincial standards.
- Raise minimum wage.
- Identify strategies to end discriminatory hiring practices where demands for “Canadian experience” are code words for whiteness.
- Ensure that employers: obey migrant worker contracts and provide them with the same wages as Canadian workers.
- Monitor deductions to ensure they are allowable and reasonable and that recruitment fees are not being extracted from temporary foreign workers under another name.

INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

- Family to accompany migrant workers.
- Redefine ‘family’.
- Affordable housing options so families can live together more readily.
WORK–FAMILY BALANCE

- Recognition of credentials.
- Live–out status.
- Offer better state–supported childcare, eldercare, and home care for the infirm and persons with disabilities.

NOTES

(1) All names are pseudonyms. From D. L. Spitzer, ‘Migration and Menopause: Experiences of Maturation in Three Immigrant Communities,’ 1998.

(2) From ‘Transnational Families in Transition: Filipino Families, Canadian Issues.’ Project funding awarded to Dr. Denise L. Spitzer by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For the past 20 years, I have had the privilege of working with migrants who came to Canada under the auspices of the Live–In Caregiver Program (LCP). During this time, I have conducted a series of research projects, in collaboration with LCP workers’ organizations and immigrant serving organizations, which have followed these workers from their arrival in various provinces in their disparate caregiving situations and rural/urban locations across Canada to first labour as LCP workers, through their lives post–LCP, and their experiences reuniting with family members in North America. This report draws primarily from a study entitled ‘Transnational Families in Transition: Filipino Families, Canadian Issues,’ funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), and in collaboration with Dr. Sara Torres (Research Coordinator) and our community partners, Ms. Aimee Beboso, Ms. Noreen Berkes, Dr. Caridad Bernardino, Ms. Josephine Pallard, and Ms. Avegail Calzado.

Foremost, I wish to thank the current and former live–in caregivers and their families who took the time to share their, often painful, stories with us: ‘Salamat Po.’

REFERENCES


APPENDIX: OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDY

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the study were to: (1) Examine the impact of separation on the families of former live-in caregivers from the Philippines now residing in two second tier Canadian cities, Ottawa and Edmonton; (2) Explore how family members renegotiate gender, parental, familial, and marital roles; (3) Situate the experiences of informants in the context of gender, globalization, identity, socioeconomic status, and the local host community; (4) Illuminate the impact of these phenomena on the health and well being of former live-in caregivers and their family members; (5) Identify supportive individual, familial and/or community coping or adaptive strategies as well as ways for governmental and non-governmental agencies to support these efforts; and (6) Consider the implications of these findings for Canadian immigration and labour policy and society.

DATA COLLECTION

In addition to conducting a survey of relevant national and provincial policies pertinent to family reunification, we employed three qualitative data collection methods: interviews, focus groups and visual ethnography. Specifically, we conducted 51 semi-structured interviews between July 2009 and April 2010 in Ottawa, Ontario and Edmonton, Alberta about the experiences of family reunification among Filipino former live-in caregivers with 28 former LCP workers, nine spouses, and 14 children. Of these participants, 70.5% of the interviews were with individuals at least one of whose immediate family members was also interviewed. Second, we involved former live-in caregivers and their family members (who participated or who were new to the study) in Ottawa to communicate their stories of familial separation and reunification through the use of photographic storytelling. Finally, we shared the findings from interviews and photo-voice projects in focus groups with community members and policy influencers in Ottawa and Edmonton.

SAMPLE

Sixty-eight percent of the former live-in caregivers immigrated to Canada between the years 2000 and 2010; approximately one third immigrated to Canada between the year 1990 and 1999. While several mothers came to Canada after working in other countries, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong SAR, the length of separation upon arriving in Canada varied. More than half (52.4%) of mothers were separated for 3 to 4 years; 19% were separated for 5 to 6 years and 9.6% were separated for 5 to 10 years. Notably, the impact of separation varied among various family formations. The length of separation of spouses
with no children was much shorter, as nearly one fifth (19%) of these couples were apart for 1 to 2 years. The brevity of their separation was largely due to the fact that these workers married after having come to Canada, but before finishing their contract under the LCP. With the majority of the long-term married couples, the woman often worked in another country prior to coming to Canada; therefore, the separation time could range between 10 to 16 years. Because of these other countries’ migration policies, mothers went back to the Philippines once a year for approximately a month long vacation. Once in Canada, only a few mothers were able to make a trip back to the Philippines.
Parental leave is one of the main social policies designed to support the accommodation of family and work responsibilities. Family friendly policies are designed to offset the tension between the workers’ schedules and responsibilities (Tremblay, & Genin, 2011). Government policies can facilitate simultaneous commitments to employment and to family (Drago, 2011). Family policies, and particularly parental leaves have a significant impact at the family level, on the quality of marital and parent–child relationships (Robila, 2012, 2014).

The 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family in 2014 represents an opportunity to examine the progress made in developing parental leave policies in different countries. The goal of this paper is to provide a review of parental leaves in United States, Canada and Mexico.

**Background Data**

The importance of the family in society needs to be recognized through an appropriate level of public spending on family benefits programs. It has been recommended that 2.5% percentage of the GDP should be set aside specifically for the family (IFP, 2008). OECD data (2014) indicate that public spending for family benefits varies between 1% of GPD in Mexico, 1.4% of GDP in Canada, 2.1% of GDP in the U.S., to 3.1% of GPD in Sweden, 3.5% of GDP in Iceland, 3.7% of GDP in France (Figure 1). Increasing the percent of GDP set aside for families would increase the opportunities to provide more effective and extensive services.

Family demographics have registered variations such as an increase in age at the first child or fertility rates. Data indicate that mean age of women at first birth varies from 21.3 in Mexico, to 25 in U.S., and to 27.6 in Canada, while the fertility rate varies from 1.66 in Canada, 2.04 in U.S., and 2.08 in Mexico (OECD, 2014) (Table 1).

Fully paid parental leave varies between 27.5 weeks in Canada, 12 weeks in Mexico, to 43.8 weeks in France and 37.7 weeks in Sweden (Figure 2) (OECD, 2014). Early childhood education and care services represent important dimensions of family services.
As part of the family policy’s support to working parents, it is recommended that states provide subsidized childcare to at least 33% of children under the age of three, and to 90% for 3 to 6 years old children (IFP, 2008). The data indicate that childcare enrollment of 0–2 year olds stands at 31.4% for the U.S, 5.8% for Mexico, 55% for Iceland and 46.7%
for France (Figure 3) (OECD, 2014). The enrollments for 3–5 year olds stand at 55.7% for the U.S., 82.7% for Mexico, 99.9% for France and 95.9% for Iceland (Figure 4) (OECD, 2014).

**Figure 2**

Maternity and Parental Paid Leave (2007-08)

--- OECD average ······ ± 0.5 standard deviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Weeks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>23.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


**Figure 3**

Enrolment Rates for 0-2 year olds (2008)

--- OECD average ······ ± 0.5 standard deviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>55.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>46.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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Different theoretical perspectives have been used in the field while analyzing the interactions of people’s responsibilities in the work and family spheres. Tremblay (2010) provides an overview of the theoretical perspectives on work–family relationships models, and reviews the work–family balance model, the work–family alternating model, and the non–interventionist model. The ‘work–family balance or cumulative model’ (since it is possible to cumulate work and family) allows for balancing the demand of work and family life, by allowing both women and men to remain employed while assuming their family responsibilities. This model provides a variety of public measures to support this balance in work and family life, such as accessible child care services, good work–time arrangements and paid and flexible parental leave, while also encouraging a more equal share of both work and family responsibilities for men and women (e.g., in Norway, Finland, Iceland, Quebec). In the ‘work–family alternating model,’ the goal is to encourage employed parents (mostly women) to choose a strategy to enter and exit labor market to balance work and family life, by giving priority to one sphere over the other at different times. The state encourages women to leave their jobs or to reduce their work hours in order to take care of their children until they reach school age and then to return to work (e.g., in Germany, Netherlands).

The ‘non–interventionist model’ is characterized by absence of generalized measures for adjusting work–family relationship, either due to limited resources (e.g., in southern Eu-
Europe: Spain, Portugal), or due to prevalent ideology of non-intervention (e.g., UK, USA) (Tremblay, 2010). In this model, accommodating the work and family responsibilities is considered a private matter, which is left to be addressed by individuals and employers. In this case the collective bargain at the company level must compensate for the lack of public policy and this determines large differences in addressing the issue. Canada and the United States are associated with the non-interventionist model, although there are significant differences between them.

A. Parental Leave in the United States

Parental leave in the United States has been provided by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) passed in 1993. FMLA allows working women and men in the United States to take 12 weeks unpaid job-protected leave to care for a new born and adopted child (parental leave) or for a serious medical condition that affects the employee or a family member. There is a requirement for the employee to work at least 52 weeks and a minimum of 1250 working hours a year in order to be eligible. Employers are required to provide the leave only if they have more than 50 employees within a 75 mile radius. Thus, many parents working in smaller organizations are not eligible. The lack of federal and state funding for parental leave under the FMLA favors the most privileged of married parents (Drago, 2011). Some states have taken initiatives in providing some paid leave for working parents (California, Washington, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico) (Kamerman & Waldfogel, 2008).

Policy development needs to be closely followed by effective policy implementation. The existence of a policy is not sufficient to guarantee effective implementation. Implementation is impacted by a variety of factors, among others, awareness of beneficiaries about the policies, social perception about the policy, and practically (people being able to actually use it). For example, given that the leave is unpaid, many parents cannot afford to take it (e.g. Fitzpatrick & Kostina-Ritchey, 2014). Women are more likely than men to take it given that their earning power is lower than that of men.

Awareness about a policy is a critical factor in people being able to use the policy. The media and the organizational/institutional environment are important factors in informing and educating the general public and their employees about their rights. Social policy could be meaningless without mechanisms that allow implementation (Kramer, 2008). Unions can play an important role in increasing awareness about policies among the employees and supporting their implementation (Kramer, 2008). A study using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1992–2002) which examined people awareness of FMLA indicated that union members’ knowledge regarding their rights is better than that of nonunion members. Moreover, employees who are more likely to use the policy were more likely to be aware of them. Thus, women were more likely than men to be knowledgeable about the leave benefits. A study on employee awareness of family leave bene-
fits indicated that 91% of employed FMLA-eligible women report they have access to unpaid leave compared to 72% of men, and that work situations more than family situations affect the knowledge of family leave benefits (Baird, & Reynolds, 2004).

Social perception of parental leave is another important factor in its implementation, with positive perspectives being associated with higher chances of usage and negative perspective preventing eligible parents from taking it. Allen and Russell (1999) found that men and women who took parental leave were perceived as less committed to their jobs compared to those who did not take it and to be less likely to be recommended for promotions. The research on the perceptions of mothers and fathers who take temporary work leave indicates a shift towards more positive attitudes toward combining family and work life. For example, a study with undergraduate students indicated that parents who took parental leaves were rated more positively than stay-at-home parents and working parents who did not take the leave (Coleman, & Franluk, 2011). Parents who took the leave were also rated as being more competent than stay-at-home and warmer than working parents. They were also expected to be less successful in their careers than the parents who did not take the leave but more successful than the parents who stayed at home. Acknowledging this shift from the traditional gender roles and negative perceptions of those taking the leaves towards a positive view on balancing family and work roles might encourage working parents to take the leave.

While there is no paid paternity leave in US, research shows that the majority of fathers take at least some leave at the birth of their child, but that the length of that leave varies (Nepomnyaschy, & Waldfogel, 2007). Most of the fathers take time off work only about a week (e.g., Malin, 1998). Fathers who take longer leaves are more involved in child care activities nine month later (Nepomnyaschy, & Waldfogel, 2007). One of the main rationales for provisions of paternity leave is that it means increasing the father–child bond and father involvement in childrearing activities, with important impact on child’s cognitive and socio–emotional development (e.g., Nepomnyaschy, & Waldfogel, 2007).

**B. Parental leave in Canada**

Parental leave policy in Canada has registered considerable progress. Since 2001 Canadian employed parents have the right to take up to a 1 year paid parental leave with a 55% wage replacement rate (Ray, 2008; Tremblay, 2010). Canada’s parental benefits are provided through the federal government’s employment insurance program and the statutory right to return to work is covered by federal, provincial and territorial legislation (Evens, 2007).

In 2006 the Canadian province of Quebec introduced a new parental leave that is different from those found in the rest of Canada, providing better paid and more flexible benefits (Tremblay, & Genin, 2011). This is due to declining birth rates but also to the signifi-
significant involvement of women’s advocacy organizations which supported a cumulative / work–family balance model. It includes, in addition to maternity leave, a paternity leave that is non-transferable to the mother, and a 1 year paid parental leave that can be shared between the parents, and that usually pays 55% or 75% of salary, depending on which option is chosen. The paternity leave consists in a three week (75% wage replacement) or 5 week leave (55% wage replacement) and it was introduced to strongly encourage father involvement in child care (Tremblay, & Genin, 2011).

The province of Quebec offers its own program since 2006, which is somewhat different than the rest because it extends coverage to those who are self-employed, it provides a higher earning replacement and it includes the option to claim higher benefits for a shorter leave (Evens, 2007).

In Quebec family policy is the result of a very strong involvement of different stakeholders such as union and women’s groups. They asked the Quebec government to support day care systems and to provide better parental leave that was provided by the federal government (Tremblay, 2010).

While parental leave is an important right for employees, its implementation in different work environments is not always effective (Tremblay, & Genin, 2011). Research indicates that management needs to make sure that employees feel supported by their work environments when they take the leave and that they do not feel that they have to pay for it in terms of career opportunities and promotions. Organizational support for parental leave utilization plays an important role in the actual implementation of these policies (Tremblay, & Genin, 2011).

Recent research indicates that parents in Quebec are more likely than other Canadian parents to take the paid parental leave, especially the fathers; thus more than ¾ of newborns in Quebec had a father who took some leave compared to ¼ in the rest of Canada (Statistics Canada, 2012 cited by Rose & Humble, 2014).

C. PARENTAL LEAVE IN MEXICO

Parental leave in Mexico is restricted to employees working in the formal sector (Gomes, 2014).

Thus the rights guaranteed by legislation to protect women during maternity period are restricted to women working formally, leaving out many of them who work in the domestic and informal sector, such as caregivers, farmers, or domestic workers (Gomes, 2014). Working mothers and all working parents with the right to Social Security can participate in maternity and child care benefits provided by the Mexican Social Security Institute (Instituto Mexicano del Serguro Social, IMSS).
Under the Federal Labor Law, working mothers receive their full wages for 42 days (six weeks) before childbirth and 42 days (six weeks) after (Kamerman, 2000). The benefits include 100% wage replacement (75% from the social security system and 25% employer) (Pautassi, & Rico, 2011). Mothers are allowed to take two 30–minute breaks per day in order to breastfeed (Pautassi, & Rico, 2011). Since 2012 Mexico introduced a five days paid paternity leave (World Bank, 2012).

Another progress is the Gender Equity Model (MEG) which was implemented in Mexico in 2003 and provides awards to private businesses, public institutions and organizations that commit to a review of internal policies and practices with a view to adopting non–discriminatory management tools and affirmative actions (Pautassi, & Rico, 2011).

**D. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Increase the utilization of parental leave by providing payment benefits.
- Increase the participation of fathers by providing paternity leaves (leaves designed only for the fathers).
- Assure effective policy implementation by requiring employers to inform their employees about their rights and to support them in taking the leave.
- Conduct research on the effectiveness of parental leave and use the data on policy revisions and improvements.
- Encourage NGOs and Civil Society to request their Governments to enact and implement effective family policies.

**REFERENCES**


From a historical perspective, the labor market and social policies in the United States have been based on a conceptualization of families that assumed that men were the economic providers, and that women would rely on their husband’s earnings for their livelihood. Places of employment, schools, pensions, and health care programs were organized around the concept of a male wage earner, who earned a ‘family’ wage and his dependent wife and children, who were to be covered by his benefits. Correlated with this notion, was the unwritten understanding that in exchange for financial security, women were to be in charge of the home and childcare. The United States, in tandem with the other countries in the Western world, supported this system, which included the belief in social protections for vulnerable individuals. Often referred to as Fordism, this was a societal arrangement that emerged after World War II in the West and was characterized by mass production, the full employment of males, an emphasis on the state as the provider of a social safety net, and increased personal consumption. An integral and often forgotten aspect of this system was the role of the state in reinforcing social relations, encouraging social connectedness, and promoting the stability of families (Carrington, 2002).

While from an ideological perspective, under Fordism, the contributions of both men and women were believed to be equally important to the well-being of the family unit, from a practical perspective, the economic dependence of women made them unequal to men. And despite the fact that this organizational model never applied to all U.S. families, it did describe the lives of many American middle and working class families in the post–World War II era through the mid–1960s. However, over the last half–century, in great part due to globalization, massive societal, economic, ideological, and technological changes have transformed the world. These transformations have also had a profound impact in the United States, changing the structure and composition of American families in essential ways. Single parent and dual–income families have become normative, and now are more frequent than the once prevalent two parent, single–earner households. Concurrently, the composition of the US labor force has been transformed as women now work outside the home, for pay, in record numbers.

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See Dorothy Smith’s (1993) article on SNAF – the Standard North American Family for an understanding of how this model of family life undergirds U.S. social policies, programs, and services.
Despite these fundamental societal changes, public policy and cultural ideas about appropriate gender arrangements in families have not kept up with contemporary trends. The social welfare system has remained entrenched in the assumption that a specific family form, the two parent, economic provider–homemaker model, is still the basis of society. This is particularly problematic in the arena of social and family policies. Furthermore, in the United States, more so than in other industrialized countries, social policies are designed around the concept that government assistance is to be a last resort, provided only after families have first used available kin, community, and employer supports, or is only to be available for those individuals who do not have access to these supports. Many American mainstream economists support these values: they commonly endorse and even advocate for limited government involvement. This has led to a situation where many individuals are struggling to balance family and work obligations, and where many women, specifically, are uniquely vulnerable to not being able to undertake full employment over a lifetime.

A pivotal aspect of U.S. workplace employment policies, which complicates this scenario, is that they are often inequitably distributed among employees: the highest-paid workers tend to receive the best benefits packages while frequently the employees who may have the greatest need for family–support assistance from their employers, may be the least likely to receive them. These arrangements have particular implications for women in the labor force: they are the ones who often have to interrupt their employment over their life course, work part time, or make other work related decisions due to their continued significant involvement with caring labor and other familial responsibilities. The decisions women make in order to balance work and family obligations often have lifetime effects with respect to their monetary earnings, the jobs that are available to them, and the long-term trajectories of their careers. By interrupting their employment, women can accrue lifelong disadvantages, and concurrently, the labor force is deprived of their talents and contributions.

Contemporary social dynamics are also affecting the roles of men in the United States. A number of recent studies illustrate that men increasingly have work–family related concerns: as male involvement in family life becomes increasingly normative, younger men, in particular, expect and are expected to be very involved in the raising of young children, often creating friction between work expectations and familial life (Glavin, Schieman, & Reid, 2011). Moreover, in an increasingly globalized world, working women and men are at risk of losing their jobs either through downsizing or to individuals in other countries where labor is cheaper than in the United States. These changes have created an environment where despite a wealth of data about work–family balance and proposed potential solutions, very few policies and programs actually assist women and men as they ne-

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18 A recent survey by the Pew Research Center found that 71% of Americans said they had “old fashioned values” when it comes to family and marriage (Pew Research Center, 2010).
gotiate their work and familial responsibilities. This has also lead to a situation where the labor force is not characterized by full employment.

**A. Demographic changes in the U.S. labor force**

Starting in the mid–to–late 1960s, an unprecedented number of women joined the paid labor force in the United States. Strikingly, many of these women had young children – even though traditionally these were the women who were most likely to stay home. According to the U.S. Department of Labor (2012), currently 57.7% of all women 16 years and over are in the labor force (72,620,000) compared to 70.2% of all men (82,327,000), and 71.3 percent of women with children under the age of 18 are working outside of the home (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012b). The United States is not an isolated case: various studies indicate that this is a growing trend in other parts of the world as well, including in so–called ‘traditional’ societies where until very recently, women with young children were almost always culturally expected to stay at home. That said, the labor force participation of women peaked in 1999 and has since been on a decline in the U.S.¹⁹

The U.S. labor force is changing in other significant ways as well. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) predicts that over the next 10 years, the aging labor force will grow, but slowly, and that there will be a decline in the overall labor force participation rate (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012a). This decline is attributed to the decreased labor force participation rate of youths and people in their middle years. The slight decline of women in the labor force also contributed to the drop in the aggregate labor force participation rate (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012a). However, simultaneously, the participation rates of older workers (individuals 55 and over) are predicted to increase. The current projection is that the labor force will grow by 0.05 percent over the 2012–2022 period. This compares to the previous 10–year period, 2002–2012 where the labor force grew by 10.1 million or 0.7 percent. As the population ages at an unprecedented rate, and skills based jobs gain in importance in a globalized economy, the lack of training opportunities for older workers is bound to become increasingly important (Little & Triest, 2002).

Diversity also plays an important role in the work and social life of the United States. As the United States continues to become ever more heterogeneous with respect to race, ethnicity and religion due to increased immigration, the labor force is reflecting this growing multiculturalism. According to the U.S. Census data (2012), people of color now make up 36.2% of the US population (13.1% black, 5.0 % Asian, 16.7% Hispanic or Latino

¹⁹ This has not necessarily been in the case in most other industrialized and developing countries where the labor force participation of women is on the rise. See for example reports by the OECD. The differences between the United States and other countries with respect to the full employment of women are commonly attributed, at least in part, to the more supportive work–family policies in those countries (see for instance, Esping-Andersen, 2013).
Origin, 1.2% American Indian and Alaska Native Persons, and 2% Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Island Persons). Moreover, in a trend that is on the rise, California, Texas, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and New Mexico have become ‘majority-minority states’ meaning that over 50% of their populations are minorities. These demographics are mirrored in labor force statistics: currently approximately 36 percent of the labor force is composed of people of color, and this diversity is projected to increase. Moreover, between 2000 and 2050, new immigrants to the United States and their children will account for 83 percent of the increase in the working age population (Burns, Barton, & Kerby, 2012). This growth in the diversity of the U.S. population poses unique challenges to public policies, the labor market, understandings about normative families, and society as a whole, as we move further into the twenty-first century.

B. Social Class Issues

Depending on social class, work intersects with family responsibilities in complex and differing ways. For instance, Bianchi (2011) illustrates that across the board, there is an increase in nonstandard work schedules, job insecurity as well as wide differences in earnings. High earning families are primarily faced with intense work demands: one or both parents frequently work very long hours with little if any time off over the course of a year. Their high incomes however, provide them with the resources to outsource most of their domestic responsibilities. Low-income families have a different set of challenges: they often are not able to work enough hours, have little if any control over the hours they do work, and do not earn enough money to provide for their basic needs let alone purchase care for their families. Those at the bottom rung of the socio-economic ladder may be eligible for public assistance programs such as Early Head Start and subsidized child care, which helps them survive. Concurrently, middle class families in the United States are the ones facing rising job insecurities, lowered earnings, and virtually no assistance from public programs. Furthermore, quality care for both children and elders is so expensive that it is increasingly out of their reach. This makes the negotiation of work and family responsibilities exceedingly complex for all families along the socio-economic spectrum.

C. Specific Gender Related Concerns

Despite fundamental demographic and societal transformations in the United States, social expectations and public policies with respect to promoting work–family balance have been slow to change. Stereotypes about the ‘appropriate’ roles of women and men persist and fuel support for workplace environments and public policies that are based on a breadwinner – homemaker model of family responsibilities. These notions are coupled with neoliberal conceptualizations that markets and economies need to be ‘unregulated’
in order for the US to thrive economically. Unfortunately, this has led to a situation where one-third to one-half of all Americans report that they experience virtually daily conflicts between their work and family responsibilities. A Human Rights Watch study released in February 2011 concluded that the United States does not provide adequate work–family supports, which burdens individuals and families unnecessarily (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

It is critical to note that work–family balance concerns affect employees in general, not just individuals with children, or only women. For instance, the Families and Work Institute reports that approximately one-third of employees say they consistently have to choose between advancing in their jobs or attending to their family or personal lives, and one-third will have dealt with elder care—care for a parent over the past year. These startling statistics have led the OECD to rank the United States as ninth–to–last out of 34 countries with respect to work–life balance (OECD, 2014).

While women and men are both impacted by the lack of supports for balancing work and family obligations, women face some specific, unique challenges. Extensive empirical research indicates that it is primarily women who spend time in ‘caring labor’: and not just caring for children, but also for the sick, elderly and disabled. Moreover, the ‘caring professions’ such as education, health care, and elder care (which are also lower paying professions) are also characterized by a disproportionately higher number of women (Folbre, 2008).

The fact that many women continue to be the primary caregivers in families leads, at times, to detrimental consequences when their situation is viewed from a life cycle perspective. Furthermore, the entrepreneurial, free market model that dominates the U.S. labor market has specific repercussions for women vis-à-vis men due to its emphasis and expectation that individuals be completely committed to their jobs on a continuous and full time basis.

**Life Cycle Consequences**

An often overlooked aspect of the work–family debate is the long–term consequences of

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20 Neo-liberalism refers to an economic perspective wherein markets dominate, unfettered by regulations and work places are restructured to reflect a more entrepreneurial direction that includes decentralized wage fixing processes and a devolution towards self-management.

21 For instance, about 82 percent of social workers, 69.9% of counselors, and 82.4% of human service workers are female (Policymic, 2013). It is important to remember that care is context and person-specific. Some people and certain situations elicit more care making it difficult to quantify caring. Care also has a personal dimension – some individuals enjoy providing care and derive emotional rewards from this activity, while others may find care provision as burdensome. It is this constellation of characteristics that makes care as a commodity difficult to fold into policy discussions and decisions.
employment decision over the life cycle. Most work–family debates primarily emphasize the day–to–day or routine aspects of work–home negotiations or the gendered division of labor. However, often times there are long–term issues that are connected to the occupational cycles of certain professions. For instance, in many jobs career success is dependent on the efforts that individuals invest at the initial phase of their employment cycle. For women in particular, these early years often conflict with the same time that they are deliberating starting families. Thus, many women are faced with complex choices with respect to career trajectories and devoting time to their families with young children. At various points in their lifespan, women are much more likely to be engaged in caregiving responsibilities which constrain their participation in paid employment. For instance, Bianchi (2011), through the use of time diaries, has illustrated that mothers tend to adjust their work hours to coincide with their care responsibilities: in other words they choose jobs that allow them as much as possible to overlap job hours with children’s school schedules. These adjustments to work hours coincide with feeling of time pressure and stress and lead to only 21 percent of women stating that full–time work was the ideal employment situation for them. Instead, over 60 percent of mothers of school age children preferred part–time work. (Pew Center, 2007 in Bianchi, 2011).

While there is debate if women ‘choose’ to limit their employment as an adaptive response to their familial situations, there is no arguing that gender still strongly structures their choices. Women’s part time and interrupted employment mean that from a life span perspective, men and women do not finish in the same place with respect to their ultimate economic situations. Over their lifetimes, due to these interruptions, women are not always able to claim equivalent employment based benefits as men, and can even become more at risk of landing in poverty. Specifically, pensions and insurance benefits are affected by periods of low income and / or lack of work. Women may also be affected in more subtle ways to discrimination in the workplace. A number of studies illustrate that women are subjected to the ‘motherhood wage penalty’ because they are perceived as less committed to their jobs than men, even though they give no indication that this is necessarily the case (Bianchi, 2011). Thus, in the United States, despite a dominant ideological commitment to gender equality, men and women are often not equally situated at the start, in the middle and at the end of their career paths.

For a certain segment of the U.S. population this confluence of factors has led to what is often referred to as the ‘feminization of poverty’: more than one in seven women, 14.5 percent or nearly 17.8 million women, lived in poverty in the United States in 2012 (U.S Census, 2012). In contrast, the poverty rate for men has remained steady at 11 percent. The wage gap between men and women also remains surprisingly large. While according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor (2010) the youngest women in the labor force (those between 16 – 24) earned 93 percent of what their male counterparts earned, women who were between 45 – 54 earned 74 percent to that of men.
This discrepancy in the wage pay between women and men who are somewhat older has not changed for over a decade. These statistics illustrate that a number of societal influences (such as working in the caring professions, time off for caretaking responsibilities, and the types of work that are available to women) all impact women in a significant, economic manner.  

D. AN IDEOLOGICAL AND LEGAL COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY: THE IDEAL VS. THE REAL

In the contemporary United States, from an ideational perspective, there now exists virtually unanimous support for the equal treatment of all citizens. Specifically, most Americans support the notion of gender equality. This ideological orientation is supported by the law: women and men are to be treated fairly and equitably at the workplace and there are foundational legal provisions against discrimination based on sex. Three specific laws in the US reflect this commitment to gender equality with respect to employment: the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (which includes Sexual Harassment), and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.

THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963

A very important aspect of the U.S. commitment to gender equality is found in the Equal Pay Act which was signed into law in 1963 by the President John F. Kennedy. This act amended the earlier Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and was instituted to “prohibit discrimination on account of sex in the payment of wages by employers.” Congress passed the EPA out of “concern for the weaker bargaining position of women” to provide an antidote to discriminatory wage structures that reproduced “an ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman” (NWLC, 2011). Various analyses indicate that overall women’s pay in the United States has gone from 59 percent of men’s in 1962 to around 80 to 84 percent today (Cohen, 2013; Milkman, 2013). Among workers ages 25 to 34, women’s hourly earnings in 2012 were 93% to those of men (Pew Research Center, 2013).

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22 For instance, professional women are far more likely to work in the health or education arenas, which are lower paid fields overall. In 2009, professional women in this area made up about 69 percent of the field.

23 Due to space considerations I am only highlighting the most important pieces of legislation concerned with gender equality at the workplace. Another related piece of legislation, the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) is discussed in a separate presentation at this conference.

24 This is an often cited quote from the Supreme Court Case of 1974, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan.

25 The figures differ depending on whether the calculations are based on hourly or weekly earnings.
Most recently, an extension of the laws established by the Equal Pay Act, entitled the Paycheck Fairness Act, has not successfully passed in the U.S. Congress despite multiple attempts.\textsuperscript{26} This Act was proposed as an effort to address a 2008 Census Bureau report that stated that women’s median annual earnings were 77.5\% of men’s earnings.\textsuperscript{11}\textsuperscript{27} In response, the Department of Labor commissioned a major study to investigate the situation. The study conducted by CONSAD (2009), concluded that the current wage gap between women and men in the United States is not due to systematic gender discrimination, but is primarily the result of individual choices that women and men make with respect to employment. While this may be a valid argument purely from a quantitative perspective, it does not take into account the reality of employment conditions for contemporary U.S. workers: women and men may, out of great necessity, make difficult choices with respect to where they privilege their time.

**SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964**

Under U.S. law, sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII is a federal law that prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion, and it applies to employers with 15 or more employees, including federal, state, and local governments. Individuals who work for smaller businesses are usually protected by similar state anti-discrimination laws. Retribution against someone who complains of sexual harassment or participates in an investigation involving sexual harassment, is also illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

In the United States, the legal foundation for sexual harassment laws was built on the original laws prohibiting racial harassment. The 1964 Civil Rights Act provides the basis. Most legal cases concerning women’s rights at the workplace have been primarily enacted through court cases that have highlighted those actions that clearly violate women’s rights. The cases are commonly associated with class action suits and high fines for the violators. Thus, in the United States, the emphasis on gender equality has centered primarily on an extensive number of rules and policies concerned with regulating sexuality in the workplace. However, this exclusive focus on sexuality is heavily criticized by feminists and policy makers both here and abroad. They point out that prohibiting sexual conduct in the workplace does not resolve issues of discrimination and harassment. Instead, both American and European feminists argue that women need to be better integrated into workplaces. In higher level professional sectors, many women are segregated.

\textsuperscript{26} There have been multiple attempts including in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014.

\textsuperscript{27} This statistic continues to be cited despite multiple questions about its accuracy in 2014. See all the op-eds in U.S. newspapers about President Obama using this statistic over the winter months.
from male dominated spaces and, thus, are not able to achieve top positions. Occupational segregation also occurs between low paid ‘female’ jobs and higher paid ’male’ jobs. Focusing exclusively on sexuality and harassment does not solve the fundamental problems.

**The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978**

An important applied dimension of the commitment to gender equality is the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) is basically an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights act. This act makes it unlawful to discriminate against a woman with respect to hiring, firing and providing fringe benefits on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical condition. This law applies to employers with more than fifteen employees, employment agencies, labor organization and the federal government. Despite its basic intent, this law has not been very effective in promoting gender equality due to its limited nature. It does not provide rights to workers in the months and years following childbirth, thus not accounting for many women’s domestic responsibilities. Our U.S. court system is full of cases of employers who continue to discriminate specifically against women who are unable to work the same number of hours as co–workers who may not have the same caregiving responsibilities (Bhushan, 2012). Moreover, both audit and experimental research indicates that employers have a tendency to discriminate against women whose resumes suggest that they are mothers (Budig & England, 2001).

**E. The intense American workplace as a challenge**

Despite the fact that work–family negotiations have become a global phenomenon, studies indicate that American women and men have a particularly complex time balancing their personal and work responsibilities (Blau & Kahn, 2013). This can be attributed to the unique combination of workplace culture and the lack of supportive policies that characterize American society. In particular, the conceptualization of the ‘ideal’ worker who is completely dedicated to his or her job conflicts with realistically balancing work and family responsibilities. Moreover, as has been noted, interruptions in the lifetime work cycle due to leaves for family responsibilities also impacts individuals, and most commonly women.

**Work Hours**

American employees are particularly strained due to two interrelated factors: most Americans work much longer hours than their counterparts in other countries in the
industrialized world; and U.S. family/social policies do little if anything to support what are perceived as private problems and negotiations. For instance, since 1979, most other industrialized countries have dramatically reduced the number of yearly work hours (Meyers & Gornick, 2004). This has not happened in the United States. Instead, for most American workers the length of the working day has been growing over recent years. A recent study reports that between 1979 and 2000, the proportion of workers putting in 50 hours or more per week increased by six percentage points for both genders (Cha, 2013). This leaves less time for leisure and personal pursuits, including care for children, the disabled and the elderly. Moreover, the same study found that long hours have led to occupational segregation: men are more likely to be found in higher paying jobs with longer hours, and women lean towards jobs that offer more flexibility with respect to time but also pay less.

“Using longitudinal data drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation ... mothers are more likely to leave male-dominated occupations when they work 50 hours or more per week, but the same effect is not found for men or childless women. Results also show that overworking mothers are more likely to exit the labor force entirely, and this pattern is specific to male-dominated occupations. These findings demonstrate that the norm of overwork in male-dominated workplaces and the gender beliefs operating in the family combine to reinforce gender segregation of the labor market” (Cha, 2013, p. 158).

Today in the United States even though women and men have equal access to education, jobs, and professions, their varied family responsibilities and the lack of family policies, disadvantages women more often over the long term. This is illustrated by recent empirical data that indicates that younger women and men who do not have familial responsibilities now have almost equivalent career opportunities and earnings, but that a significant income differential appears with age (Pew Research Center, 2013).

We have a situation in the United States where there is relatively equal access to most jobs, pay, and benefits for those who are in equivalent positions. However, for those individuals who need to either drop out of the workforce or who can only participate partially, their ultimate economic outcomes are usually adversely impacted. Since it is more often women who need to interrupt their employment, they are also the ones who suffer the economic and personal consequences over the long term.

**F. Resistance to Supportive Work–Family Policies**

Despite much empirical documentation about the long-term employment and social gains through policies that facilitate the lives of working individuals with family responsibilities, most U.S. employers have been slow to institute family friendly policies and programs. Instead, many employers and politicians contend that policies such as work flexi-
bility, job sharing, paid leave, and telecommuting are associated with great economic costs. In other words, they do not believe that instituting family friendly policies is financially feasible, and will instead reduce the ability of the United States to stay economically competitive in the global arena. For instance, at a hearing in 2007 on the proposed Healthy Families Act which would guarantee a minimum of seven paid sick days to workers, a very limited number by global standards, G. Roger King, a partner at the Jones Day corporate law firm, argued that this act and any similar regulations to protect employees would lessen the competitive edge of the United States in the global market place.

“Employers in this country are already burdened by numerous federal, state and local regulations which result in million of dollars in compliance costs.... These mandated and largely unfunded ‘cost of doing business’ requirements in certain instances not only hinder and impede the creation of new jobs, but also inhibit our nation’s employers from competing globally.” (Quoted in Earle, Mokomane, & Heymann, 2011, p. 196).

Empirical cross-cultural research on the effects of work–family policies does not provide support for the perspective that instituting more family friendly policies will make the United States less economically competitive. For instance, various studies in Japan, the United Kingdom and Sweden have shown that providing women with paid maternity leave leads to employee retention (Allen, 2003; Earle, Mokomane, & Heymann, 2011). In contrast, long hours often lessen employee productivity, as does not having a weekly day of rest. Shepard and Clifton (2000) illustrated for example, that in a study of eighteen manufacturing industries in the United States over thirty-five years, every 10 percent increase in overtime hours led to productivity declining by 2–4 percent.

In contrast, just recently, five European countries have given workers the right to demand a change to part–time and 12 now have legislation that forbids employers from discriminating against part–time employees (Blau & Kahn, 2013). None of this holds true for American workers. Moreover, when it comes to childcare we lag even further behind. Most industrialized countries have increased their spending on childcare from 35 percent of their GDP to 47 percent while we have expanded our expense from 0.03 to 0.11 since 1990 (Blau & Kahn, 2013).

Thus, we have a situation where despite striking demographic changes and a general recognition that individuals and families need more support, the United States lags far behind other industrialized and developing countries with respect to instituting family policies that assist individuals with family care responsibilities.

G. CONCLUSION

Contemporary U.S. work–family policies provide limited support to families since most do not account for the fact that a majority of individuals are involved in both caretaking and employee responsibilities. Gender related job concerns and trends are well docu-
Mentioned, and work–family balance is frequently found as a discussion point on national and local agendas. Yet, the United States is very far away from instituting policies that would help women and men balance their dual responsibilities. The United States needs stringent policy changes that address both the challenges individual and families face on a regular basis, as well as the inequality issues that are at the crux of our current work–family policy situation.

**MAINTAINING COST EFFECTIVE WORKPLACES WHILE EASING THE BURDEN ON WORKING FAMILIES**

As we move further into the twenty-first century, the challenge for the United States is to participate in a process that allows individuals and families, employers, and the government to engage in a dialogue that is mutually beneficial. We also need to find mechanisms that will lead to the implementation of policies that are more in keeping with the social and family changes that are we are currently witnessing in our society. In particular, we need to change the fundamental assumption that employee and employer interests are mutually exclusive, and in opposition to one another. Empirical research indicates that allowing employees more flexibility with respect to their hours and location of their work, and providing a more individualized selection of benefits actually increases productivity and the retention of employees. Instead of decreasing an employer’s profits, well thought out work–life policies can contribute significantly to the overall success of a business. Moreover, assuming that work–family issues are primarily only of concern to women is a fallacy. Especially younger men indicate that they expect to be fully involved with family responsibilities, necessitating work flexibility for them too. In the U.S. we need to support healthy, strong families – not just ideologically, but also with concrete actions. This includes making adjustments to school schedules, medical care, elder care, and other community based programs and services that support families.

**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CARE**

The care of children, elders, as well as the disabled and chronically ill, promises to be one of the most complex social issues facing Americans in the twenty-first century. With the proliferation of dual earner couples and single parent households, balancing care and work obligations is increasingly complex in economically precarious environments. There is a great need for policies and programs not just for families with young children but also for families that are caring for aging relatives and individuals with chronic illnesses or disabilities. Currently, approximately 65.7 million Americans (or 29% of the adult population) provide unpaid care to elders, the ill, or individuals with disabilities (National Alliance for Caregiving, 2009). Many of these individuals are part of the ‘sandwich generation’ – those people who care for children and aging parents concurrently, and work ei-
ther full or part–time. Without adequate social supports, the strain on families will become untenable, and will adversely affect the talent that is available in the labor market.

We need to prioritize the concept that social policies do not operate in a vacuum but are created and utilized in varying cultural contexts. Research indicates that cultural attitudes in the United States increasingly endorse maternal employment outside of the home, and paternal involvement in family responsibilities. This sets the stage for a greater acceptance for policies that would ease the conflicts that can be caused by negotiating personal and work responsibilities.

The following are some policy recommendations, many of which are backed by significant empirical evidence that they make a pivotal difference in the lives of individuals and families, while not disadvantaging employers. Creating dialogues and collaborations between employees, employers, and the government would alleviate the social crisis we are currently facing.

**F. Policy Recommendations**

- **Flex time:** Scheduling flexibility should be mandated by federal law. Moreover there exists a need for two types of flex time:
  - Employees should be allowed to determine a window of time when then they arrive at work and then subsequently work a full day from that point onwards
  - Employees should be allowed to trade overtime work for time off instead of extra pay.
- **Menu of choices:** Work places need to provide a menu of work time and benefit choices. In this way, individuals could better adapt their schedules to their particular familial needs. This may also encourage more men to participate in care responsibilities.
- **Reduction in work time:** The overall full–time work week needs to be limited to 35–39 hours, thus allowing employees more time with their families. Workers need to be guaranteed an adequate, yearly allowance of paid days away from work. In the alternative, the work year needs to shortened to alleviate the strain of parents finding care for their children over the summer time. This would also give individuals more time to spend with their families.
- **Re–conceptualization of part–time work:** Part–time work needs to be more accessible and desirable: part time workers should receive benefits commensurate with full–time employees who are performing similar tasks at the work place. This would provide more economic security for workers and would incentivize more individuals to take on this type of work (Moen, Kelly, & Hill, 2011).
Equal pay law enforcement: As an increasing number of American families become dependent on women’s financial contributions to the household for their well-being, it is essential that women be paid equivalently to men for performing the same jobs.

An expansion of the knowledge base about family friendly work policies, which needs to include:

- Empirical data on various types of quality child care options, longer term parental leave options, family leave insurance programs, job sharing possibilities, and other mechanisms that have been proven to improve the work–family climate in some other industrialized and developing countries.

- Increased research on cross-cultural perceptions of balancing work and family is needed; as our society becomes increasingly multi-cultural individuals will have very varied levels of responsibility with respect to caring for family members. We need to better understand what the variables are: including but not limited to how different jobs, family types and ethnic/racial groups vary in their perceptions and access to work–family balance.

- Investigation regarding how work–family balance shifts over the life cycle and what needs individuals may have at various points in their lives.

- Increased multi–level research that integrates individual and organizational perspectives and measures.

- Multi-disciplinary research in organizations that documents how different individuals at various levels of the organization’s hierarchy experience work–family issues. For instance, individuals at the lower end will have less flexibility and control with respect to work flexibility. They will also have fewer resources for accessing high quality child and elder care.

- Increased interactive forums that include: stakeholders – working individuals, employers, policy makers – coming together and dialoguing about the issues pertaining to work–family balance and potential solutions.

- New creative mechanisms for disseminating the current body of knowledge about work–family negotiations and policies, i.e. breaking out of current silos and forging greater linkages between empirical data and public knowledge and policies.

References


6. SOCIAL INTEGRATION: ADVANCING SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

THE FAMILY IN TRANSITION: SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT DECLINES IN FERTILITY AND MARRIAGE?

W. Bradford Wilcox

A turning point has occurred in the life of the human race. The sustainability of human-kind’s oldest institution, the family – the fount of fertility, nurturance, and human capital – is now an open question.

FIGURE 1

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN) FOR SELECT COUNTRIES, 1960–2010

Source: United Nations Population Division

On current trends, many countries confront a future of rapidly aging and declining populations, of few children – many of them without the benefit of siblings and a stable, two–

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28 This essay is adapted from Phillip Longman et al. 2011. ‘The Empty Cradle.’ The Sustainable Demographic Dividend (Charlottesville, VA: National Marriage Project).
parent home—of lonely seniors living on meager public support, of cultural and economic stagnation. In almost every developed country, including most in Europe and East Asia and many in the Americas—from Canada to Chile—birth rates have fallen below the levels needed to avoid rapid population aging and decline (see Figure 1).

The average woman in a developed country now bears just 1.66 children over her lifetime, which is about 21 percent below the level needed to sustain the population over time (2.1 children per woman). Accordingly, the number of children age 0–14 is 60.6 million less in the developed world today than it was in 1965. Primarily because of their dearth of children, developed countries face shrinking workforces even as they must meet the challenge of supporting rapidly growing elderly populations.

![Figure 2](source: United Nations Population Division, Medium Variant Projections, 2011.)

In recent years, the phenomenon of subreplacement fertility has spread to many less

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\(^{30}\) Ibid.
developed countries. In fact, the number of lifetime births per woman shrank in a single
generation from six or more to less than two in places ranging from Iran, Lebanon, and
Tunisia to Chile, Cuba, Trinidad, Thailand, China, Taiwan, and South Korea.31

World population is still growing, to be sure; the United Nations projects that our num-
bers could increase from 7 to 10 billion over the next 90 years.32 But this is a different kind
of growth than we have ever seen before. Until quite recently, population growth came
primarily from increases in the numbers of young people.

But over the next 40 years, according to the U.N.’s latest ‘medium variant’ projections, 53
percent of world population growth will come from increases in the numbers of people
over 60, while only 7 percent will come from people under 30. Indeed, the U.N. projects
that by 2025, the population of children under 5, already in decline in most developed
nations, will be falling globally as well (see Figure 2).33 This means that world population
could well start falling by the turn of the century, especially if birth rates do not break
their downward trend.

Accompanying the global megatrend of falling birth rates is a radical change in the cir-
cumstances in which many children are raised, as country after country has seen a surge
of divorce and/or out—of—wedlock births and a sharp drop in the percentage of children
living with both of their married parents. In much of Europe and the Americas, from the
United Kingdom to the United States, from Mexico to Sweden, out—of—wedlock births
are the ‘new normal,’ with 40 percent or more of all children born without married par-
ents (see Figure 3). Though many of these births are to cohabiting couples, families
headed by cohabiting couples are significantly less stable than those headed by married
couples. This means that children born outside of marriage are markedly more likely to
be exposed to a revolving cast of caretakers and to spells of single parenthood, compared
to children born to married couples.

Take the United States. Fully 41 percent of U.S. children are now born outside of mar-
riage. About half of these children are born to cohabiting couples, and about half of them
are born to single mothers.34 Both of these groups are much more likely to be exposed to
instability (when a parent leaves the household, or a new social parent arrives in the
household—both of which are often stressful for children) and spells of single parenthood
than are children born to married parents. One study of U.S. children found that 17 per-
cent of those born to married couples, 57 percent born to single mothers, and 63 percent
born to cohabiting parents experienced some type of instability in the first six years of
their lives.35 Another study found that the percentage of children in single—parent fami-
lies in the United States more than doubled from 12 percent in 1970 to 25 percent in

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Sheela Kennedy and Larry Bumpass, ‘Cohabitation and Children’s Living Arrangements: New Estimates
35 Shannon E. Cavanaugh and Aletha C. Huston, ‘Family Instability and Children’s Early Problem Behavior,’
Or take Sweden, where 55 percent of children are born outside of marriage. The vast majority of these children are born to cohabiting couples. But even in Sweden, where cohabitation enjoys widespread acceptance and legal support, cohabiting families are less stable than married families. One recent study found that children born to cohabiting couples were about 75 percent more likely than children born to married couples to see their parents break up by age 15.\textsuperscript{37} And the percentage of single–parent households with children in Sweden has almost doubled in the last twenty–five years, from 11 percent in 1985 to 19 percent in 2008.\textsuperscript{38}

An abundant social–science literature, as well as common sense, supports the claim that children are more likely to flourish, and to become productive adults, when they are

\textsuperscript{36} W. Bradford Wilcox, ‘When Marriage Disappears: The New Middle America’ (Charlottesville, VA: The National Marriage Project, Institute for American Values, 2010).


raised in stable, married–couple households. We know, for example, that children in the United States who are raised outside of an intact, married home are two to three times more likely to suffer from social and psychological problems, such as delinquency, depression, and dropping out of high school. They are also markedly less likely to attend college and be stably employed as young adults. Sociologist Paul Amato estimates that if the United States enjoyed the same level of family stability today as it did in 1960, the nation would have 750,000 fewer children repeating grades, 1.2 million fewer school suspensions, approximately 500,000 fewer acts of teenage delinquency, about 600,000 fewer kids receiving therapy, and approximately 70,000 fewer suicide attempts every year.

In Sweden, even after adjusting for confounding factors, children living in single–parent families are at least 50 percent more likely to suffer from psychological problems, to be addicted to drugs or alcohol, to attempt suicide, or to commit suicide than are children in two–parent families.

Moreover, a new study from Child Trends conducted by sociologist Laurie DeRose and her colleagues found that young children in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—including Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, and Peru—were generally more likely to experience diarrhea and mortality if their mother had experienced union instability. In fact, young children (5 and under) whose mothers got divorced, saw their union dissolved, remarried, or repartnered were at least 20 percent more likely to die, compared to children whose mothers remained in their union from their birth.

This new research suggests that children in the developing world are more likely to thrive, at least physically, when they are raised in a stable, two–parent home. Moreover, this research also indicates that such stability is highest in countries where marriage rates are high and nonmarital childbearing rates are low. For instance, 94 percent of mothers of young children in the Asian countries in this study, where marriage is comparatively strong, were in a stable, first union; by contrast, only 60 percent of mothers of young children in the Latin American


40 Amato, ‘Impact of Family Formation Change’.


countries in this study, where marriage is more fragile, were in a stable, first union.\(^4^3\)

And so it is not just the quantity of children that is in decline in more and more regions of the world but also the quality of their family lives, calling into question the sustainability of the human family. Sustainable families don't just reproduce themselves; they also raise the next generation with the requisite virtues and human capital to flourish as adult citizens, employees, and consumers. And families headed by intact, married couples are the ones most likely to succeed in raising the next generation.

What are the causes and consequences, especially economic, of these recent declines in fertility and marriage? What is the appropriate response of policy makers, business leaders, civil society, and individuals? These questions were addressed at the ‘Whither the Child?’ academic conference sponsored by the Social Trends Institute in Barcelona, Spain, in 2010. This paper surveys the evidence from that conference, and other relevant scholarship, in an attempt to understand the rapid demographic evolution of modern societies and to suggest options for ensuring their sustainability.

**A. CAUSES OF FALLING FERTILITY AND MARRIAGE RATES**

Urbanization is a key driver in the transformation of global demographics. Today, more than half the world population lives in urban areas, up from 29 percent in 1950.\(^4^4\)

This trend impacts human reproductive behavior. For city dwellers, whether rich or poor, the economics of childbearing are challenging. In the not–so–distant past, when the majority of the world’s population were still small–scale farmers, most children could still play economically useful roles. They could tend to fields and farm animals, deliver messages between fields and home, and perform tasks in the home that have now been largely supplanted by the widespread consumption of store–bought food and clothing and the introduction of modern appliances. In an urban environment, however, children are no longer an economic asset to the parents but an expensive (and easily avoidable or deferrable) economic liability.\(^4^5\)

Declining real wages and increasingly insecure job tenure have also no doubt played a big role in many young couples’ conclusions that they should either remain childless or delay marrying and starting families. In a paper presented at the Social Trends Institute conference, demographers Wolfgang Lutz, Stuart Basten, and Erich Striessnig noted that over

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\(^4^3\) Ibid. For evidence on marriage and nonmarital childbearing rates in Asia and Latin America, see Laura Lippman and W. Bradford Wilcox, World Family Map 2014 (Washington, DC: Child Trends).


the last generation in the developed world, especially in Europe, entry into professional life after education has become more difficult. “In many European countries,” they observed, “where young employees in the past enjoyed positions which were more or less permanent, today many have to jump from one short–term contract to the next. Under such conditions it becomes less attractive to establish a family and, subsequently, to avoid dedicating all of one’s time and energy to pursuing a professional career.”

Meanwhile, the increasing demand for education in modern, urban economies also discourages fertility. In today’s advanced societies, a college degree has become for most people a prerequisite for achieving a living wage, and many people have not completed their schooling before their own or their spouse’s biological fertility is already in decline. Even if a young couple nonetheless succeeds in starting a family, the same upward trends in the cost and duration of education will leave them scrambling to figure out how they can ever afford to endow their children with the minimum education required to succeed in 21st–century job markets.

Finally, although social–security systems around the world, as well as private pension plans, depend critically on the human capital created by parents, they paradoxically provide incentives to remain childless or to limit family size. In advanced economies, citizens no longer must have children and raise them successfully in order to secure support in old age. Instead, the elderly in developed countries have largely been able to rely on health and retirement benefits paid for by other people’s children: that is, working–age adults who are currently paying taxes for public pensions.

B. THE ROLE OF CULTURE

Changing values and conceptions of the good life have also played a role in driving down rates of marriage and childbearing. The initial emergence of subreplacement fertility in Scandinavia, and its subsequent spread throughout Western Europe, for example, was strongly associated with the diffusion of secular values, the decline of religious authority, and the rise of expressive individualism. Demographer Ron Lesthaeghe and his colleagues have gathered extensive data on the values revolution among the young that swept though Europe starting in the late 1960s. They looked at changing attitudes toward divorce, contraception, sex, single parenthood, and organized religion and noticed a clear geographical pattern. Attitudes once termed ‘counter–cultural,’ and today associated with mainstream secular liberalism in Europe, first gained prominence in Scandinawi—


via in the late 1960s. They then spread south, eventually diffusing though Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece by the later part of the 1970s and through the 1980s. And as these attitudes spread, birth and marriage rates fell almost in lockstep.48

![Figure 4: Average Number of Children in 53 Countries, by Religious Attendance](image)

Today there remains within the individual countries of Europe, and of the West generally, a strong and growing correlation between conservative religious values and larger-than-average family size. In France, for instance, practicing religious white women have a half-child fertility advantage over nonreligious white women and, as political scientist Eric Kaufman has pointed out, this disparity has been increasing over time.49 In Spain, women who are practicing Catholics have significantly more children than do nonpracticing Catholic women—holding income, marital status, education, and other factors constant.50

Much the same story can be found throughout the globe, where the religiously observant typically have markedly higher birth rates than does the rest of the population. Our analysis of 53 countries from every region of the world, from Africa to Oceania, and from the Americas to Europe and the Middle East, indicates that men and women who attend religious services monthly or more have had about 0.5 more children on average than their


peers who attend services less often or not at all (see Figure 4).\textsuperscript{51}

Another powerful factor appears to be the expanding influence of television and other cultural media. Even in the remotest corners of the globe, when television is introduced, birth rates soon fall. This is particularly easy to see in Brazil. There television was not introduced all at once but rather province by province, and thus it is possible to see after the fact that every place the television arrived next, birth rates plummeted. Today, the number of hours a Brazilian woman spends watching domestically produced telenovelas strongly predicts how many children she will have.\textsuperscript{52} These soap operas, though rarely addressing reproductive issues directly, typically depict wealthy individuals living the high life in big cities. The men are dashing, lustful, power-hungry, and unattached. The women are beautiful, manipulative, independent, and in control of their own bodies. The few characters who have young children delegate their care to nannies.

The ‘telenovelas’, in other words, reinforce a cultural message that is conveyed as well by many Hollywood films and other North American and European cultural exports: people who are wealthy, sophisticated, free, and self-fulfilled are those people who have at most one or two children and who do not let their parental roles dominate their exciting lives.

Before concluding, however, that modernity necessarily fosters sterility, one should note a still small but possibly important countetrend. In recent years, birth rates have begun to rise modestly in places that have strongly committed to gender equality and that have large shares of women in the formal labor force, such as Sweden and France.

By contrast, fertility is today lowest in nations where traditional family and religious values are still comparatively strong but on the wane, such as South Korea, Japan, Italy, and Greece. And this pattern may partly reflect differences in how well conflict over evolving gender roles has been resolved. According to cultural observers in South Korea, for example, Confucian values remain strong enough to inhibit out-of-wedlock births, of which there were a mere 7,774 in 2007.\textsuperscript{53} Yet birth rates are very low, and divorce is comparatively high.\textsuperscript{54} The common explanation is that women still feel social pressure, if they

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Analysis of World Values Survey, 2005-2008; see also Alicia Adsera, ‘Fertility, Feminism and Faith: How are Secularism and Economic Conditions Influencing Fertility in the West?’ (presented at Social Trends Institute experts meeting, ‘Whither the Child?’ Barcelona, Spain, March 2010).
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Janet S. Dunn, University of Michigan, ‘Mass Media and Individual Reproductive Behavior in Northeastern Brazil’ (paper presented at the XXIV General Population Conference of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, August 18–24, 2001); Joseph E. Potter and Paula Miranda-Ribeiro, ‘Below Replacement Fertility in Brazil: Should We Have Seen it Coming?’ (presented at Social Trends Institute experts meeting, ‘Whither the Child?’ Barcelona, Spain, March 2010).
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, South Korea: http://english.mw.go.kr/front_eng/index.jsp.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} See Table 1 and Table 2 in ‘International Family Indicators’ section, below.
\end{itemize}
marry, to show exceptional deference to their husbands and mothers–in–law. For the new generation of South Korean women, who now have many opportunities to support themselves without marrying, this looks like a bad bargain. Thus many remain single, get divorced, or limit their fertility.

Looking at the modestly higher fertility found in at least some countries that have large numbers of working women, some observers have proclaimed that “feminism is the new natalism” and have called for more measures to boost gender equality and state support for working women as a way to sustain population. The premise of this argument, however, is easily overstated. Whether the pattern really applies to the world as a whole, for example, is disputed by demographers. Moreover, the comparatively higher annual birth rates of such ‘feminist’ countries as Sweden or France partly reflect the temporary effect of more women having their first child at later ages, as well as a surge in out–of–wedlock births and the comparatively high fertility of their immigrant populations.

C. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHICS

What is the relationship between population growth and economic growth? Does fewer people mean there is more for each to enjoy? Or that each will have to work harder?

With the benefit of hindsight, it is not hard to see the role population growth has played over time in fueling economic growth and the emergence of affluent societies. Greater numbers often meant greater economies of scale, through assembly lines and other means of mass production, and they also allowed for more specialization of labor. More people also means a larger workforce for businesses and, crucially, more demand for the products they sell. Population growth can also be a spur to innovation, as it causes people to look for more efficient ways to grow food, for example, or to find substitutes for depleted natural resources like whale oil and firewood. The more brains are available to


57 In France, for example, more than a third of the officially estimated increase in the birth rate between 1997 and 2004 came from women of foreign nationality. See France Prioux, ‘Recent Demographic Developments in France: Fertility at a More Than 30-Year High,’ Demographic Trends, Institut National d’Etude Démographiques (2007): http://www.ined.fr/en/publications/demographic_trends/bdd/publication/1345/.

work on natural–resource challenges, the sooner someone will come up with the idea that provides a solution. The more general point is that people can be resources for, rather than drains on, the economy, provided that the right cultural and policy environment is in place.\footnote{Julian Simon, 'The Ultimate Resource' (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).}

So what will happen now that the great population boom of the last two centuries is waning? A first–order effect is a slowdown in the size of the global workforce. The world’s working–age population (15–64) grew by 1.3 billion, or 40 percent, between 1990 and 2010.\footnote{Nicholas Eberstadt, 'World Population Prospects and the Global Economic Outlook: The Shape of Things to Come,' The American Enterprise Institute, Working Paper Series on Development Policy 5 (2011).} But this pace cannot continue, because the people who would be necessary to make that happen were quite literally never born. Due to the global decline in birth rates over the last two decades, the global working–age population will likely grow by only about 900 million between 2010 and 2030, or 400 million less than the previous two decades.\footnote{U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base: http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/informationGateway.php.} Indeed, over the next forty years, the working–age population will shrink throughout Europe and East Asia (see Figure 5).\footnote{See also Eberstadt, 'World Population Prospects.'}
For instance, the working-age population of Western Europe will shrink in absolute size even with continued high levels of immigration. Over the next twenty years, its pool of men and women age 15–64 will fall by 4 percent even if Western Europe accepts 20 million new immigrants. Meanwhile, the population over 65 will likely grow by 40 percent. Coaxing more women out of the home and into the paid workforce, as is official European Union policy, would help to improve the dwindling ratio of workers to retirees, but at the risk of driving down birth rates still more. Raising the average age of retirement would also help arrest the declining size of the workforce, but here, too, there are clear political and practical limits. For example, despite all the talk of “70 being the new 60,” the health status of the next generation of seniors in the developed world is likely to be lower than that of their counterparts today. This is because of sharp increases in chronic conditions among today’s late-middle-agers, due to the global obesity epidemic and other factors.

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau International Database.

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63 Ibid.

64 Marga Gonzalvo-Cirac, ‘El Descenso Irreversible de la Mortalidad en el Siglo XX en la Provincia de Tarra- gona. Analisis Demografico y Epidemiologico’ (doctoral thesis, Universitat Internacional de Catalunya,
In Europe and East Asia, the decline in the numbers of younger workers will be even sharper than the decline in older workers, with consequences that could be particularly grave for economic dynamism. In every country of the world, regardless of its stage of economic development, form of government, or age structure, the highest rates of entrepreneurial activity are found among those age 25–34—an age group whose numbers will be shrinking in many advanced countries (see Figure 6).

To be sure, during the early stages of fertility decline, nations often experience prosperity, a phenomenon known as the ‘demographic dividend.’ As birth rates first turn down, a rising share of workers occupy the prime productive years of young adulthood. With fewer children around to support and care for, vast reserves of female labor are freed up to join the market economy, and adults are free to devote more money to savings, consumer durables, and real estate. Societies traversing through this early stage of population aging often find they have more resources available to invest in each remaining child, so their literacy rates, for example, improve. This phenomenon clearly happened in Japan and the other ‘Asian Tigers’ from the 1960s to the 1990s and is still at work in China today.65

But with the next generational turn, the ‘demographic dividend’ has to be repaid. So long as birth rates remain low, there are still comparatively few children, but the proportion of productive younger workers now begins to decline even as the ranks of risk–averse, middle–aged citizens and dependent elders explodes. Population aging goes from being a positive force for economic development and innovation to being a drain on resources—as is already happening now in Japan, which is now struggling to pay for the rising costs of its public pensions as its working–age population shrinks and its elderly population surges.66 This will be the story of China over the next forty years, as Figure 5 indicates. China’s working–age population will begin falling by 1 percent a year after 2016—with its population of people in their twenties and thirties specifically in even steeper decline.67


66 Ibid.

Meanwhile, the population of Chinese seniors (age 65 and over) will swell from 109 million, or 8.2 percent of the population, to 279 million, or 20 percent of the population, by 2035. Chinese demographers now speak of the emergence of a 4–2–1 society, in which a single child becomes responsible for two parents and four grandparents. This sets up China to experience an even worse aging crisis than Japan is undergoing.

Finally, the global retreat from marriage is also likely to depress and distort economic growth. Evidence drawn from Europe and North America indicates that children who are raised in an intact, married home are more likely to excel in school and be active in the labor force as young adults, compared to children raised in nonintact homes. Married adult males also work harder than their unmarried counterparts and enjoy an income premium over single men of between 10 and 24 percent, in countries ranging from Ger-

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many to Israel to Mexico to the United States. These findings suggest that market economies in the Americas and Europe—from Canada to Chile, from Spain to Sweden—that are now experiencing a retreat from marriage will also reap a new crop of problems as fewer children have the opportunity to acquire the human and social capital they need to thrive in the global economy and as fewer men have the motivation that marriage brings to fully engage the world of work.

D. THE WELFARE STATE IN AN AGING SOCIETY

The financing of the welfare state also depends critically on population growth and strong families, as evidenced by the painful rollback of social programs in aging Europe and its sovereign debt crisis as well as Japan’s deepening debt problems. Indeed, a recent report by Morgan Stanley suggests that a country’s proportion of old people may now be a more important indicator of its likelihood of default than the size of its current debt, especially because older voters are not likely to support reforms in public pensions that limit their income.

The demographic sources of the current crisis in the welfare state are not hard to fathom. So long as population is growing, each new generation of retirees can get back far more in public pensions and health-care benefits than they ever paid in without creating any financial encumbrance on the future. But in the face of today’s population aging, old-age benefits can no longer be financed by a rapidly expanding labor force. They must instead be limited to what a shrinking working-age population is able and willing to contribute to the elderly’s support.

France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Japan, and many other aging countries have already made draconian cuts in their promised of future pensions, even as insolvency or threat thereof is forcing many others (such as Greece, Spain, and Ireland) toward the same course. Even the United States is now coming to grips with a similar problem; for instance, in 2010 Social Security began paying out more to the elderly than it is taking in from current workers. In an aging society, growing expenditures for pensions and health

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care for the elderly also inevitably compete with the resources available to invest in children and families. Faced with a mounting budget deficit, the United Kingdom has cut child benefits while largely protecting pensioners.74 Thus, fertility declines and growth in aging populations pose a fundamental challenge to the financial viability of the welfare state in much of the developed world.

E. APPROPRIATE FAMILY POLICY IN AN AGING SOCIETY

What then are the appropriate policy responses to the unsustainable state of family life in many advanced societies? Here are ten proposals that might be helpful:

1. Promote family enterprise. The last generation has seen a rapid increase in corporate consolidation. Whereas rigorous enforcement of antitrust and other policies preserved an important role for small-scale family farms and businesses until the 1980s, today there is almost no check on the growth of giant retailers, agribusinesses, and industrial concerns. As British social theorist Philip Blond has written, “Our fishmongers, butchers, and bakers are driven out—converting a whole class of owner occupiers into low wage earners, employed by supermarkets.”75 Though it is not possible, or even desirable, to entirely reverse these trends toward monopolization, it is possible to moderate them and thereby carve out more space for family enterprise and entrepreneurship, which will in turn help to rebuild the economic foundation of the family. A good start would be to offer payroll tax breaks to small businesses and to more rigorously enforce existing antitrust laws.

2. Increase income security for young couples. Young couples contemplating starting a family now face far greater risk than their parents typically did that they will face repeated spells of unemployment. As political scientist Jacob Hacker has demonstrated, even before the Great Recession of 2008, the size of swings in pretax family income from year to year had doubled in the United States since the early 1970s.76 In Europe, many young adults typically find themselves maneuvering from contract to contract, rather than being able to settle into a secure career that will support a family. In the developing world, young adults often find themselves trying to get ahead amid the swirl of hypercompetitive megacities that seem to have literally no room for children.

There is no single policy lever to pull that will put the family back into a healthy and sustainable balance with global market forces. We must grapple with issues like foreign trade, offshore employment, and downsizing. Yet it is essential that measures of effi-
ciency not be so narrowly defined that they discount the vital role that secure, functioning families play in sustaining economic progress. To soften the blows young adults face from income and employment instability associated with globalization, countries should ensure access to affordable health care and lifetime learning to keep job skills from becoming obsolete.

3. **Ease the tension between higher education and family formation.** A woman’s education strongly predicts how many children she will have. For American women age 40–44 in 2008, the average number of children among those with advanced degrees was just 1.6, compared to 2.4 for those who never graduated from high school. Fully 21.5 percent of highly educated women remain childless throughout their lives, compared to only 15 percent of high–school dropouts.\(^{77}\)

To some extent, these disparities simply reflect differing individual priorities and preferences. They also reflect, however, the severe obstacles placed in the way of couples who want to start families while they are still biologically capable of doing so and at the same time want to pursue higher education. Under our current system of higher education, a woman who wants to, say, interrupt her education at age 20 to start a family and then return to school at age 30 will face steep handicaps in gaining admission. Institutions of higher learning, as well as employers, should include parents in their attempts to build diversity and overcome historical patterns of discrimination.\(^{78}\)

4. **Build livable, family–friendly communities.** Around the world, high–cost housing is closely associated with low birth rates. This is particularly true in Japan, South Korea, Europe, and coastal China.\(^{79}\) Though housing is comparatively affordable in most parts of the United States, deteriorating public schools in many areas force parents into bidding wars for homes in good school districts or compel them to pay for private school or limit their family size. At the same time, underinvestment in transportation—particularly efficient, affordable mass transit—is forcing parents in many parts of the United States and Canada to endure long commutes that have a negative financial and emotional impact on family life.\(^{80}\) Suburbia, once a fount of fertility, needs to be refitted and modernized to make it family friendly again.

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79 Lesthaeghe, ‘Unfolding Story’; Sidney B. Westley et al., Very Low Fertility in Asia (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2010).

The policy responses needed to address these threats to the family are much easier to state than to achieve. Yet such vital reforms as improving public education, reducing automobile dependency, and fostering walkable communities will perhaps be easier if these goals are tied to the needs of the family. Salt Lake City, which has the highest birth rate of any American metropolitan area, has since the late 1990s made a huge and successful commitment to containing sprawl and building light-rail under the influence of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter–Day Saints.  

5. Honor work–family ideals of all women. Women are diverse in their life preferences, no less so when it comes to the balance of motherhood and career than in any other realm. For example, in the United States, about one–fifth of married mothers state that their ideal preference is to remain in full–time employment; almost half prefer to work part–time only, and a full one–third prefer to avoid working outside the home while they raise children. Though the proportions of women expressing preference for one of these three broad options varies over time and among countries, research shows that the ratios are remarkably consistent. In general in developed nations, about 20 percent of women favor a home–centered life, 60 percent prefer a life that combines career and family, and about 20 percent are primarily concerned with career only.

Unfortunately, government family policy often ignores this diversity among women. Instead, there is often bias toward the needs of working mothers and neglect of those of home–centered mothers. Pronatalist policies are not likely to be effective if they primarily target career–oriented women; such women are not only a minority in any national population but are generally the most resistant to increased childbearing. As sociologist Catherine Hakim points out, family policy that is aimed only at the particular problems of two–paycheck families fails “to recognize and accept the heterogeneity of women’s (and men’s) lifestyle preferences.”

Policy makers should embrace programs such as the highly successful Finnish homecare allowance, which provides parents who do not use public childcare with a stipend that they can use for their own family budget–or to pay a grandparent, neighbor, friend, or

83 Catherine Hakim, ‘What Do Women Really Want? Designing Family Policies for All Women’ (presented at Social Trends Institute experts meeting, ‘Whither the Child?’ Barcelona, Spain, March 2010), Table 1.
84 Ibid.
nanny to care for their children. In Finland, the allowance is less expensive than the cost of public childcare and is linked to increases in fertility.\(^8^5\) Most importantly, it has allowed women to choose the best caregiving option for themselves and their families.

6. **Support marriage and responsible parenthood.** There are limits to what any government can or should do to promote marriage as an institution. Nonetheless, public policy should stop penalizing marriage and should also support initiatives to educate the public about the benefits of marriage and the hazards of single parenthood. This is no different in kind from government efforts to educate the public about the benefits of properly installed car seats for children or the hazards of smoking.

First, many public policies unintentionally penalize marriage by reducing or eliminating public benefits to parents who marry and thereby have access to two incomes rather than one.\(^8^6\) Public policies aimed at families should either be offered on a universal basis or should allow the two parents to split their income when it comes to determining the family’s eligibility for public support.

Second, governments should test the effectiveness of social–marketing campaigns on behalf of marriage—especially those connecting marriage and parenthood. Experience has shown that well–designed social–marketing campaigns aimed at changing sexual behavior, drug use, and smoking habits can have a positive impact.\(^8^7\) In some cases, the impact of these campaigns has proved to be modest. Yet the extraordinary cost, both to individuals and society, of contending with, for example, out–of–wedlock births, makes social marketing aimed at changing such behaviors likely to be cost effective. These campaigns can also generate a larger, salutary conversation in the society at large about the importance of marriage for raising children.

7. **Promote thrift.** Young adults in today’s developed countries, and increasingly in developing nations as well, are encumbered by debt to an unprecedented degree. According to the Project On Student Debt, the average American college graduate in the class of 2009 faces $24,000 in student loans, a figure that has risen by 6 percent every year since 2003.\(^8^8\) Mountains of credit–card debt also now typically encumber young couples contemplating whether to start a family; this is an obvious discouragement to fertility.

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\(^8^5\) Ibid.


Better consumer–finance–protection laws and enforcement are part of the solution, from putting caps on usurious lending to enforcing standardized, easy–to–understand contracts for credit cards and mortgages. So is restoring the ethos of thrift that historically was a pillar of the thriving working–class and middle–class family. Until it petered out in the 1960s, Americans celebrated ‘Thrift Week’ pegged to Benjamin Franklin’s birthday on January 17. Until the 1960s, public schools ran their own small banks for students, allowing millions of American children to better learn financial literacy and the habits of thrift. Savings and loans encouraged thrift through Christmas savings plans. And so on. We need to renew this ethos for our day. Restoring thrift is a generational project but also a prerequisite to restoring the health and fertility of the modern family.  

8. Adjust the financing of the welfare state to meet the needs of an aging society. All pension and health–care benefits, including those conveyed through the private sector, are ultimately financed by babies and those who raise and educate them. Yet in modern societies, the ‘nurturing sector’ of the economy is starved for resources. Parents in particular rarely receive any material compensation for the sacrifices they make on behalf of their children. Here is a suggestive policy idea for allowing the nurturing sector to keep a greater share of the value it creates for society: Say to the next generation of young adults, have one child, and your payroll taxes, which support the elderly, will drop by one–third. A second child would be worth a two–thirds reduction in payroll taxes. Have three or more children, and pay no payroll taxes until your youngest child turns 18. When it comes time to retire, your benefits (and your spouse’s) will be calculated just as if you had both been contributing the maximum tax during the period in which you were raising children, provided that all your children have graduated from high school.

9. Clean up the culture. Television and other global media, as we’ve already seen, appear to have played a big role in driving birth and marriage rates down. From pop stars’ efforts to push the sexual envelope, to Hollywood films, violent video games, and ubiquitous Internet pornography, the global media sends a strong message to young people around the world that a family–centered way of life is passé.

To some extent, these cultural excesses and distortion can be expected to correct themselves. Just as during the Victorian age, when fear of underpopulation, particularly among elites, led to a reformation in manners and morals, there will be less and less tolerance for those who do not contribute children to society or whose activities contribute to children’s moral corruption. But Hollywood film makers, advertisers, and other cultural merchants need to catch up with the new demographic reality and become aware that we now live in a world in which strong families can no longer be taken for granted–much.

less endlessly mocked and trivialized.

10. Respect the role of religion as a pronatal force. Childlessness and small families are increasingly common among secularists. Meanwhile, in Europe and the Americas, as well as in Israel, the rest of the Middle East, and beyond, there is a strong correlation between adherence to orthodox Christian, Islamic, or Judaic religious values and larger, stable families.

In recognition of the contribution that religion makes to family life and fertility, governments should not persecute people of faith for holding or expressing views that are informed by religious tradition. Alas, such persecution is now common in some countries around the world, from Canada to China to France. Faith brings hope, and ultimately it is hope that replenishes the human race.

None of these ten proposals is anywhere near adequate to solve the challenges created by the new demographics of the twenty-first century. Yet they are suggestive of the philosophical approach that is needed—one that emphasizes the critical role of the intact, nurturing, and financially secure family in sustaining and renewing the human, social, and financial capital of aging societies around the globe.

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The purpose of this paper is to critically examine current thinking about intergenerational solidarity at the micro level (as reflected in attitudes, values and behaviours among generations within families) and intergenerational/social cohesion at the macro level (as reflected in relations between generations or age groups in society). I argue that a) it is essential to understand how the broader context of demographic, economic and socio-political influences affects family processes and inter-group relations, and b) that emerging tensions between generations that are related to broader issues of income inequality and inequality of access to benefits and services should be addressed in order to support individual well-being and family life. Such policies include those most often viewed as family policies that focus on child rearing, care for dependent family members, and the reconciliation of work and family roles; as well as income and employment policies that could reduce income inequality and promote greater cohesion and social inclusion. Current and future challenges to the sustainability of care provided to aging family members are highlighted.

A. Conceptualizing Intergenerational Solidarity within Families

Research on intergenerational relations within families has grown dramatically in the last 30 years as evidenced by the number of studies, the breadth of topics covered and disciplines represented by researchers, and the development of specific journals devoted to life course research and to intergenerational relations. The study of intergenerational relations has been heavily influenced by Vern Bengston and his colleagues who advanced the Solidarity Model of Intergenerational Relationships. Bengston described six behavioural and emotional dimensions of intergenerational solidarity:

- Affectual solidarity (how close individuals feel to each other).
- Associational solidarity (the type and frequency of contact between intergenerational family members).

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- Consensual solidarity (agreement in opinions, values and orientations between generations).
- Functional solidarity (the giving and receiving of instrumental and social support, including financial assistance, care and emotional support).
- Normative solidarity (expectations regarding filial and parental obligations as well as norms about the importance of familistic values).
- Structural solidarity (creation and maintenance of opportunities for cross-generational interactions, including geographic proximity between family members).

Research based on the Solidarity Model has focused particularly on affectual solidarity and patterns of interdependence and mutual support between successive generations within families. Longitudinal research has affirmed the presence of consistent, high levels of affectual solidarity across generations within families over time and demonstrated that emotional closeness, shared activities in childhood, and financial assistance are reciprocated in continuing emotional ties and the provision of instrumental support by adult children to their aging parents later in life. The positive focus on intergenerational solidarity in much of this research has helped to counter media portrayals of “the decline of the family” and fears of abandonment of elder family members. In addition to affectional ties stemming from earlier family experiences, such studies affirm altruistic motivations and an implicit social contract that ensures long-term reciprocity within families.

Later studies have provided evidence of increased diversity and complexity in intergenerational relations that reflect the diversity and complexity of family patterns, roles and relationships. For example, several studies suggest that divorce among parents is likely to result in less financial support and care provided to fathers in later life. Research on intergenerational conflict and ambivalence reflect the tensions between autonomy and independence and the felt dissonance between what one wishes to do, what one feels obligated to do, and resources and constraints that expand or limit options. Connidis and


McMullen, among others, have highlighted the importance of understanding how individual actors negotiate patterns of relationship and support in different economic and social contexts.  

**B. INCORPORATING THE CULTURAL CONTEXT AS AN INFLUENCE ON PATTERNS OF INTERGENERATIONAL SUPPORT**

A second, useful model of intergenerational solidarity within families has been advanced by Szydlik.96 This model focuses more directly on determinants at the individual, family, and societal levels on three interacting dimensions of solidarity between generations: affectual solidarity (emotional closeness), associational solidarity (common activities), and functional solidarity (giving and receiving money, time, and space, including direct help and care). Szydlik analyzes the importance of opportunity structures (opportunities and resources available that either promote or hinder social interactions and supportive exchanges) and need structures (indicative of the need for assistance and/or emotional support) as viewed by adult children and parents.

Examples of opportunity structures include geographic proximity that enables adult children to provide care and support to aging parents, and the availability of financial resources to help pay for a child’s or grandchild’s education. Examples of need structures include the health condition of a frail or aging parent and an adult child’s needs for instrumental and financial support when raising young children, especially in a difficult period. In such situations, grandparents typically provide significant levels of support including child care, financial assistance, and even co-residence. Importantly, Szydlik considers how intergenerational relations not only involve individuals, but also are embedded in family structures—recognizing that variations in family size and structure, roles, and earlier experiences create needs and opportunities. Indeed, there is a robust literature on these individual and family variables—generally indicating that women (mothers, daughters and daughters in law) are far more likely to provide care and assistance, even given the dramatic changes that have occurred in women’s labour force participation in the last decades; and that other factors such as geographic proximity, education, and whether there are children living at home who compete for time and involvement influence adult children’s opportunities to provide care and support. A separate set of analyses relates to intergenerational patterns of inheritance. Szydlik concludes that it is the wealth amassed in previous generations that determines the extent of intergenerational transfers, sug-

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gesting that bequests, particularly in countries with high amounts of privately heritable wealth, will continue to impact on current and future inequality.

Furthermore, cultural-contextual structures (societal conditions in which intergenerational relations develop) must be considered. Szydlik defined the cultural-contextual level as the “conditions of the social, economic and tax system, the welfare state, the labor and housing market, as well as specific rules and norms of certain institutions and groups”. 97

C. Investigations of caregiving in context

Cross-national comparisons provide examples of how public policies and cultural norms relate to care for aging family members – a policy area that is increasingly important in many nations as a result of population aging. Several recent studies across Europe have demonstrated substantial differences between countries in observed patterns of help and care to aging parents, as well as in opinions among national populations about whether the state or the family should be responsible for the care and support of dependent elderly people. 98 Important findings from these studies include the following:

- There are clear differences between countries in the extent to which adult children are involved in providing support and care to aged parents, with the largest contrasts between the Nordic countries and the Netherlands and those in Southern Europe (Spain, Italy and Greece).
- Country differences exist in the extent of state provision for home care services and residential care, in legal obligations for adult children and other family members to provide or finance care, and in cultural norms and preferences for the involvement of state provision.
- Both individual factors (notably the nature of the parent’s physical limitations, whether there is a spouse/partner present, and the parent’s financial resources) and family factors (the availability of daughters, residential proximity, and whether the adult child is employed full time) influence patterns of intergenerational care. These

97 Ibid, p. 104.
individual and family variables clearly illustrate needs and opportunity structures. Contextual cultural factors are also very significant. Specifically, the extent to which publicly financed home care services were available and widely used, the presence of legal obligations, and cultural norms concerning the responsibility for the provision of care all influenced observed patterns of intergenerational care. Generally, the extent of state provision was consistent with cultural norms.

In their discussion of these findings, Haberkern and Szydlik point out that while family members are more involved in providing assistance and care in countries with limited or inadequate state involvement in the provision of home care and residential services (what Saraceno and Keck refer to as familism by default), there is little evidence that well-structured home care services “crowd out” family involvement in the care of the elderly or endanger solidarity among family members. Indeed, in countries where home care services were widely used and available, elderly parents received considerable support from their adult children with less medically demanding and time consuming aspects of care and children still feel responsible for their parents’ well-being. These arrangements suggest a division of labour or complementarity between family and public services – one that allows adult children (particularly women) more choice and greater capacity to retain their attachment to the labour force, and permits families to concentrate on addressing social-emotional needs. 99 Moreover, Daatland and Herlofson concluded that, in addition to enabling adult children to better balance care and other obligations, public provision of home care services resulted in higher total coverage of need among older persons in poor health. 100

RESEARCH ON CAREGIVING CONSEQUENCES

In addition to understanding patterns of care, a robust literature has emerged on the experiences of family caregivers, given their extensive involvement in care and support for family members. In Canada, the 2012 General Social Survey revealed that more than 8.1 million Canadians (28%) provided care to a family member or close friend with a long-term health condition, a disability, or problems associated with aging. Indeed, it is estimated that about 80 percent of all care is provided by family members. While many individuals provide limited amounts of care and assistance per week, one in ten caregivers spent 30 or more hours each week providing assistance. 101 Care for aging family mem-

99 Haberkern & Szydlik, 2010. Ibid.


bers may extend over many years and include periods of more intense involvement, and even care for more than one family member at a time.

Research in Canada and the U.S. indicates that while many family caregivers value their involvement and the emotional gratification that derives from helping to care for a loved one, there can be significant economic, social and health consequences for caregivers. Keating et al. have identified the economic costs to caregivers as encompassing three main domains – employment-related consequences, out of pocket costs, and costs associated with caring labour. 102

1. Employment consequences result when employees miss work days or take a leave of absence for caregiving, reduce their hours, forego opportunities for advancement, take early retirement, or quit or lose a job in order to provide care. These employment consequences can be costly to employees and their families, resulting in reduced earnings and loss of employer benefits, including extended health care benefits, life insurance and long term disability insurance; and curtailed private and public pension benefits, potentially with long-term consequences for caregivers’ own economic security. Employment related consequences are particularly evident among caregivers with more intense, ongoing care involvement (i.e., those providing more than 20 hours of care per week) and accrue more to women, since women are more likely to be providing assistance with tasks that must be done on a regular basis in person (such as personal and medical care, meal preparation, etc.) for more hours per week. 103

A significant concern is the situation of caregivers who are economically and socially vulnerable, including those with less education, recent immigrants and those employed in non-standard or precarious employment. A recent study of employed caregivers to adults in the U.S. found that women, caregivers with less education, and first generation immigrants provided the greatest amount of care, but were less likely to be employed in workplaces that afford access to flexibility in work scheduling, caregiving leave, or support from a supervisor. 104 Low wage workers who have limited access to employer-provided benefits and do not qualify for leave entitlements and protections (i.e., unpaid leave under the U.S. Family and Medical Leave Act) are doubly disadvantaged. The eco-


nomic and social consequences of these actions not only affect the individual caregivers, but also their families.

2. Out of pocket expenses include direct expenses related to the provision of care including transportation, additional food and housing costs for those who are co-resident, and expenses for medications, privately purchased services, health products and supplies. In one recent U.S. study, expenditures on community services including home care, day services, respite, counseling care management and legal services accounted for almost 18% of caregivers’ total annual expenses.\(^{105}\) Expenditures on home care and acute care can be substantial, especially when hospital and emergency room costs are not covered by government or employer-provided health insurance.

3. The third category of economic costs relates to the costs associated with care labour – the time and emotional investments involved in direct care provision, in traveling to or with the caregiver, and time spent monitoring and managing care. Economists value such time as either the opportunity cost of not earning income during those hours or in the value of what it would cost to replace caregivers’ time by hiring others. It has been conservatively estimated that the economic contributions of Canada’s informal caregivers accounted for between $24 and $31 billion in 2007, or 1.6-2.0% of Canadian GDP.\(^{106}\) Conceptualizing the costs of care labour that accrue to caregivers involves not only opportunity costs associated with time spent out of the paid labour force, but recognition of the fact that extensive hours involved in care can affect caregivers’ quality of life and the conditions that contribute to well-being. Specifically, time spent providing care can limit caregivers’ opportunities for leisure, recreation and physical fitness, time to be with friends and to participate in social and community activities, and time with other family members. When family caregivers cannot attend to their own social and emotional needs and withdraw from social contact, they are at greater risk of depression and ill health.\(^{107}\)

Health-related consequences for caregivers include impacts on their physical and mental health. Caregiver strain and stress are common experiences, reflecting physical, financial and emotional aspects. Caregivers may experience stress, especially when they lack the resources to meet the needs of the person(s) they are caring for, when they are the primary or sole caregiver, and when caring for a family member with dementia. Anxiety, depression and exhaustion can erode physical health and lead to caregiver burnout.

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compromising the quality and sustainability of care. For these reasons, health care professionals and service providers are starting to assess caregivers’ needs and capacities as a secondary assessment to patients’ needs, sometimes suggesting or providing respite and other forms of caregiver support.

While governments endorse concepts of aging in place and recognize the value of enabling seniors to live at home as long as possible, there has not been a commensurate investment in integrated policies and services to support and sustain family caregivers. Potential policy options are discussed in the concluding section of this paper.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS

To further contextualize our understanding, it is important to consider the effects of recent and projected demographic and social changes. Such factors as population aging, low fertility rates, increasing diversity in family forms, and high rates of international immigration affect the nature of intergenerational relations at both the micro and macro levels. In addition, longer-term and more recent trends in education, employment, labour markets, and government policies affect opportunities and create tensions, especially for those in younger generations who are experiencing difficulties making ends meet, becoming financially independent, and beginning and supporting their own families.

A. Population aging – Impacts on family relationships, work and family reconciliation, and care provision

1. Population Aging is a feature of most developed societies, a result of low fertility rates and people living longer. These two forces are transforming the traditional population pyramid to a more rectangular shape, shifting the size and proportion of older populations in society. In Canada, the proportion of the population 65 years and over increased from 8.0 percent in 1971 to 15.3% in 2013, and will be close to 25% in 2050. Across Europe, the proportion of the population aged 80 and over is expected to increase from 4% in 2010 to close to 10% by 2050, with substantially higher proportions in Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea. These trends have major implications for government planning to address pensions, health care costs, home and residential care, and supports for family caregivers.

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Of increasing concern is the projection that there will be more individuals in their advanced years, with fewer children and grandchildren to provide care and assistance. Using census data, Keefe and her colleagues have projected that the number of elderly people needing assistance in Canada will double in the next 30 years and that the decline in the availability of children will increase the need for home care and formal care, particularly over the longer term. Notably, it is projected that close to one in four elderly women may not have a surviving child by 2031.  

2. Baby boomers (born between 1946 and 1964) continue to be the largest population group, still dominating the work force, but starting to reach traditional retirement age. It is this group that is experiencing caregiving pressures for aging parents, and who face significant challenges managing paid work and care. Canadian statistics indicate a 20 percent increase in the number of Canadians age 45 and older who are caregivers to one or family members or close friends who are chronically ill, disabled or frail. In 2007, 37% of employed women and 29% of employed men age 45-64 were caregivers, and those proportions are only going up. At the same time, an estimated 28% of boomer caregivers still have one or more children age 18 or younger at home. 

A recent trend in Canada and the U.S. is an increasing proportion of “older workers” typically defined as 55 years and older. Still healthy and capable, many people in their 60s and 70s are either prolonging careers or taking new jobs, often to supplement savings and/or limited pension income that will not last through their full retirement years. Canadian Federal, Provincial and Territorial Ministers Responsible for Seniors have identified the promotion of workplace supports for the inclusion of older workers, including supports to balance work and care, as one of two priority areas for the coming years. 

The baby boomers, in addition to being the largest population group, have encountered different social circumstances growing up than their parents. In the U.S. and Canada they have been influenced by changes in women’s rights and roles, the sexual revolution, higher rates of divorce, and enhanced educational opportunities. The longevity of the boomers’ relationships to their siblings and to aging parents has been described as “un-
preceded” 115 and their experiences as caregivers to their aging parents and their expectations and capacities as they age will significantly influence policy developments related to pensions, health care, and long-term care. The boomers have also had particularly close relationships with their children, and a poor economy that is limiting their young adult children’s opportunities and contributing to delayed family formation and careers is a source of significant concern. As a result, baby boomers are currently providing substantial care to aging parents with chronic illnesses; they have significant ties to siblings who, like themselves, may be carefully monitoring their retirement savings and possibly planning to extend their involvement in the labour force; and they are providing support to their own children.

At the micro level, longer years of life shared with siblings, parents and grandparents than in previous generations has been observed by Bengston as positive, creating prolonged periods for shared experiences and for opportunities for exchange that may result in greater intergenerational solidarity within families, despite a general societal trend towards weakening norms governing intergenerational relations. 116

B. Greater diversity in family forms

Baby boomers and their adult children have experienced higher rates of separation and divorce, remarriage, blended families, and common-law arrangements than previous generations. An increase in same sex unions and marriages is also evident. These complex and diverse relationships can result in what Fingerman describes as “complex emotional, legal and financial demands” from former partners, estranged parents, and relatives such as former in-laws or stepchildren. 117 While complicating the nature of relationships and creating ambiguous expectations for exchange and support, Bengston suggests that the diverse network of relationships can provide a broader “latent kin network” that can provide additional support when needed. 118 This latent kin network, which increasingly includes close friends who function “like family” may substitute for or augment the support available from fewer or estranged family members who may be geographically distant and/or have weaker ties over time. Interesting policy questions emerge when legal rights, financial benefits and other supports that were developed with heterosexual nuclear families in mind do not extend to the broader diversity of family forms evident in modern societies.

117 Fingerman, ibid.
118 Bengston, 2001. Ibid.
C. Gen X and Millennials – Longer transitions for young adults in a challenging labour market

A variety of cultural, social and economic conditions have been identified as factors that are contributing to a prolonged transition to adulthood in North America. Evidence of this lengthy and sometimes precarious transition to financial independence includes young adults’ extended involvement in education, a higher proportion living at home with their parents than previously, delayed and difficult entries into the job market and into long-term career paths, and delayed conjugal formation and child bearing. These processes have been occurring over a period of time, but are increasingly evident and in contrast to the experiences of previous generations at the same age. Young people’s experiences have led to longer periods of financial dependency on parents at the micro level and are contributing to emerging concerns about intergenerational equity at a broader social level.

Given increasingly tight job prospects and the importance of education for good jobs in a knowledge-based economy, an increasing proportion of young adults have turned to post-secondary education programs and the gaining of credentials as a way to increase employment opportunities and earnings. In Canada and other OECD countries, almost half of those in their early 20s are attending educational institutions full time. Consequently, the tendency to stay in school longer, in conjunction with the extended time it is taking to obtain employment in a related field is increasing the average duration of the school-to-work transition. Although post-secondary education adds human capital for individuals and for society, the benefits of a university degree may not be evident when graduates have difficulty finding suitable employment, as has been the case in recent years. Those with only a high school education face an even more difficult time finding a job that pays a living wage.

A complicating factor for many university graduates in Canada and the U.S. is the level of student debt. According to a recent Bank of Montreal student survey, current university students, in Canada anticipate graduating with over $26,000 in debt. Student debt levels have escalated, particularly in the last decade, as tuition fees have increased; a function of limited government funding. Current student loan programs require that graduates begin repayment almost immediately after graduation. According to one re-

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cent national newspaper account, delinquency rates on student loan repayments have increased by nearly 25% in the past five years. In addition to the anxiety accumulated debt produces for students, it is a substantial impediment to gaining financial independence from parents and contributes to delaying marriage, child bearing, home ownership and other purchases.

A serious concern, reflected in a growing number of current news reports, is the challenge young adults are having finding jobs that afford a living wage. As described by Côté and Bynner, “Today’s young people face a labour market characterized by an increasing wage gap with older workers, earnings instability, more temporary and part-time jobs, lower-quality jobs with fewer benefits, and more instability in employment”. These authors go on to state an additional concern: that “the decreased utility of youth labour in the context of this job competition has produced a growing age-based disparity of income, (emphasis mine) contributing to increasingly prolonged and precarious transitions to financial independence”. The Pew Research Center reports that in its recent surveys, 7 in 10 Americans (of all ages) say that today’s young adults face more economic challenges than their elders did when first starting out.

Delays in marriage and family formation are evident in the proportion of young adults still living with their parents. Statistics Canada has reported that in 2011 42.3% of young adults aged 20-29 lived in the parental home, either because they had never left it or because they returned home after living elsewhere. Most telling is the finding that among 25-29 year olds, one quarter (25.2%) lived in their parental home in 2011, more than double the 11.3% observed in 1981.

The Pew Research Center’s report on the Millennials (age 18-33) in the U.S. has noted marked generational changes in the age of marriage. In 2013 just 26% of the millennial generation was married, compared to 48% of Baby Boomers when they were the same age. The current pattern of delayed child bearing evident in Canada is a natural consequence. Young people are having fewer children (if any) and having them later. Begin-

124 Ibid. p. 259
127 Pew Research Center. Ibid.
ning in 2005 fertility rates of mothers in their 30’s has outnumbered the rates observed among mothers in their 20’s.\textsuperscript{128}

Does this data suggest intergenerational inequity in how Millennials are faring and in the degree to which they are supported by current government policies? There are indications that more people are starting to think this way. In Canada, Paul Kershaw, a political scientist, has founded a campaign called Generation Squeeze to advocate for targeted benefits to those under 45 years of age who, he argues are squeezed for time, money and access to services, and who deserve “A better generational deal.” Key policy recommendations include: enhancing and extending parental leave benefits from 12 to 18 months, universal affordable child care, and policies to reduce the work week from 40 hours per week to 35 hours.\textsuperscript{129}

\textit{D. Higher rates of immigration}

Rates of international immigration have increased dramatically in recent decades, spurred by greater opportunity to do so and economic needs. For many years Canada has relied on international migration as a source of population and labour force growth. Policies and services can aid in resettlement, promote learning English or French, enhance access to health and community services, and promote a smoother transition to the labour force. Although newcomers may be more dependent on immediate family members for support, they experience wider discrepancies in expectations between generations as a result of acculturation. Cultural and religious values may place particular emphasis on respect for elders and filial obligations to provide support. Studies of immigrants from diverse backgrounds suggest that immigration and acculturation can place significant strains on migrant families, especially when aging parents expect filial support and reject formal support.\textsuperscript{130} Recent immigrants may also find that the challenges to obtaining steady employment and an adequate income require more hours of work to support their families, compromising the time available to provide care and support to young children and to aging parents. In Canada, recent changes to Canadian immigration policies are giving greater priority to immigrants who have more education and business experience and to temporary foreign workers, reducing the number of immigrants permitted under the “family class.” The latter include older parents, siblings and extended family members who could provide substantial assistance and support. Immigration poli-


\textsuperscript{129} Kershaw, P. (2011). ‘Does Canada work for all generations?’ Human Early Learning Partnership, University of British Columbia. Blogs.ubc.ca/new deal for families. See also Generation Squeeze at www.gensqueeze.ca

cy is a particularly contentious issue in the U.S. with many implications for families, including access to health care and other public services.

**ECONOMIC, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR MARKET TRENDS**

Critical influences that are absent from many studies of intergenerational relations are effects of the recent financial crisis and longer term trends in the nature of employment. The financial crisis that ensued in 2008 continues to have long-term impacts on employment, savings, and, for many, the costs of home ownership. It is likely that financial strains brought some families together, creating the need to share resources and support each other, and tore other families apart as a result of financial and other pressures. In Canada and across the OECD, serious, interrelated issues that must be addressed are the increasing prevalence of precarious employment and the need to address increasing levels of income inequality.

**A. Precarious employment**

Precarious work is a global phenomenon with multiple causes. While not new, its prevalence has been increasing as a feature of the new global economy and is an increasing contributor to poverty and to income inequality. Precarious work arrangements (in contrast to a standard industrial model of permanent, full-time work that provides an adequate living wage) have a number of features and forms. Examples typically include temporary work, part-time work, casual or on-call positions with uncertainty about how many and which hours will be guaranteed, and “own account” self-employment. More than the specific form of work, Vosko clarifies that precarious work “refers to forms of work characterized by atypical employment contracts, limited or no social benefits and statutory entitlements, high degrees of job insecurity, low job tenure, low wages and high risks of occupational injury and disease. From a workers’ point of view, precarious work is related to uncertain, unpredictable and risky employment.”

Recent research suggests that while precarious employment had been evident before, the recent recession has been one of the contributing factors in its rise, with employers seeking more flexible options in their drive to limit costs and be competitive. Current estimates suggest that more than one third of working Canadians do not have permanent, full-time paid jobs. Although anyone can be precariously employed, a report by

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the Law Commission of Ontario suggests that “precarity is more likely to affect workers in already marginalized groups – women, racialized groups, temporary foreign workers, new immigrants, Aboriginal persons, persons with disabilities, older adults and youth”. These workers are vulnerable both because of their social location and by the precarious nature of their work.

Research studies consistently link precarious employment to negative physical and mental health outcomes as a result of higher risks of injury and illness due to physically demanding work and potential problems in ensuring adequate occupational health and safety, as well as the accumulated stress and strain of not being able to ensure an adequate, stable income. Potential negative impacts on family relationships as a result of working multiple jobs, long hours, and nonstandard or unpredictable schedules include reduced availability of time to spend with family members; making it difficult to participate in daily activities, secure stable child care, or plan for the future. Precarious workers have limited opportunity to access training or education to upgrade their skills. Most will not qualify for Employment Insurance benefits in the event of job loss, and will not meet the criteria (600 hours of work in the past year with the same employer) for maternity, parental, or sickness leave benefits. Stress, strain, and eroded self-worth can take their toll. Moreover, in addition to low wages and/or unpredictable income, most individuals who are precariously employed are not afforded, or do not qualify for employer-provided benefits such as supplemental health, dental or drug plan coverage; workplace pensions, or long-term disability coverage in the event of illness or injury.

Concerns about the growing prevalence of unemployment, underemployment, and precarious employment are serious. The growing divide between those with good jobs (with stable pay, the opportunity to advance, workplace benefits and statutory protection) and those who have no job security, assurance of ongoing adequate income, or supplemental benefits) not only affects individuals and their families, but also affects communities and visibly demonstrates inequality – not only income inequality, but inequality of opportunity. When precarious employment and unemployment disproportionately disadvantage vulnerable groups, including youth and young adults, they can contribute to intergenerational inequity and social instability.

B. Increased income inequality

Based on the latest data, the level of income inequality in Canada, as measured by economists using the Gini coefficient, is above the OECD average, with Canada ranked 12th


334 Ibid.
out of 17 peer countries.\textsuperscript{135} Income inequality among working-age Canadians has been rising, especially since the mid-1990s. In a 2011 report, The Conference Board of Canada observed that “between the mid-1990s and the late 2000s...Canada had the fourth largest increase in income inequality” among the comparator nations studied by the OECD.\textsuperscript{136} A recent analysis of Statistics Canada data revealed that the real incomes of the top 10 percent of Canadians increased by 32\% between 1982 and 2010, while the incomes of the bottom 90 percent increased by only 6\% over the same period.\textsuperscript{137} Further, there has been a concentration of income and wealth among those with the very highest incomes. A recent OECD study revealed that the richest 1\% of Canadians saw their share of total income increase from 8.1\% to 13.3\% between 1980 and 2007. At the same time, top marginal federal income tax rates declined markedly from 43\% in 1981 to 29\% in 2010.\textsuperscript{138}

These recent reports have led to increased visibility of income inequality among the public, culminating in a study of the issue by the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Finance. High and increasing levels of inequality are a concern for many reasons. Research demonstrates that inequality is correlated with shorter life expectancies and poorer health, higher rates of child poverty, more limited access to high-quality public services such as child care, education, and health care, limited opportunities for intergenerational mobility, higher crime rates, and lower levels of social trust.\textsuperscript{139} Moreover, high and visible income inequality impacts social cohesion, undermines democracy, and throws into question general notions of fairness and solidarity.

There are a variety of factors that have contributed to growing income inequality; however the OECD has noted that “Prior to the mid-1990s, the Canadian tax-benefit system was as effective as those in the Nordic countries in stabilising inequality, offsetting more than 70\% of the rise in market income inequality. The effect of redistribution has declined since then: taxes and benefits only offset less than 40\% of the rise in inequality.”\textsuperscript{140} Pre-


\textsuperscript{140} (OECD 2011 Country Note: Canada) Ibid. p. 1
scriptions for reducing income inequality are multifaceted, but clearly include strengthening the redistributive power of taxes and benefits to individuals and families, while promoting employment. The provision of accessible, high quality public services is important as well, as investments in both human capital and social cohesion.

UNDERSTANDING POLICY MAKING IN THE CANADIAN LANDSCAPE

Policy making that can effectively address the various and complex issues that affect families are challenging in the best of circumstances since governments must deal with competing priorities, limited resources, political election cycles, and sometimes lack of consensus within government or in the broader public about specific policy alternatives. Canada is challenged as well because of the complexity of social policy making in a federal state. Historically, as set out in the Constitution Act of 1867, there has been a division of powers between the federal and provincial/territorial governments with provincial governments responsible for the design and delivery of programs and services related to health, education and charitable (social) services. The federal government also has a significant presence in social policy with full jurisdiction over unemployment insurance, and substantial jurisdiction over immigration and contributory pensions, as well as major responsibility for policies and funding programs affecting First Nations peoples, especially those living on reserves. The Federal government’s tax powers function as a powerful tool for redistribution through taxes and transfers to individuals and families. The Federal government enters into agreements with the provinces and territories for transfers of funds for programs that are either strictly within provincial/territorial jurisdiction or that have shared or collaborative components. Both levels of government have some role in family law, with the federal government having authority over legislation related to marriage, divorce, and child support.

An important result of these institutional features is that there is no mechanism for developing or overseeing national family policies in Canada. There are elements of what is typically considered a nation’s family policies in place, such as tax benefits to families with children and parental leave, but such policies are typically treated and administered as tax/transfer policies, or labour policies, despite their obvious and sometimes explicit family-related goals. In other cases, such as child care, there is currently no national approach. Federally, there is a child care expense tax deduction for working parents, and a “universal child care benefit” (a direct monthly payment) for parents of children under 6; there is also funding for Aboriginal Head Start. In addition, funds are transferred to the provinces and territories on an equal per capita cash basis as part of a block fund (The Canada Social Transfer or CST) in support of post-secondary education, social assistance and social services, and early childhood learning and childcare. In reality, the provinces and territories are largely responsible for the design, delivery and additional funding for child care services. The provinces and territories are also responsible for the administra-
tion and organization of health care services and home care, and for social assistance programs and policies.

In addition, Québec has assumed more autonomy over social and economic policies, has a different legal tradition, and operates quite distinct policies with respect to parental leave and child care, as well as its own public pension system. Québec has gone farther than many other provinces in articulating a strong role of the state in supporting families, especially families with children. Research studies have indicated that Québec’s generous and flexible parental leave policies have dramatically increased the proportion of parents taking parental leave, especially fathers. Québec’s child care policies have led to a substantial increase in the proportion of children attending regulated child care services and have contributed to increased maternal labour force participation.

Further, there are differences in social policy priorities related to political party affiliation and ideology. At the national level, there have been quite different views and approaches towards the development and funding of child care services by successive federal governments. This has led to limited investment by the current government in the development of affordable, high quality child care services, an essential element in most nations’ family policies.

The division of powers between the levels of government and historical differences in policies operating within each province/territory can be interpreted as leading to a fragmented patchwork with respect to social policy provision for children and families and/or as a rich “living laboratory” that allows flexibility and enables experimentation in meeting the needs of citizens. The current (Conservative) federal government has focused on increasing trade with other countries, reducing taxes and debt reduction, and limiting its role in a number of social policy domains, for example, shifting from a collaborative approach to funding the development of early child care services to one that provides minimal individual payments to families with young children. Unlike countries in Europe, Canada is not governed by supranational agreements such as those that characterize the European Union. Canada’s capacity to implement the provisions of UN Conventions to which it is a signatory, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the UN Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons, is difficult given jurisdictional autonomy and the lack of mechanisms at the federal level to ensure consistent, positive, coordinated progress in meeting the goals set forth in those documents.


POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO SUPPORT INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS
AND PROMOTE SOCIAL COHESION

Historical, political and institutional elements preclude the likelihood of Canada developing a national family policy. It is possible, however, for individual provinces and territories to do so (Québec having come the closest) and for the federal government to articulate goals that various policies, taken together, could achieve. Currently, many of the provinces have introduced or are introducing multifaceted poverty reduction plans, even while none is evident at the federal level. Moreover, there are some significant examples of how child/family-focused policy goals can be achieved through collaborative policy making and the development of a shared vision. The best example in Canada of this process is the National Child Benefit, a means of providing both universal and targeted income support to families with a child or children under 18 years of age as well as funds to the provinces and territories to reinvest in a range of benefits and services targeted to low income families.

Some specific policy suggestions include the following, although many others might be considered.

1. Improve incomes for families with children; redirect non-refundable tax credits

Campaign 2000 and other organizations have affirmed the need for improving and streamlining the National Child Benefit (NCB). Currently, eligible families (those who qualify for both the universal CCTB and targeted NCB supplement for low income families – i.e. those with a net family income of up to $25,356) can receive a maximum combined benefit of $3,654 per child. Since its introduction, economists have evaluated the NCB as an important policy tool for preventing and reducing child and family poverty; however they have consistently recommended that the benefit level be raised, with a full benefit recommended of $5400. The separate federal “Universal Child Care Benefit” - $1200 per year for children under 6 should be folded into the NCB.

A strength of the NCB is that higher amounts are provided to parents of children with disabilities, and the age limit is extended for this group as well. Many of the federal credits available to families (including the Children’s Fitness credit) are non-refundable credits, which are of no benefit to moderate and lower income families. Such funds could be used instead by communities to subsidize community-based arts and recreation programs for children and families, providing opportunities for inclusive, affordable programs that would be accessible to all children, their parents and caregivers, and provide opportunities for interactions and community building.

Campaign 2000, 2013. Ibid.
2. Improve parental leave and benefits policies and access to high quality child care

Family policies increasingly include the quality of parental leave policies and access to quality child care services as key elements in a comprehensive approach that promotes fertility, gender equality, work-family reconciliation, and early child development. Substantial improvements to Canada’s parental leave policies were made in 2000, extending the length of (partially paid) parental leave available and broadening eligibility criteria for benefits. Policy makers should allow more flexibility in the length of the leave period, improve the level of remuneration (currently 55% of a modest ceiling), and consider ways to support fathers taking leave. Québec’s policies provide one example, which appears to be quite successful.

Currently, the challenges of providing affordable, inclusive high quality early childhood and education programs is one that the provinces and territories are trying to address despite the lack of committed federal support. Parent fees are high, qualified early childhood educators are not being paid adequate wages, and spaces are limited. Recent initiatives that expand access for 4 and 5 year olds through school-based programs have destabilized the funding structure that sustained community-based child care programs. Models of integrated child care programs that include regulated home child care, early years centres that provide programs and resources for parents and other caregivers, and family resource programs that provide opportunities for intergenerational programming and a range of services are scattered across Canada and are vulnerable without adequate support.

3. Redesign current income support programs

Several policy makers and think tanks have suggested a basic income to all citizens through a fairer tax/transfer system that is more progressive with more redistributive capacity. This goal could be met by building incrementally on existing income support programs targeted to different age groups, and remove the impediments created by an array of programs with different eligibility criteria, some of which are contradictory and frustrate efforts to improve job skills, maintain employment, and sustain a reasonable quality of life.

4. Address the challenges of the working poor; improve access to services and affordable housing

The working poor and near poor who may move in and out of low paid jobs or who have health problems that limit their capacity to work on a full-time basis, should benefit from a significantly increased federal Working Income Tax Benefit. The current benefit is a

144 See The Broadbent Institute, ibid.
good starting point, but is quite modest and phases out completely at low levels of employment income. Some provincial governments are increasing the minimum wage as one part of multifaceted Poverty Reduction Plans. Low wage work and unstable, precarious employment do not provide an adequate income to live on in most Canadian cities. The cost (and in some areas, limited access to public transit and the lack of affordable housing are additional stressors. Lack of leadership on these issues has been evident for some time. While they are not considered family policy issues, they do impact on the capacity to provide a stable home life and maintain an adequate standard of living.

5. Develop a multipronged approach to improve access to employment and assure decent jobs

The challenges of improving employment opportunities and the quality of jobs are formidable, but are crucial to reducing poverty and income inequality and, in the long term, to sustaining social cohesion. It is time to synthesize what has been learned to date, to identify policy options, and to consider new options. The recent report on Vulnerable Workers and Precarious Work by the Law Commission of Ontario provides a number of specific recommendations that could be replicated in other jurisdictions.

6. Strengthen the caregiving infrastructure, invest in health and long-term care

It is clear that Canada and its provincial/territorial governments must invest in the infrastructure that is needed to support an aging population and to address the goals evident in previous Health accords and policy documents. Home care services are currently not included as part of Canada’s health care system and have not been funded adequately. There is also no national Pharmacare program, which would reduce the high costs of medications for families without alternative coverage. Necessary supports for family caregivers include a) workplace supports that provide more flexibility to manage work and caregiving; b) improvements to current Compassionate Care Leave policies and benefits; c) financial support with out of pocket expenses, and community-based caregiver support services that provide information, emotional support, and assistance in accessing services. There are elements to build on, such as current leave policies and newly developed caregiver allowance/benefit policies in four provinces. Existing and new caregiver tax credits are available, but should be refundable. It is essential that the informal caregiver sector be sustained and supported.

7. Enhance support for intergenerational relations and for community programs

In Canada, there are few policies or programs that are specifically designed to support intergenerational relations, either within families or more broadly. One important area is evident in the range of programs that are currently being developed to support grand-
parents raising grandchildren (skipped generation families), many of whom consist of grandmothers with limited incomes raising grandchildren in challenging situations. Web-based resources are growing, including Cangrands, a non-profit, member-supported organization that provides information, resources and web-based and telephone support. Another example is provided by a website maintained by the Legal Services Society of British Columbia which provides information about legal issues pertaining to guardianship and custody, tax benefits and other sources of information and support. Several provincial governments have developed programs to support adoption and foster parent options by kin, particularly for Aboriginal children, in part to help repair intergenerational relations that were damaged by the widespread enforced use of residential schools.

An example of one intergenerational program designed to break down age-based stereotypes, improve physical and mental health, and give opportunities for young people to develop relationships with older adults through shared experiences is the Meadows School Project, developed in a rural BC community. The program, originally started in 2000, involved an immersion approach in which a grade 6 classroom was located in an assisted living facility for periods of five weeks in the fall term and again in May. The program was designed and implemented by an experienced teacher committed to community learning. Its success led to its selection as a showcase project at an international competition, and the development of resources and assistance for other communities interested in intergenerational practice.  

In addition, Aboriginal Head Start programs and other early childhood programs serving First Nations and other Aboriginal communities have recognized the importance of including elders in early childhood programs for the benefits it provides for the children, for the Elders, and for the community as a whole. Such programs honour the position of Elders in the community. Moreover, their participation helps maintain the culture and language in Aboriginal communities. 

8. Recognize the importance of addressing intergenerational inequity

Young adults are facing significant challenges. High levels of student debt, high housing costs, and difficulties finding employment as well as the prevalence of precarious work that pays low wages, offers few benefits, and does not lead to job security or career advancement are affecting couple formation, child bearing, and long-term economic prospects. It is critical that policymakers balance the needs and concerns of young adults


146 British Columbia Aboriginal Child Care Society (2014). ‘What you need to know about the inclusion of elders in early childhood development settings.’
along with those of boomers and seniors as a matter of intergenerational justice. Young adults’ success, economic well-being and engagement in our political processes are essential for social cohesion.

D. CONCLUSIONS

In his 2013 report on “Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon raises important questions about our responsibilities to future generations, and also affirms the fact that the sustainable development agenda and issues of intragenerational equity and justice are intertwined. Considerations about the fair and equitable distribution of benefits and opportunities are both practical and moral/ethical issues that raise profound questions about our responsibilities to each other. The opportunity to consider how intergenerational relations and social cohesion can be addressed on a national level provides an opportunity to examine the important levers available to bring about positive social change. Some of the levers and issues considered in this paper involve political, economic and institutional changes that are difficult to bring about and challenging to implement. In the meantime, the Secretary General reminds us that “Concern for future generations rests on an open and critical engagement with moral and ethical choices, carried out by informed stakeholders at all levels”. 147 It can also be nurtured through individual and collective actions in our families, communities and workplaces to value each other and contribute to our collective well-being.

7. Good Practices

A. Dealing with poverty through education

Official name of the Organization
Colegio Meyali

Website of the Organization
http://meyalli.com/

Aim of the practice
Working for women to acquire professional skills and a sense of life that allows them to transform themselves as well as the environment around them.

Target group of the practice
Girls

Name of the person who made the presentation
Luz Aspe de Artigas

Position in the Organization
President

B. Family orientation for teachers

Official name of the Organization
Instituto de Enlaces Educativos

Website of the Organization
http://www.enlace.edu.mx/
Aim of the practice
Educate teachers who, as part of their training, will educate their student’s parents, giving family orientation courses.

Target group of the practice
Teachers

Name of the person who made the presentation
Andrea Fernández Cueto

Position in the Organization
Director of Communication

C. FAMILY ENRICHMENT COURSES

Official name of the Organization
LAR (IFFD)

Website of the Organization
http://www.lar.org.mx/

Aim of the practice
Courses for parents designed to suit the different stages of child development and structured on the participant-based case study method.

Target group of the practice
Parents

Name of the person who made the presentation
Mario Armella

Position in the Organization
Secretary General
D. FAMILY JUSTICE CENTERS

Official name of the Organization
National Family Justice Center Alliance

Website of the Organization
http://www.familyjusticecenter.org/

Aim of the practice
Utilizing a network of onsite staff, national faculty and technical assistance providers, the Alliance provides training, planning, consulting and technical assistance to Family Justice Centers and family violence professionals throughout the world.

Target group of the practice
The Alliance develops innovative programs and tools, highlights best practices, spreads awareness, and supports professionals in serving family violence victims.

Name of the person who made the presentation
Clint Carney

Position in the Organization
Secretary and Board Member

E. RESEARCH PROGRAM

Official name of the Organization
The Vanier Institute of the Family

Website of the Organization
http://www.vanierinstitute.ca/

Aim of the practice
To explore key social, economic, cultural and environmental challenges and opportunities important to the well-being of Canadian families today, with a view to supporting the
development of effective action – “translating” and linking research findings into practice.

Target group of the practice
Experts and practitioners

Name of the person who made the presentation
Nora Spinks

Position in the Organization
CEO
8. PARTICIPANTS

A. EXPERTS

Mihaela Robila
Professor of Human Development and Family Studies at Queens College, City University of New York (CUNY). Her main scholarship areas are family policies, family relations in different cultures and international migration. She recently edited the ‘Handbook on Family Policies across the Globe’ (Springer, 2013) which provides a comprehensive review of family policies development, implementation and evaluation in 28 countries. She also Guest Edited a Special Issue for the Journal of Child and Family Studies on ‘Family Policies in International Perspectives’ (2012). In addition, Dr. Robila wrote a book on ‘Eastern European Immigrant Families’ (2010; Routledge), edited a book on ‘Families in Eastern Europe’ (2004; Elsevier), wrote several book chapters and numerous articles in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, and presented to over 70 national and international conferences. Her work has been supported by grants and contracts from the American Councils for International Education/ U.S. Dept. of State, Fulbright, Spencer Foundation, United Nations, Fahs-Beck Fund, Jacobs Foundation, and CUNY Research Foundation, among others. She is a National Council on Family Relations (NCFR) representative at the United Nations and a Fellow of the American Psychological Association Divisions 52 (International Psychology), 43 (Family Psychology), and 37 (Child and Family Policy).

Linda M. Burton
She is the James B. Duke Professor of Sociology at Duke University. She currently serves on the Editorial Board of the American Sociological Review and the Journal of Marriage and Family and was recently a member of the Committee on the Science of Research on Families for the Institute of Medicine, the Advisory Board of the National Center for Marriage and Family Research, the Board of Directors for the Family Process Institute, and the Board of Directors for the Council on Contemporary Families. In 2013 she was inducted into the Sociological Research Association (National Honor Society for Sociological Researchers) and is also a recipient of the Family Research Consortium IV Legacy Award and the American Family Therapy Academy Award for Innovative Contributions to Family Research. Dr. Burton directed the ethnographic component of Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study and is principal investigator of a multi-site team ethnographic study (Family Life Project) of poverty, family processes, and child development in six rural communities. Her research integrates ethnographic and demographic approaches and examines the roles that poverty and intergenerational family dynamics play in the intimate unions of low-income mothers and the accelerated life course transitions of children, adolescents, and adults in urban and rural families.
Bahira Sherif Trask
PhD., and a full Professor and Associate Chair of Human Development and Family Studies at the University of Delaware and a Policy Scientist in the Center for Community Research and Service. She holds a B.A. in Political Science from Yale University and a PhD in Cultural Anthropology from the University of Pennsylvania. Her research focuses on the intersection of globalization, gender, work and family in Western and non-Western contexts. Primarily she concentrates on economic changes, work and gender roles, and policies that can assist and strengthen low income families. She has authored and edited a number of books in this area including ‘Women, Work, and Globalization: Challenges and Opportunities’ (Routledge, 2014), ‘Globalization and Families: Accelerated Systemic Social Change’ (Springer, 2010), ‘Personal Relationships’ (Cognella, 2011), ‘Cultural Diversity and Families: Expanding Perspectives’ (Sage, 2007), and ‘The Greenwood Encyclopedia of Women’s Issues Worldwide’ (Greenwood, 2003). She has also served as the guest editor of various special edition journals on these issues. Dr. Trask has published over fifty peer-reviewed articles, chapters and review articles in significant journals, handbooks and edited works. Much of Dr. Trask’s scholarship has been informed through participation with a number of international, national and community based research projects that focus on diversity, gender and work, and strengthening low-income families. Her work has been funded by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Marguirite Casey Foundation, and various local community initiatives. Currently, she is involved with the Blueprints Initiative Delaware, a program funded through the Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh. Blueprints is a revitalization program that is supporting 8 low-income Delaware communities. Dr. Trask’s involvement on these projects reflects her belief that academics need to apply their knowledge towards bettering social conditions. She has published and spoken extensively on these topics in the United States, South America, and Europe, and has served as an expert witness and national commentator on challenges facing American families.

Bradford Wilcox
Director of the National Marriage Project at the University of Virginia, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Virginia, and a member of the James Madison Society at Princeton University. Brad Wilcox earned his undergraduate degree at the University of Virginia and his Ph.D. at Princeton University. Prior to coming to the University of Virginia, he held research fellowships at Princeton University, Yale University and the Brookings Institution. His research focuses on marriage, parenthood, and cohabitation, especially on the ways that marriage, gender, and culture influence the quality and stability of family life in the United States and around the globe. He is the coauthor of ‘Gender and Parenthood: Biological and Social Scientific Perspectives’ (Columbia, 2013, with Kathleen Kovner Kline), ‘Whither the Child? Causes and Consequences of Low Fertility’ (Paradigm, 2013, with Eric Kaufmann), and the author of ‘Soft Patriarchs, New Men: How

Donna Lero

Professor in Family Relations and Applied Nutrition at the University of Guelph and is the Jarislowsky Chair in Families and Work. She co-founded the University’s Centre for Families, Work and Well-Being, where she leads a program of research on public policies, workplace practices and community supports. She has authored or co-authored over 30 major reports and book chapters on a range of topics related to work and caregiving across the life course including parental leave, child care quality, parents of children with disabilities, and flexible work arrangements. Her recent research focuses on understanding Caregiving and Work from the perspectives of employees, employers and managers. Dr. Lero provides consultation and support through her role on task forces and advisory committees at the federal and provincial levels, and is well known as a speaker at national and international conferences, as well as regional employer roundtables. She co-edited the 2008 Handbook of Work-Family Integration: Research, Theory, and Best Practices and is currently working on a new book on Caregiving and Work.

Denise L. Spitzer

Canada Research Chair in Gender, Migration and Health at the University of Ottawa where she is an Associate Professor affiliated with the Institute of Women’s Studies and a Principal Scientist in the Institute of Population Health. In addition to undergraduate studies in Biology, Chinese Language, and Music, she holds a Master’s degree and doctorate in Anthropology from the University of Alberta, Canada. Dr. Spitzer is interested in examining how global processes —intersecting with gender, racialization, migration status and other social identifiers— are implicated in health and wellbeing. Her current program of research focuses on the impact of the global economy on immigrants, migrants and refugees in different parts of the globe and engages with critical perspectives of the body, transnationalism and constructions of identity; the impact of policy on health; community-based research and intersectional analysis. Professor Spitzer has published in journals such as Gender & Society, Medical Anthropology Quarterly, and the Canadian Journal of Public Health. Her edited collection, Engendering Migrant Health: Canadian Perspectives, was published by the University of Toronto Press in 2011 and was recognized by the Women’s and Gender Studies Association in 2013 with a WGSRF Outstanding Scholarship citation.
B. PRACTITIONERS

Clint Carney
Secretary and Board Member of the National Family Justice Center Alliance in San Diego, CA (USA).

Nora Spinks
CEO, The Vanier Institute of the Family.

Mario Armella
Founder and member of the Board of LAR, institution affiliated to IFFD (International Federation for Family Development).

Luz Aspe
President of Meyali School and President of ‘Educar’ (Mexico).

Andrea Fernández Cueto
Director of Communication of Instituto de Enlaces Educativos (Mexico).

C. OBSERVERS

Renata Kaczmarska
Focal Point on the Family in the Division for Social Policy and Development of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs since 2009.

Humberto Soto de la Rosa
Social Affairs Officer at the Social Development Unit of ECLAC’s Subregional Headquarters in Mexico.
Ignacio Socías
Director of Communication and International Relations of the International Federation for Family Development (IFFD).

Manuel Soto
Director of the World Youth Alliance for Latin America.

Al-Daana Al-Mulla
Third Secretary to the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations.

Fernando Rodríguez Doval
Federal Deputy of the 52th Legislature of the Mexican Congress representing the Federal District.
The twentieth anniversary of the International Year of the Family (2014) offers an opportunity to refocus on the role of families in development; take stock of recent trends in family policy development; share good practices in family policy making; review challenges faced by families worldwide and recommend solutions.

Owing to rapid socio-economic and demographic transformations, families find it more and more difficult to fulfil their numerous responsibilities. Many struggle to overcome poverty and adequately provide for the younger and older family members. It is also more and more difficult for them to reconcile work and family responsibilities and maintain the intergenerational bonds that sustained them in the past.

In response to these trends, the celebrations for this anniversary focus on exploring family-oriented policies and strategies aiming mainly at confronting family poverty; ensuring work-family balance and advancing social integration and intergenerational solidarity. The preparatory process has to accelerate progress in family policy development; demonstrate its relevance for overall development efforts and draw attention to the role of different stakeholders in achieving these goals.

As part of this process, the International Federation for Family Development, together with the United Nations Focal Point on the Family, organized a North American Expert Group Meeting in Mexico City (19-20 May 2014) in which experts, practitioners and observers from the three countries discussed about family-oriented policies and strategies aiming mainly at the topics suggested for this Anniversary.

The meeting was coordinated by the International Institute for Family Research - The Family Watch. This publication contains the main outcomes and documentation of it. All the information can also be found online at www.familyperspective.org.